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This thesis argues that UK deportation law exists in a state of tension. On the one hand, 
the political imperative to deport foreign national offenders, and on the other, to protect 
the human rights of children. The human rights of foreign national offender’s children, 
are protected in UK law by their right to family life (under Article 8 ECHR, 
domesticated by the Human Rights Act 1998), and their right to their best interests as 
a primary consideration, and not to be blamed for the wrongdoing of their parent 
(under Article 3 UNCRC, domesticated by s55 of the Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Act 2009). However, the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR may 
be interfered with on the basis of the public interest in deporting foreign national 
offenders. This tension in UK deportation law is evinced by the apparently 
irreconcilable characteristics of these legal obligations. This thesis theorises this by 
arguing that deportation decisions are polycentric in nature, because of the multiplicity 
of human rights and interests at stake and which must, by law, be given effect to. 
Furthermore, UK deportation law creates a plurality of decision-making norms; 
multiple legal principles which must also be given simultaneous effect to. This thesis 
traces the attempts of UK law to give effect to the best interests of the child in 
deportation decisions through three distinct phases of decision-making approach. It 
concludes that no deportation decision-making approach adopted to date has 
effectively reconciled the human rights obligations and the best interests of the child 
by resolving the problems of polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making 
norms. Finally, this thesis demonstrates that UK deportation law is capable of giving 
effect to the best interests of the child by taking the human rights of children both 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviated forms are used, except when used in quotations. Abbreviations are identified in 
text (except where in common usage) and presented here for reference. 
 
BCIA  Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 
Cafcass  Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service  
CIA  Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EEA  European Economic Area 
EU  European Union 
FNO  Foreign National Offender1 
HRA  Human Rights Act 1998 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
LJ  Lord Justice 
NIAA   Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
SSHD  Secretary of State for the Home Department 
UNCRC United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 




                                                          
1 I abbreviate ‘foreign national offender’ to FNO in this thesis with great reluctance. It further distances our 
conceptualisation of foreign national offenders from their being first and foremost individual human beings. 
Whilst ‘foreign national offender’ at least retains the virtue of being a descriptive category, ‘FNO’ is an 
administrative label with no inherent meaning. 
 
The use of ‘FNO’ also hides the essential ‘foreignness’ of those designated ‘foreign national offenders’, and 
thereby asks us to ignore the principle moral objection to deportation; that it is a discriminatory additional 
punishment which is visited solely on individuals who are ‘foreign’ (see inter alia: Daniel Kanstroom, 
‘Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases’ (2000) 
113 Harvard Law Review 1890; Victor S Navasky, ‘Deportation as Punishment’ (1959) 27 University of Kansas 
City Law Review 213). 
 
However, given the significant limitations on word count inherent to a PhD thesis, I have reluctantly taken the 
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1. Deportation Decisions, Human Rights, and the Best Interests of the Child 
This thesis investigates the best interests of the child in decisions about the deportation of 
foreign national offenders in the UK. A decade ago, in a 2008 review of the case law, the writer, 
campaigner and barrister Colin Yeo argued that, ‘In immigration law, children are neither seen 
nor heard.’2 This investigation concludes that although the best interests of the child are now 
seen and heard in UK deportation law, the law remains problematic for increasingly complex 
doctrinal legal reasons. This thesis unpacks and explains these doctrinal legal problems and 
traces their effect through three distinct chronological phases of UK deportation law since 2007. 
It also makes suggestion as to a solution. 
 When Yeo conducted his case law review, the UK had a reservation to the United 
Nations Convention to the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) which explicitly excluded the 
international legal obligations of that Convention to UK immigration law.3 Yeo argued that this 
reservation was the barrier in deportation law to effectively considering the human rights of 
children who were family members.4 UK deportation law was instead focused on the person of 
the foreign national offender: 
 
                                                          
2 Colin Yeo, ‘Protecting the Rights of Family Members’ (2008) 22 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Law 147, 150 
 
3 The reservation stated that, ‘The United Kingdom reserves the right to apply such legislation, in so far as it 
relates to the entry into, stay in and departure from the UK of those who do not have the right under the law of the 
UK to enter and remain in the UK, and to the acquisition and possession of citizenship, as it may deem necessary 
from time to time.’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘First Report: Foreign Policy and Human 
Rights’ (21 December 1998, HC 100-I – HC 100-III), Annex A 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/100/100ap32.htm> accessed 3 December 
2018) 
 




Like a well behaved ornamental cherry tree, we have been trained in certain 
directions. We focus on the human rights of the immigrant. We all but disregard the 
rights of family members who are more firmly rooted in the United Kingdom.5 
 
The UK Borders Act 2007 introduced provisions for ‘automatic deportation’; that any 
foreign national offender who had been sentenced to 12 months or more imprisonment was to 
be deemed automatically to be liable for deportation.6 Those liable for deportation are those 
who the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) has considered their presence in 
the UK ‘not conducive to the public good’.7 Yeo was writing after both the UK Borders Act 
2007, and the House of Lords case of Huang.8 In that case, the House of Lords found that the 
right to family life – in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
domesticated into the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) – required deportation decision-makers 
to make a fact specific decision as to the proportionality of the deportation of the foreign 
national offender (FNO) with the interference with the FNO’s family life. 
 This kind of decision – the importance of the public interest of deportation on the one 
hand, and the family life rights of the FNO on the other9 – fits well into a standard human rights 
framework. This standard framework relies on the metaphor of the merchant’s weighing scales, 
with two distinct sides to a human rights argument. Using the weighing scales metaphor, 
                                                          
5 Yeo (n2) 147 
 
6 UK Borders Act, s32(2) 
 
7 Immigration Act 1971, s3(5)(a) 
 
8 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167 
 
9 Article 8 ECHR: Right to respect for private and family life 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 




judges10 and scholars11 are able to think and talk in terms of a ‘balance’ that has to be struck 
between the human rights of the FNO, and the public interest in their deportation. The task of 
the deportation decision-maker is thereby to determine where the balance between these 
competing demands lies. 
 In chapter 2 of this thesis, I demonstrate that this focus accords with how FNOs are 
viewed in the public policy context. FNOs are presented in media and politics as individually 
responsible for their offending, that deportation should evidently follow, and that FNOs are 
‘manifest undesirables’;12 the epitome of the “bad migrant” paradigm.13  But this is not the only 
relevant public policy context. The child – a human individual under eighteen years old14  – is 
generally perceived as a special category of person who requires and deserves protection from 
and by the state. Therefore, when an FNO has a child (or children) who would be negatively 
affected by their deportation, this creates significant tension. The children of FNOs may be 
separated from the FNO if they remain in the UK after the FNOs deportation, or they may suffer 
‘constructive deportation’15 if they leave the UK with the FNO. In either case, research shows 
that the deportation of a parent causes children emotional distress and material hardship.16 From 
                                                          
10 For example, see: Keles v Germany App no 32231/02 (ECtHR, 27 October 2005), [55] 
 
11 Aharon Barak, ‘Proportionality (2)’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (First Edition, Oxford University Press 2012), 745 
  
12 Luke de Noronha, ‘Unpacking the Figure of the “Foreign Criminal”: Race, Gender and the Victim-Villain 
Binary’ (2015, Criminal Justice, Borders and Citizenship Research Paper No. 2600568) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2600568> accessed 13 September 2016, 1 
 
13 Melanie Griffiths, ‘The Convergence of the Criminal and the Foreigner in the Production of Citizenship’ in 
Bridget Anderson and Vanessa Hughes (eds), Citizenship and Its Others (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 
 
14 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Article 1 
 
15 Jacqueline Bhabha, ‘The “Mere Fortuity” of Birth? Are Children Citizens?’ (2004) 15 differences: A Journal 
of Feminist Cultural Studies 91, 100 
 
16 Kara Apland and Elizabeth Yarrow, ‘Children’s Voices: A Review of Evidence on the Subjective Wellbeing of 
Children Subject to Immigration Control in England’ <www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Voices-Immigration-Control-1.pdf> accessed 4 September 2018; Elaine Arnold, 
‘Separation and Loss Through Immigration of African Caribbean Women to the UK’ (2006) 8 Attachment & 
Human Development 159; Kalina M Brabeck, M Brinton Lykes and Rachel Hershberg, ‘Framing Immigration to 
and Deportation From the United States: Guatemalan and Salvadorian Families Make Meaning of Their 
6 
 
these public policy contexts, the law constructs a series of cognizable categories; the public 
interest in deportation, the FNO’s own human rights (which elicit little popular sympathy), and 
the human rights of the FNO’s children. This multiplicity of rights and interests (which in 
chapter 3 I label the polycentricity of deportation decisions) is made further complex when one 
also includes for consideration other adults who might be affected by the deportation of an 
FNO, such as the FNOs current partner, and any other caregivers to their children (who may or 
may not be the same person). Family life has, after all, a ‘diversity of forms’.17 Although this 
thesis is concerned with the best interests of the child in deportation decisions, the human rights 
of other adult family members should not be far from the reader’s peripheral vision. 
 What Yeo’s 2008 review could not have accounted for was a significant, later legal 
shift. In November 2008, the UK’s reservation to the UNCRC was withdrawn.18 In s55 of the 
Borders, Citizenship and Asylum Act 2009 (BCIA),19 the welfare of children was required to 
                                                          
Experiences’ (2011) 14 Community, Work & Family 275; Kalina M Brabeck, M Brinton Lykes and Cristina 
Hunter, ‘The Psychosocial Impact of Detention and Deportation on U.S. Migrant Children and Families’ (2014) 
84 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 496; Children’s Commissioner, ‘Skype Families: The Effects on 
Children of Being Separated from a Mum or Dad Because of Recent Immigration Rules’ 
<www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/SkypeFamilies-CCO.pdf> accessed 4 
September 2018; Patricia Cole and Amanda Perez, ‘A Guidepost to Shifting Sands: Child Well-Being and 
Immigration Policy’ (2018) 39 Zero to Three 33; Regina Day Langhout and others, ‘Statement on the Effects of 
Deportation and Forced Separation on Immigrants, Their Families, and Communities’ (2018) 62 American 
Journal of Community Psychology 3; Joanna Dreby, ‘The Burden of Deportation on Children in Mexican 
Immigrant Families’ (2012) 74 Journal of Marriage and Family 829; Joanna Dreby, ‘U.S. Immigration Policy and 
Family Separation: The Consequences for Children’s Well-Being’ (2015) 132 Social Science & Medicine 245; 
Megan Finno-Velasquez and others, ‘Heightened Immigration Enforcement and the Well-Being of Young 
Children in Immigrant Families: Early Childhood Program Responses’ (2018) 39 Zero to Three 27; Adrian 
Florido, ‘When Parents Face Deportation, Their Children’s Mental Health Suffers’ (NPR, 22 June 2016) 
<www.npr.org/2016/06/22/483129579/when-parents-face-deportation-their-childrens-mental-health-suffers> 
accessed 9 April 2018; Saira Grant and others, ‘Family Friendly? The Impact on Children of the Family Migration 
Rules: A Review of the Financial Requirements’ 
<www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/CCO-Family-Friendly-Report-
090915.pdf> accessed 7 June 2017; Jill D McLeigh, ‘How Do Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
Practices Affect the Mental Health of Children?’ (2010) 74 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 96; Fernando S 
Mendoza and others, ‘Immigration Policy: Valuing Children’ (2018) 18 Academic Pediatrics 723. 
 
17 Singh v Entry Clearance Officer New Delhi [2004] EWCA Civ 1075, [2005] QB 608, [72] 
 
18 Sandra Drew and Dragan Nastic, ‘The Immigration Reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
An Insuperable Difficulty No More’ (2009) 23 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 119 
 
19 Borders, Citizenship and Asylum Act 2009, s55: 




be considered by the SSHD in carrying out her immigration functions, including deportation 
decisions. After that date, UK courts increasingly found space to consider the human rights of 
children, both as a consequence of the s55 duty and because of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which was giving the welfare of children a role in decisions 
about the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR.20 In 2011, the Supreme Court in ZH 
(Tanzania) found that the s55 duty required more of the decision-maker in deportation cases 
than passively considering the welfare of children: 
 
In making the proportionality assessment under article 8, the best interests of the 
child must be a primary consideration. This means that they must be considered 
first. They can, of course, be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other 
considerations. In this case, the countervailing considerations were the need to 
maintain firm and fair immigration control, coupled with the mother's appalling 
immigration history and the precariousness of her position when family life was 
                                                          
(a) the functions mentioned in subsection (2) are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom, and 
(b) any services provided by another person pursuant to arrangements which are made by the Secretary 
of State and relate to the discharge of a function mentioned in subsection (2) are provided having regard 
to that need. 
 
(2) The functions referred to in subsection (1) are— 
 
(a) any function of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality; 
(b) any function conferred by or by virtue of the Immigration Acts on an immigration officer; 
(c) any general customs function of the Secretary of State; 
(d) any customs function conferred on a designated customs official. 
 
(3) A person exercising any of those functions must, in exercising the function, have regard to any guidance 
given to the person by the Secretary of State for the purpose of subsection (1). 
 
20 Üner v Netherlands App no 46410/99 (Grand Chamber, 18 October 2006); LD (Article 8 – best interests of 
child) Zimbabwe [2010] UKUT 278 (IAC), [2011] Imm AR 99; R (MXL) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2010] EWHC 2397 (Admin); R (TS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 




created. But, as the Tribunal rightly pointed out, the children were not to be blamed 
for that.21 
 
The logical consequence of this judgment, I argue in chapter 3, brought s55 BCIA much 
closer to the legal demands made by the ‘best interests of the child’ under Article 3 UNCRC.22 
However, how can the best interests of the child be weighed in a two-sided balance with the 
family life of the FNO, if the best interests of the child is to be considered first, and of primary 
importance? How can anything be balanced against the best interests of the child if the child 
should not be blamed for the actions of their parents?23 Do the child’s best interests exist inside 
the balance of the FNO’s family life rights but separate of it, or entirely outside the balance of 
their parent’s human rights claim? The metaphor of the balance seems to break down as being 
inadequate to contain all the relevant legal considerations. 
 Any investigation of the best interests of the child in deportation law immediately 
throws up these problems, and these are just the start. The reality of UK deportation law, with 
respect to the best interests of the child, is a complex knot of contradictions. This thesis 
therefore asks why and how UK law has found it difficult to give effect to the best interests of 
the child in deportation decisions. It is an exercise in finding, labelling, and untangling a series 
of threads which otherwise present an impenetrable knot. 
                                                          
21 ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 AC 166, [33] (emphasis 
added) 
 
22 UNCRC, Article 3: 
 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.  
 
23 Rosalind English, ‘Analysis: Children’s “Best Interests” and the Problem of Balance’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 
2 February 2011) <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/02/02/analysis-childrens-best-interests-prevail-in-




 This thesis does not just do this with respect to the legal framework for deportation 
current as of January 2019, introduced by s19 of the Immigration Act 2014 and subject to a 
settled interpretation by the October 2018 Supreme Court judgment in KO (Nigeria).24 The 
Immigration Act 2014 is not in fact analysed in depth until chapter 6. The reason for this is that 
although the 2014 Act represents a distinct statutory intervention into deportation law, it is one 
which sits within a longer legal conversation. I suggest that to understand precisely how and 
why deportation law as it presently stands in the UK is problematic – to the extent that one of 
the conclusions of this thesis is that s19, Immigration Act 2014 ought to be repealed and 
replaced – it must be placed in the context of the ad hoc layering of legal obligations in UK 
deportation law from at least the House of Lords case in Huang,25 mentioned above. 
 
2. The Thesis Outline 
Untangling the best interests of the child in UK deportation law requires this thesis to move 
forward in three stages. Stage one, encompassing chapters 2 and 3, identifies the political and 
legal context within which UK deportation law takes place. Chapter 3 seeks to make sense of 
the different, conflicting law relevant to deportation decisions in the UK – the Human Rights 
Act 1998, Article 8 ECHR, s55, BCIA, and Article 3 UNCRC – and explains why they are 
contradictory and apparently irreconcilable. Stage two, encompassing chapters 4 to 6, engages 
in a chronological review of UK deportation law. This helps illuminate how and why the legal 
obligations have arisen as they have, as well as providing insight as to why those obligations 
are, in practice, irreconcilable. Stage three, comprising chapter 7, suggests an alternative means 
by which the best interests of the child might be given effect in UK deportation law. This third 
stage is important because it evidences that it is not impossible to give effect to the best interests 
                                                          
24 KO (Nigeria) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53 
 
25 Huang (n8) 
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of the child in deportation decisions, but that UK law does not presently do so is because of the 
various choices about the law that have been made to date. 
 
2(a) Stage One 
The legal problem at the centre of this thesis occurs within the public policy contexts of 
deportation and the protection of children. Chapter 2 concludes that these public policy engines 
drive in different directions. One engine focuses on the foreign national offender as a “bad” 
migrant who must be deported, even to the exclusion of their human rights, whilst the other 
engine focuses on the child as a vulnerable and dependent individual who requires protection, 
including through heightened human rights protection. This presents a considerable tension 
where a child would be negatively affected by the deportation of an FNO. UK deportation law 
is a consequence of this tension; the creation of legal obligations which require and demand 
the deportation of the “bad” FNO, and at the same time legal obligations to protect the best 
interests of children as vulnerable individuals deserving of protection.  
Deportation from the UK is carried out under s3(5)(a), Immigration Act 1971 which 
provides the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) with the power to determine 
that the deportation of a person, other than a British citizen, is ‘conducive to the public good’. 
The deportation of a person from the UK may be conducive to the public good because of 
actions which have not been prosecuted26 or prosecuted but led to no conviction.27 However, 
criminal conviction is ‘the most common basis’28 for deportation to occur. This is not least 
because s32(2), UK Borders Act 2007 introduced a statutory presumption that the deportation 
                                                          
26 For example, Mahajna v Home Secretary (deportation hate speech - unacceptable behaviour) [2012] UKUT 
B1 (IAC), in which the SSHD sought deportation on the basis of accusations that Mahajna’s past history included 
instances of anti-Semitic speech and support for terrorism. 
 
27 For example, Farquharson (removal – proof of conduct) [2013] UKUT 00146 (IAC), in which Farquharson 
was on multiple occasions arrested or prosecuted for various offences, but never convicted. 
 




of foreign nationals sentenced to twelve months or more of imprisonment is conducive to the 
public good for the purposes of the 1971 Act. The UK Borders Act 2007 lists exceptions to 
deportation, including that deportation would breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee 
Convention,29 or the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings,30 or breach 
the rights of the individual under the ECHR.31  
In contrast to deportation, removal is not contingent on criminality32 and applies simply 
‘if the person requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but does not have it.’33 
Removal therefore applies to individuals who entered the UK without permission (known as 
leave to enter), or those who once had permission but have been refused, or failed to apply for, 
a further period (known as leave to remain). The effect of a deportation order is that it 
invalidates any extant leave to enter or remain,34 whereas a removal order applies only where 
there is no leave in the first place. In 2017, the Home Office enforced the removal or deportation 
of 12,321 individuals, of whom 5,835 (i.e. 47%) were deported.35  
As well as the distinction between removal and deportation, UK law distinguishes 
between EEA national36 offenders and non-EEA national offenders. The legal framework under 
which an EEA national offender can legally resist deportation is The Immigration (European 
                                                          
29 UK Border Act 2007, s33(2)(b) 
 
30 UK Border Act 2007, s33(6A) 
 
31 UK Border Act 2007, s33(2)(a) 
 
32 Although entry without leave or overstaying a period of leave is itself a criminal offence which may be 
prosecuted: Immigration Act 1971, s24 
 
33 Immigration Act 2014, s1 
 
34 Immigration Act 1971, 5(1) 
 
35 Home Office, ‘How Many People Are Detained or Returned?’ (21 March 2018) 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2017/how-many-people-
are-detained-or-returned> Accessed 13 April 2018 
 
36 An EEA national is someone who is not a British citizen but is otherwise a national of an EU member state, or 
of Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, or Switzerland (The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 




Economic Area) Regulations 2016.37 The deportation of non-EEA national offenders is 
governed by a different legal regime. However, despite the current differences in protections 
against deportation afforded to EEA and non-EEA nationals (an issue returned to in chapter 7), 
the post-Brexit immigration White Paper envisages that the deportation law regime which 
currently applies to non-EEA national offenders will also be applied to EEA national 
offenders.38  
This thesis is concerned with UK deportation law, as it applies to non-EEA national 
offenders. For simplicity, this thesis refers only to “foreign national offenders” (FNOs). Also 
for simplicity’s sake, “FNO” should be understood as covering any individual whose 
deportation is determined by the SSHD to be conducive to the public good under the 
Immigration Act 1971. Finally, this thesis is concerned with the appeals of FNOs based on their 
right (and the right of their family members) to family life under Article 8 ECHR.  
That deportation would breach the rights of an individual under the ECHR is a distinct 
ground of statutory appeal against deportation.39 The Human Rights Act 1998 is the ‘statutory 
domestication’40 of the ECHR, including Article 8, into UK law. As noted at the outset of this 
introduction, deportation decisions have been traditionally perceived as a conflict between the 
public interest in preventing crime and disorder (which is typically invoked in order to support 
the deportation of FNOs) and the right of the FNO to family life (typically invoked to resist 
deportation). This conflict is a reflection of the basic structure of the right to family life under 
Article 8 ECHR which recognises that everyone has the right to respect for their family life, 
but that it may also be interfered with in some circumstances. These circumstances include the 
                                                          
37 The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, regulations 23-28 
 
38 HM Government, ‘The UK’s Future Skills-Based Immigration System’ (December 2018, Cm 9722), 36  
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‘prevention of disorder or crime’, and a balance must be struck between this and the family life 
at stake, including the ‘best interests and well-being of the children’.41 Jacqueline Bhabha notes 
this two-dimensional, dichotomous conflict and its consequence that ‘Torn between the 
sovereign state’s prerogative to exercise border control and the human being’s right to respect 
for family life, courts have had difficulty reaching unanimity.’42  
However, the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR is not the only human rights 
regime which is applicable to UK deportation decisions. Recognising that children have 
independent human rights and interests – indeed, their best interests – at stake in deportation 
decisions is a recently new development. Until recently, children were ‘considered appendages 
and possession of others’.43 Legal recognition of the best interests of the child has developed 
slowly with a crucial turning point occurring in 1989 with the adoption internationally of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). In Article 3(1), the UNCRC 
states that ‘the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’.44 However, only in 
2009 was the SSHD placed under a duty, in s55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration 
Act 2009 (BCIA), to ‘safeguard and promote the welfare of children’45 in deportation (and 
other immigration) decisions. In a series of judgments, UK courts have effectively collapsed 
any distinction in language, meaning, interpretation, or approach between s55 BCIA and 
Article 3 UNCRC.46 
                                                          
41 Üner v Netherlands (n20) [58] 
 
42 Jacqueline Bhabha, Child Migration & Human Rights in a Global Age (Princeton University Press 2014), 48 
 
43 ibid 3 
 
44 UNCRC, Article 3: 
 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.  
 
45 The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, s55 
 
46 Relying on the ‘spirit’ of the international obligation (ZH (Tanzania) (n21) [23]), the statutory guidance (R (TS) 
(n21) [31-32, 35]), and the similarity of outcome (JO and Others (section 55 duty) Nigeria [2014] UKUT 517 
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Lastly, the Immigration Act 2014 most recently applies to deportation appeals. The 
deportation provisions therein where designed, according to the government, to codify the 
Article 8 ECHR case law47 and in so doing ‘give a policy steer to the courts and tribunals’,48 
whilst limiting questions as to the proportionality of individual decisions with human rights 
obligations to within the scope of the application of pre-determined rules.49 This new, statutory 
intervention into deportation law is an unusual, if not unique, example of Parliament dictating 
how human rights provisions ought to be interpreted.50 
It is these overlapping legal principles which are central to this thesis. They can be 
summarised as comprising the following propositions: 
 
 That the best interests of the child are an ‘integral’ part of the right to family life under 
Article 8 ECHR; 
 That the best interests of the child ought to be a primary consideration; that it ought to 
be considered separately and of no less inherent weight than other considerations (and 
preferably temporally first in the decision-making process); 
 That the child should not be ‘blamed’ for the moral failings of their parent, including 
that they have offended. Therefore only rights-based considerations ought to be 
balanced against the best interests of the child; 
                                                          
(IAC), [6]). See also: Jane Fortin, ‘Are Children’s Best Interests Really Best? ZH (Tanzania) (FC) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department’ (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 947, 952 
 
47 Home Office, ‘Immigration Bill: European Convention on Human Rights Memorandum by the Home Office’ 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249270/Imm
igration_Bill_-_ECHR_memo.pdf> accessed 9 May 2018 
 





50 Bernard McCloskey, ‘Human Rights, Governments and Judicial Independence’ [2012] European Human Rights 
Law Review 478, 487 
15 
 
 That the legitimate aims for interfering with the right to family life include the 
maintenance of immigration control and preventing crime and disorder, including by 
the deportation of foreign national offenders in order to incapacitate, deter, and to 
communicate society’s opprobrium for criminal offending. 
 
In chapter 3, I establish the authority for each of the above principles of UK deportation 
law. I argue in this thesis that these legal demands have been introduced as an ad hoc layering 
of legal demands consequent to the UK’s international legal obligations under Article 3 
UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR. These have been domesticated into UK law in such a way that 
inconsistent legal principles must be given effect to simultaneously, and within a decision-
making framework which is unable to effectively accommodate them.  
These legal principles, and the problems that they create in reconciling them, go far 
beyond simply what weight the best interests of the child ought to have in the deportation 
decision-making process. Instead, the problems arise because the best interests of the child 
appear to demand to be treated both inside and outside the assessment of proportionality; as an 
‘integral’ aspect of the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise, but also treated as a separate 
consideration, that comes temporally first and has primary status. The best interests of the child 
requires to be treated both as part of the balancing scales and to break them. The difficulty that 
UK deportation law has faced is in finding a means by which both are possible. 
 In chapter 3, I argue that there are two theoretical problems which can be disentangled 
from these legal demands and I label these the problems of polycentricity and the plurality of 
decision-making norms. Polycentricity refers to the fact that where the deportation of a foreign 
national offender affects their child or children, multiple human rights and interests are at stake. 
Both the foreign national offender and their children (and additionally any partners/spouses or 
other relations) have family life rights that are engaged by the threatened deportation and each 
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can claim that their rights ought to be the centre of the human rights enquiry. At the same time, 
each child has their best interests to be considered and which is to be given primacy. Finally, 
there is a public interest in deportation so as to prevent crime and disorder and maintain 
immigration controls.  
The plurality of decision-making norms relates to the different formal legal 
requirements of Article 8 ECHR (domesticated by the HRA) and Article 3 UNCRC 
(domesticated by s55, BCIA). Whereas Article 8 ECHR requires a simple balance between the 
family life and the public interest, Article 3 UNCRC demands that the best interests of the child 
be a primary consideration and that only rights-based considerations may be balanced against 
the best interests of the child. Separately and individually, polycentricity and the plurality of 
decision-making norms may be resolved relatively simply, at least in theory. However, because 
Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC must be applied simultaneously in UK deportation 
decisions, the two issues therefore appear simultaneously and must be resolved together. It is 
in having to coherently apply both Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR simultaneously that 
the issues arise. 
 
2(b) Stage Two 
The second stage of this thesis is to trace the implications of this layering of separate but 
concurrent legal demands arising from Article 8 ECHR/HRA and Article 3 UNCRC/s55 BCIA. 
I trace this through three distinct approaches adopted by UK deportation law; (a) that of a 
“simple balancing approach” after the House of Lords decision in Huang,51 (b) that of a 
“modified balancing approach” after the Supreme Court judgment in ZH (Tanzania),52 and (c) 
an “exception approach” after the Immigration Act 2014. I identify throughout how the 
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problems of polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms are persistent throughout 
each of these approaches and how these theoretical perspectives explain why each approach 
has found it difficult to give effect to the best interests of the child in UK deportation law.  
The “simple balancing approach” to deportation decision-making, is evident in UK 
deportation law after the 2007 House of Lords authority of Huang53 and is explored in detail 
in chapter 4. It is a decision-making approach that uses the familiar metaphor of a balance 
between two competing principles; in the case of deportation, the right to family life against 
the public interest in deporting the FNO. The decision in Huang required, for the first time, UK 
decision-makers to undertake a fact-sensitive proportionality exercise in deportation cases,54 
guided by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).55 Such guidance 
is found in the ECtHR case of Üner56 in which the ECtHR states that it will consider a range 
of principles in deportation cases which come before it. I argue that this “simple balancing 
approach” consists of the subsuming of the best interests of the child into an assessment of 
family life as a right that is commonly-held by the family unit, rather than an approach which 
views family life or the best interests of the child as being individual rights. In addition, family 
life in the ECtHR deportation case law is determined with reference to how the decision-maker 
assesses the value of family life and the gravity of interference with family life by deportation. 
I argue that consequentially the “simple balancing approach” side-lines the best interests of the 
child (and is therefore not polycentric in character) and furthermore does not give effect to the 
aspects of the best interests of the child which give rise to the plurality of decision-making 
norms. 
                                                          
53 Huang (n8) 
 
54 ibid [20] 
 
55 ibid [18] 
 




Chapter 5 examines the seminal UK Supreme Court case of ZH (Tanzania). I argue that 
the approach taken in this case was an attempt to modify the balancing approach to family life 
by bolting-on the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration. 
This is therefore a “modified balancing approach”. In so doing, the court chose from a range 
of different viable options to interpret the best interests of the child in deportation decisions. 
However, the court was either unaware of, or ignored, the inherent theoretical difficulties of 
creating a solution which effectively incorporates Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR into 
UK law in a way that gives effect to the polycentric nature of the human rights issue of 
deportation and to the plurality of decision-making norms inherent therein. The court provided 
no explanation as to the relationship between the family life and the separate, first, and primary 
consideration of the best interests of the child. Nor did it resolve the mutually exclusive 
requirements that the best interests of the child must not be outweighed by non-rights-based 
considerations, yet non-rights-based considerations are a relevant and necessary consideration 
under Article 8 ECHR. 
 Chapter 6 examines a third approach which is based around statutory exceptions to 
deportation. The Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria)57 found that the Immigration Act 2014 created 
exceptions to deportation, including on the basis that the effect of deportation on certain 
‘qualifying’ children is unduly harsh. However, I also argue that this “exception approach” is 
not polycentric because it excludes the best interests of some children entirely where they do 
not qualify for the exception, and those children which do qualify do not have their best 
interests considered. Nor does the exception approach resolve the plurality of decision-making 
norms because the best interests of the child are weighed against non-rights-based 
considerations. The “exception approach” is therefore in many ways the worst of all worlds. 
 
                                                          
57 KO (Nigeria) (n24) 
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2(c) Stage Three 
In the final stage, comprising chapter 7, I suggest an alternative means by which to formulate 
UK deportation law in a way that would resolve the difficulties that I have argued UK 
deportation law has thus far faced. It rejects the premise of the solutions in previous chapters 
that family life and the best interests of the child ought to be reconciled in one decision which 
balances the right and interests of all individuals against the deportation of the FNO. This 
rejection requires the repeal of s19, Immigration Act 2014, because the Act is itself an attempt 
to create one decision-making process which accommodates all the human rights and interests 
relevant to deportation decisions. Instead, I propose that UK law must begin with the premise 
that the best interests of the child is a human right in and of itself. Only rights-based 
considerations may be used by the state to justify an interference. Deportation must rationally 
protect the rights of others, and it must be necessary for such protection. Only then may 
deportation be balanced against the best interests of the child. I label this as the “human rights 
approach”. 
 This stage three exercise is important because it evidences that it is not impossible to 
give effect to the best interests of the child in deportation decisions. By evidencing the existence 
of a rational, coherent alternative to the approaches to deportation decisions which have thus 
far been devised in UK deportation law, I seek to demonstrate that the contradictory nature of 
Article 8 ECHR/HRA and Article 3 UNCRC/s55 BCIA is not inevitable. Instead, it is a product 
of choices that have underplayed the transformative impact that the principle of the best 
interests of the child might have on UK deportation law.  
 
3. The Importance and Original Contribution of this Thesis 
The importance of this enquiry can be appreciated by both positivists and non-positivists. For 
the positivist, this enquiry matters because it is about how to make two positive law 
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requirements work together. If they do not, or cannot, then there must be some way to decide 
which should have priority because the positive law cannot exist in a state of cognitive 
dissonance whereby it remains committed to two equally important, but mutually inconsistent, 
legal rules. This points to the need for law reform in order to resolve this tension. For non-
positivists, the importance of this thesis stems from the high stakes in deportation decisions 
and the importance of deportation decisions to the lives of those affected, particularly to the 
children of FNOs. The way in which decisions are made, whose rights and interests are central 
to the decision-making process, and the order in which those interests are considered, all 
influence the outcome of a deportation decision.  
Academic interest in the development of the best interests of the child in the broader 
immigration context has been limited; and even more limited in the specific area of deportation. 
Some articles have described how the decision of ZH (Tanzania)58 – the first Supreme Court 
decision which dealt with what s55 BCIA require of decision-makers – sought to incorporate 
the best interests of the child as a primary consideration into the Article 8 ECHR aspects of 
immigration decision making.59 However, few have interrogated how the best interests of the 
child can be rationally incorporated into the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise, as this thesis 
does. Jane Fortin is one of the few who have interrogated the decision in ZH (Tanzania) in 
greater depth, and she found that it is based on ‘distinctions [which] are subtle and may be 
difficult to maintain’,60 but does not expand on this conclusion. Beyond the Supreme Court 
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decision in ZH (Tanzania), academic interest in the best interests of the child in the broader 
immigration context has been limited. Devyani Prabhat and Jessica Hambly investigated the 
impact of the best interests of the child on nationality decisions and they concluded that 
although the ‘law on the books fully supports the welfare of children in all instances’61 the law 
in practice restricted the role of a best interests assessment both by ignoring wider social 
relationships created by children, and by ignoring the positive benefits of obtaining British 
nationality.62 
 Because UK deportation law is an under-researched area in the academic literature, I 
make three original and interlinked contributions to knowledge. The first is to identify, on a 
theoretical basis, why the best interests of the child present a problem of coherency to UK 
deportation law. Disentangling and the problems of polycentricity and the plurality of decision-
making norms is this first contribution. The second contribution is to trace three distinct 
approaches the best interests of the child in UK deportation law; (a) that of a “simple balancing 
approach” (b) that of a “modified balancing approach” and (c) an “exception approach”. I 
further identify how the problems of polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms 
are persistent throughout each of these approaches and how these theoretical perspectives 
explain why each approach has found it difficult to give effect to the best interests of the child. 
My third contribution is, at chapter 7, a suggestion as to how UK deportation law might be 
formulated in a way that would resolve this difficulty. 
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Public policy pulls the decision-maker in competing directions in deportation cases. On one 
hand the foreign national offender (FNO) is cast as a “bad” migrant whose deportation is in the 
public good, and on the other hand is the innocent and vulnerable child who requires protection. 
When these tensions are replicated in the legal obligations under which deportation decision-
makers must operate, it creates a tension in the law; one that this thesis demonstrates has been 
difficult for the courts to accommodate. This chapter outlines these competing public policy 
demands. 
Deportation as a social policy tool arose in the 1960s as a means by which to distinguish 
the “good” immigrant and the “bad” FNO.63 Deportation policy has continued to develop 
through the lens of the “bad” FNO and restrictions on the ability of FNOs to claim human rights 
protections against deportation have been central to government policy in this area.64 This is 
the subject of part 1 of this chapter. Part 2 observes that at the same time, public policy has 
sought to protect children. Children have been constructed in the popular and legal imagination 
as vulnerable and in need of protection. This has resulted in greater legal protection for the 
rights of children, including that their best interests ought to be a primary consideration in 
decisions which affect them.65 This part addresses what the best interests of the child 
substantively means. The subject of this thesis is how the best interests of the child ought to be 
accommodated within the deportation decision-making process, rather than what aspects of a 
child’s circumstances ought to be considered as comprising the best interests of the child. 
However, this part demonstrates that the ‘best interests of the child’ is generally understood to 
encompass the physical and emotional welfare of children.  
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Part 3 shows that the best interests of the child is context specific and how the best 
interests of the child ought to be protected in deportation decisions is therefore not 
predetermined. This is evident from sentencing law and from family law, where the best 
interests of the child play substantially different roles. Deportation decisions are not thereby 
bound by pre-existing patterns of decision-making and the application of the best interests of 
the child to deportation decisions must be devised from first principles. 
This chapter is part of the key as to why it has been difficult for UK deportation law to 
give effect to the best interests of the child. The public policy demands pull decision-makers 
in two different directions between deporting FNOs, as “bad” migrants, and protecting the 
vulnerable and innocent child. In chapter 3, it becomes clear that these competing public policy 
demands have become central aspects of the UK’s deportation law; the law replicates the public 
policy conflict described here. 
 
2. The Public Policy Impetus for the Deportation of Foreign National Offenders 
Two public policy themes regarding the deportation of FNOs are clearly established in the 
literature. The first is that the development of deportation law in the UK arose from (perceived) 
crisis and, yet, deportation as a public policy tool has become normalised.66 The second theme 
is that policy has focused on the FNO and on distinguishing them as “bad” migrants in contrast 
to desirable “good” migrants.67 These themes can be identified clearly in the history of UK 
deportation law. 
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 The ‘first modern legislation’68 which permitted the expulsion of foreign nationals was 
the Aliens Act 1905. This allowed the Secretary of State to require a foreign national to leave 
the UK if they have been convicted of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment without 
the option of a fine, or other listed (mainly prostitution) offences.69 However, the provisions 
for expulsion were mainly ‘symbolic’70 and expulsion was used only ‘occasionally’ and to 
‘execute de facto extraditions’ of those fleeing prosecution or punishment for crimes 
committed abroad, rather than as a consequence of offences committed in the UK.71 Likewise, 
the Aliens Order 1920 permitted deportation of those whose presence was not conducive to the 
public good, but ‘deportation was still rarely used’.72 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 ‘transformed’ the previous relationship 
between the British metropole and its colonial subjects.73 It was ‘the starting point in a process, 
culminating in [the Immigration Act] 1971, that would extend provisions of aliens’ legislation 
to Commonwealth citizens.’74 It was the CIA itself that extended the provisions of deportation 
from applying solely to ‘aliens’ (through the Aliens Act 1905) to encompass Commonwealth 
nationals. Both contemporary75 and later76 academic commentary agree that the CIA 
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represented a watershed moment when the deportation of foreign national offenders 
transformed from a mainly symbolic idea into a concerted legal and policy reality.  
The CIA was as a response to what the public in the 1950s increasingly viewed as a crisis 
of immigrant criminality.77 Although the British government had been considering introducing 
deportation powers throughout the 1950s78 the crisis point arose as a result of the Notting Hill 
race riots of 1958.79 Initially, post-entry powers of deportation were promoted as a means of 
forestalling pre-entry immigration restrictions:  
 
The rationale was that deporting a small group of Commonwealth immigrants 
(i.e., convicted criminals) would salvage the rights of others, dichotomizing 
“good” and “bad” immigrants and keeping the right of entry open.80 
  
However, deportation swiftly became an embedded facet of the UK’s immigration control 
and, ‘by the 1960s, deportation was increasingly used as a complement to restrict entry rather 
than as a substitute for it.’81 The Parliamentary debates surrounding the deportation powers in 
the CIA indicated that the powers were intended by Parliament to be ‘used sparingly, for the 
protection of the community, as a penalty for serious crime.’82 Nevertheless the courts 
developed broader distinctions between ‘desirable and undesirable residents […] policing the 
boundaries between different types of migrants: the incorrigible criminal versus the legitimate 
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laborer.’83 Thus the law reflected and supported popular notions of the “good” immigrant, and 
the “bad” FNO. Deportation powers were ‘incrementally strengthened’ throughout the 1960s.84 
The Immigration Act 1971 conferred a wide discretion on the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (SSHD) to determine that the deportation of a person, other than a British Citizen, 
is ‘conducive to the public good’.85 
 After a period of low public salience of immigration issues in the 1980s and 1990s,86 
deportation again came to public and political prominence in 2006 as a result of crisis. 1,023 
foreign national offenders were released at the end of their custodial sentence between February 
1999 and March 2006 without being considered for deportation.87 Subsequent ‘populist 
agitation’88 led to legislative changes.  The scandal had arisen as a consequence of the SSHD’s 
failure to take positive action to decide whether an individual FNO’s deportation was in the 
public good and that a deportation order should follow. As a direct immediate consequence, the 
Immigration Rules were amended,89 and the UK Borders Act 2007 created, so as to remove the 
SSHD's discretion as to whether to seek deportation.90 The UK Borders Act 2007 is scaffolded 
onto the legislative framework for deportation in the Immigration Act 1971. Whereas s3(5)(a) 
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of the Immigration Act 1971 provide that ‘A person who is not a British citizen is liable to 
deportation from the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State deems his deportation to be 
conducive to the public good’, s32 of the UK Border Act 2007 creates a statutory presumption 
that deportation is conducive to the public good if an FNO has been sentenced to ‘a period of 
imprisonment of at least 12 months’91 or convicted of, and imprisoned for, certain offences 
considered by the SSHD to be particularly serious.92 This statutory presumption remains in 
force. 
The response to the foreign national prisoners scandal by both the government and the 
opposition presupposed that deportation ought to be a standard consequence of offending, 
regardless of whether the initial prison sentence was sufficient rehabilitation and/or deterrent.93 
An emphasis on deportation also reflected the Labour government’s policy framework whereby 
the immigration system ought to reward “good” immigrants, with citizenship as the ultimate 
reward.94 When immigration status is made conditional on integration and good behaviour, 
FNOs must be treated particularly harshly by the immigration system as a consequence of their 
offending. As both offenders and foreigners, FNOs are viewed popularly and in public policy 
as ‘particularly undeserving of sympathy because they have betrayed the hospitality of the 
society’.95 The intersection of being both foreign and offenders meant that FNOs are 
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constructed in the public policy imagination as being ‘fundamentally unwelcome and always, 
already, potentially dangerous.’96 
 The post-2010 Conservative governments sought to further normalise deportation and 
to restrict the recourse to human rights law by FNOs. The government sought to restrict the 
right to family life of FNOs, and of their children and families, through new Immigration Rules 
in July 2012 and through the Immigration Act 2014.97 The government felt that it lacked control 
over the outcomes of deportation appeals, resulting from a ‘public policy vacuum’ and a 
‘democratic deficit’.98 It is clear that the government, led by Theresa May (first as SSHD and 
then as Prime Minister) saw human rights claims to family life as a barrier to deporting all 
FNOs. In her 2011 party conference speech, May announced that, ‘we need to make sure that 
we’re not constrained from removing foreign nationals who, in all sanity, should have no right 
to be here.’99 In lauding the ‘deport now, appeal later’ powers (since found to be unlawful)100 
the Immigration Minister stated that, ‘the new powers have seen a number of criminals 
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deported despite having family members in the UK’.101 Family life, including with children, 
was not to be protected where it was disruptive of deportation as a normalised consequence of 
a foreign national’s conviction. 
Thus as a means of pursuing its political agenda, the government introduced new 
immigration rules in July 2012 to ‘embed within the rules the Secretary of State’s interpretation 
of Article 8 ECHR.’102 This interpretation of Article 8 ECHR weighted the proportionality 
balance ‘firmly on the side of removal and deportation.’103 It did so by limiting relief from 
deportation where a child of an FNO is either a British Citizen or resident in the UK for seven 
years, and that ‘it would be unduly harsh for the child to live in the country to which the person 
is to be deported and ‘unduly harsh for the child to remain the UK without the person who is 
to be deported’.104 Outside of these situations, only if ‘there are very compelling circumstances’ 
would a deportation order be cancelled.105 
However, it was apparent that ‘strong factual cases which would previously have been 
allowed under the application Article 8 ECHR would fall outside what was provided for by the 
Immigration Rules.’106 The Court of Appeal responded by finding space within the Immigration 
Rules formulation that ‘the public interest in deportation will only be outweighed by other 
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factors where there are very compelling circumstances’107 for authority to continue to conduct 
‘a proportionality test as required by the Strasbourg jurisprudence.’108  
Despite the SSHD’s position in litigation in which ‘[counsel for the SSHD] has made it 
clear on behalf of the Secretary of State that the new rules do not herald a restoration of the 
exceptionality test’,109 in the political sphere the SSHD chose to interpret the decision in MF 
(Nigeria) as the judges ignoring Parliament110 and instead pursued her agenda through primary 
legislation; in the form of the Immigration Act 2014, which is examined in depth in chapter 6. 
 Katherine Otto has noted that the number of successful Article 8 ECHR family life 
appeals against deportation was already small, and was decreasing, between 2010 and the first 
major legislative effort by the Conservative government to restrict successful family life 
appeals in 2012.111 Otto concluded that the government’s programme was ‘overblown and 
unnecessary’.112 In 2017, 5,835 FNOs were deported from the UK, of whom 1,954 (33%) were 
non-EU nationals.113  
The effect of these two themes – crisis to normalisation, and the distinction between 
“good” migrants and “bad” FNOs – is that there is limited space in the public policy 
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imagination for consideration of children who are caught up within, and negatively affected 
by, the deportation of a parent. The public policy focus (and as this thesis demonstrates, the 
legal focus) is on the FNO and therefore on their status as “bad” migrants to be deported. This 
focus obscures from consideration the children of FNOs – who may themselves be British 
citizens – and obscures the children’s essential innocence of the activity which has caused their 
parent to be labelled a “bad” migrant. The normalisation of deportation results in the effect of 
deportation on children also being normalised; the normal collateral consequence of the 
offending by the adult foreign national offender. Thus Lord Justice Sedley observed in one case 
that ‘this family, short-lived as it has been, will be broken up for ever because of the appellant's 
bad behaviour. That is what deportation does.’114 
When deportation and the effects of deportation on children is normalised as the effects 
of ‘what deportation does’, the negative effects on children which most frequently accompany 
the deportation of a parent become insufficient to require remedial attention. Only effects 
which are unusually harsh will then suffice to justify relief from deportation. This thesis finds 
that a focus on the FNO at the centre of the deportation enquiry results in the law finding it 
difficult to give effect to the best interests of the child. 
 
3. The Best Interests of the Child as Public Policy Aim 
The public policy demands for deportation, explored above, limit the space for human rights-
based arguments in favour of FNOs. However, children are generally perceived in public policy 
context as a special category of person who require and deserve protection, both from and by 
the state. This pulls public policy in a different direction to the public policy on deportation 
which perceives children and family life as barriers to deportation. The public policy impetus 
to protect children is important because it fundamentally reformulates the human rights 
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problem of deportation away from a two-dimensional problem of balance solely as between 
the FNO and the public interest, and towards a polycentric problem which requires a 
polycentric solution. 
 In part 2(a), I describe how the child is constructed in public policy as vulnerable and 
dependent and how this conception of children grounds their legal protection. In part 2(b) I 
summarise the evidence as to the effect of deportation on children; that children will typically 
experience some form of emotional distress and/or material hardship as a result of the 
deportation of a parent. In part 2(c) I describe how the concept of the best interests of the child 
has been substantively understood. The best interests of the child clearly includes 
considerations of the child’s emotional wellbeing and life opportunities. The best interests of 
the child also include continuity of care and stability of life circumstances as being good in and 
of themselves; things which are clearly interrupted by the deportation of a parent. Finally, in 
part 2(d) I demonstrate that the way in which the best interests of the child is given legal effect 
in different areas of domestic law is not pre-determined, and that different areas of law have 
pursued different approaches to the best interests of the child. I examine briefly the 
paramountcy principle in family law and the limited footprint of the best interests of the child 
in sentencing law. I conclude that there is no single methodological means for giving effect to 
the best interests of the child in legal decisions affecting children. The implication is that the 
way in which the best interests of the child is given effect in deportation law is not constrained 
by prior patterns of incorporation. This thesis will explore in further chapters the choices that 
have been made in different phases of UK deportation law, and suggest a means of altering 






3(a) The Child as Vulnerable and Dependent 
Children are positioned in the public policy imagination as being vulnerable and dependent. 
The vulnerability of children makes them dependent on adult care, but their dependence also 
makes them vulnerable:  
 
Children are profoundly dependent on others for their well-being, because they 
cannot meet their own needs (emotional, physical, developmental), or negotiate 
the obstacles in the social world in such a way that their needs will be met. They 
are also (for this reason) profoundly vulnerable to the decisions of others.115 
 
Recognising the dependence and vulnerability of children legitimises the placing of legal 
demands on both parents and the state to safeguard the welfare of children. As King and Piper 
argue, if children require adult care then they are also: 
 
…the recipients of parental (or adult) responsibilities, the object of parental 
duties. It is their welfare that must always be given the first and paramount 
consideration; it is their development that must be safeguarded by the law116 
 
 Thus the ‘welfare principle’ – that the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration – was advanced in family law decisions in the nineteenth century and gradually 
displaced the absolute rights of fathers.117 The Children Act 1989 puts the welfare principle at 
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the heart of UK family law.118  Choudhry and Herring argue that the welfare principle is well 
understood by the public and forces parents to put children’s welfare at the heart of their dispute 
resolution, rather than their own individual rights.119  
 As well as justifying the domestic legal schema of family law, governed by the welfare 
principle, the vulnerability of the child has been used to justify human rights standards in 
international law. The 1924 League of Nations Declaration and 1959 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of the Child both emphasised a child’s protection needs, rather than the child’s 
autonomy. Other instruments which relate to the rights of the child are also aimed at the 
protection of children in circumstances as diverse as the workplace and warzone, and when 
they are vulnerable to specific abuses such as trafficking.120 In the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of the Child the child is solely ‘an object of concern’121 and paragraph 3 of the preamble 
reinforces the perception of the vulnerable child underpinning the rationale for the Declaration, 
declaring the need for the child’s special protection ‘by reason of his physical and mental 
immaturity.’122 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is similarly justified. 
The preamble ‘reaffirms that children, because of their vulnerability, need special 
protection.’123  
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 However, there has been a significant shift from an approach which protects children’s 
welfare as being solely the object of obligations on parents or the state, to one which recognises 
that children possess individual human rights.124 The best interests of the child have been 
recognised by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child as being a human right.125 The 
elevation of the best interests of the child to the status of a human right is important because, 
although children are considered to be vulnerable and dependent, assigning human rights to 
children signifies that they have moral status as individual human beings. Because children are 
recognised as individual human beings with human rights, it is recognised that their human 
rights may or may not be coincident with their parent’s interests.126 
   
3(b) The Effect of Deportation on Children 
Given the widespread recognition of children as vulnerable it is alarming that there is a dearth 
of evidence about the effect of the deportation of parents on children, and that it is an under 
researched area.127 From what is known about deportation and about other forced separations 
of parents and children it is clear that, because of their dependence and vulnerability, children 
are particularly susceptible to negative welfare outcomes arising from the deportation of their 
parents. Research in the United States suggests that two of the biggest impacts on children 
arising from the deportation of a parent are emotional distress128 and financial disadvantage.129 
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A wider US study which included the effects of immigration detention found negative reactions 
amongst children including changes to eating and sleeping, crying and feeling afraid, anxiety, 
withdrawal and clinginess. 130 Although many negative effects reduced over the nine months 
of the research, other effects such as withdrawnness and aggression increased during the 
research period.131 The same research recorded a larger number of negative experiences 
amongst those children who were separated for longer periods, and amongst older age 
groups.132  
Research on the effect of deportation on children in the UK is less well established.133 
Research134 on behalf of the Children’s Commissioner for England showed results similar to 
the outcomes in US research. It showed that family separation caused by immigration issues 
led to both financial disadvantage and emotional distress: 
 
The main impacts on children emerged due to separation from a parent, as well as 
children internalising and reacting to their parents’ anxiety and stress. Parents also 
reported that they found it more difficult to mediate and resolve their child’s 
emotional and developmental needs due to separation from a partner.135 
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 Clearly the effects of deportation on most children is that of emotional distress, material 
disadvantage, and hindered development. These aggregated findings, however, inevitably 
mask a wide variety of responses by children which are impacted by their resilience. Resilience 
is itself an aspect of child development and is not pre-determined by the child’s age.136 Thus 
one can say that children are generally at risk of having their best interests substantially 
impaired by the deportation of a foreign national offender parent, but that the impact on 
individual children will be fact-specific. 
 Instead of separation from the deported parent, the child may be subject to de facto or 
constructive deportation; ‘If a young child’s parents are forced to leave a country, so in effect 
is the child.’137 This may occur regardless of any leave to remain in the UK – or the right to 
abode of British citizen children – possessed by the child. Residence in the UK affects a range 
of the child’s interests including ‘life expectancy, their physical and psychological 
development, their material prospects, their general standard of living.’138 Residence in the UK 
is also connected to identity, as Lady Hale observed: 
 
They will lose the advantages of growing up and being educated in their own 
country, their own culture and their own language. They will have lost all this when 
they come back as adults.139 
 
 This observation does not just apply to those children who are legally British citizens, 
but also theoretically to those who identify as British or -British because of their upbringing 
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and cultural exposure. The deportation of an FNO parent therefore can negatively affect a 
child’s welfare, identity, and development. All of these are encompassed by the principle of 
‘the best interests of the child’. What factors go into the decision as to what is in the best 
interests of the child will undoubtedly have an impact on the outcome of individual cases. 
However, my argument is that if ‘the best interests of the child’ is not given proper 
methodological consideration in deportation decisions then an outcome which supports the best 
interests of the child is less likely to emerge, regardless of what contextual factors the court 
considers.  
For the purpose of this thesis I therefore do not propose to develop or defend a specific 
checklist of factors which must go into the best interests of the child. It is enough to show that 
those aspects of the best interests of the child which are negatively affected by the deportation 
of a parent are generally considered to be fundamental aspects of the best interests of the child. 
The deportation of an FNO parent may impair a child’s identity, family ties and connections, 
physical, emotional, and material needs, and support for the child’s development.140 All of 
these factors are also explicitly or implicitly contained in three prominent checklists of factors 
relevant to the best interests of the child; the UK family law ‘welfare checklist’141 (s1(3) 
Children Act 1989), the Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment 14 on the 
right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration,142 and in the 
BIC-Model, created by academic Margrite Kalverboer and colleagues.143 Table 1 identifies the 
                                                          
140 HM Government, ‘Every Child Matters’ (Cm 5860, 2003)  
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272064/5860.pdf> accessed 23 March 
2018 
 
141 Jonathan Herring, Family Law (Eighth Edition, Pearson 2017), 535 
 
142 General Comment No. 14 (2013) (n125) 
 
143 Margrite Kalverboer and others, ‘The Best Interests of the Child in Cases of Migration: Assessing and 
Determining the Best Interests of the Child in Migration Procedures’ (2017) 25 International Journal of Children’s 




factors included in, and excluded from, each of these. Each checklist comprises different 
factors, and each checklist and their sources use different language and their categorisations 
give different levels of specificity. As a consequence, whether any one term used in any one 
checklist is sufficient to implicitly encompass that in another is open to debate. For example, 
the BIC-model factor of ‘To have an example (behavioural, cultural etc) set by the child’s 
parent(s)’ is marked in Table 1 as being implicitly contained within the welfare checklist’s 
factors of ‘child’s emotional needs’ and/or the ‘Capability of the child’s parents at meeting the 
child’s needs’. To argue this definitively is not the purpose of this thesis, and reasonable 
commentators may disagree with my coding. However, the comparison of checklists in Table 
1 is sufficient, I suggest, to establish the point relevant to this thesis; that there is some 
agreement as to the core content of the best interests of the child, and that the negative effects 






























Wishes, feelings, or views of the child Explicit Explicit Explicit 
Health and physical wellbeing Explicit Explicit Explicit 
Safe physical environment (immediate 
and wider) 
Explicit Explicit Explicit 
Relationship of mutual affection with 
parent(s) or care-givers(s) 
Explicit Implicit Implicit 
Supportive, flexible parenting structure Explicit Absent Absent 
To have an example (behavioural, cultural 
etc) set by the child’s parent(s) 
Explicit Implicit Implicit 
To have an example (behavioural, cultural 
etc) set by the wider community 
Explicit Implicit Implicit 
Interest in the child shown by parent(s) Explicit Implicit Implicit 
Continuity in upbringing and care Explicit Explicit Explicit 
Stability in life circumstances Explicit Explicit Explicit 
Education Explicit Explicit Explicit 
Social network (including peers and 
friends) 
Explicit Explicit Implicit 
Capability of the child’s parent(s) to meet 
the child’s needs 
Implicit Explicit Explicit 
Consideration of individual 
characteristics (eg age, sex, religion, 
cultural background) 
Absent Explicit Explicit 
The child’s identity Absent Explicit Implicit 
 
Table 1: Factors contained in the ‘best interests of the child’ in three different checklists 
 
The absence of an agreed checklist of factors relevant to the best interests of the child 
can be perceived positively or negatively. The Committee on the Rights of the Child argue that 
the best interests of the child is a context specific and ‘dynamic’144 principle, whereas Mnookin 
argues that the best interests principle is ‘indeterminate’, value-driven,145 and prone to 
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inconsistent decision-making.146 Because the checklists do vary in their inclusions, level of 
specificity, and emphasis, the adoption of one or other of these checklists will have an effect 
on individual deportation decisions. I recognise the value of creating a context specific and 
context appropriate list of factors to assist deportation decision-makers in their assessment of 
the best interests of the child. However, this is a different enquiry to the one that this thesis 
undertakes, and one that I argue must be determined separately to it. 
In this thesis I argue that there is considerable legal confusion as to role that the ‘best 
interests of the child’ plays within deportation decisions in UK law. The consequence of this 
confusion, as I show in chapters 4-7, is that the best interests of the child are effectively 
excluded or side-lined from deportation decisions which affect children. An agreed checklist 
of factors comprising the best interests of the child cannot, no matter how empirically or 
theoretically sound it is, give effective protection to the best interests of the child if the best 
interests of the child is overall excluded or side-lined from deportation decisions. 
 
3(c) How to give effect to the best interests of the child is not pre-determined (I) 
As an aspect of decision-making, the way in which the best interests of the child is given effect 
in different legal decisions is not consistent. Two factors of particular importance account for 
this diversity of legal treatment. First, the way in which the best interests of the child has, or 
has not, been domesticated into UK law. Rather than direct incorporation of Article 3 UNCRC 
into UK law as a form of constitutional principle, the best interests of the child appears 
piecemeal in different parts of UK law.147 Secondly, different areas of UK law have developed 
different cultural and political assumptions which either animate a child-centred jurisprudence 
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or restrict the space for such a jurisprudence to develop. Both factors are evident from a short 
survey of UK family law (part 2(c)(i)) and sentencing law (part 2(c)(ii)). 
 
3(c)(i) Family law 
Family law promotes the best interests of the child through the welfare principle, found in 
s1(1), Children Act 1989.148 The welfare principle treats the welfare of the child as paramount, 
so that ‘the child’s welfare automatically prevails over the right of other family members’149 or 
otherwise ‘determinative’.150 Family law is directed to a statutory checklist of relevant factors, 
the ‘welfare checklist’151  in s1(3), Children Act 1989.152 Furthermore, there is a common law 
presumption that children should be brought up by a parent and that ‘maintaining current 
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arrangements (the status quo) and contact with the non-residential parent are each in the 
children’s best interests.’153 
The relationship between the welfare principle and the right to family life and other 
ECHR rights is much debated.154 In Choudhry and Fenwick’s analysis the welfare principle 
has been ‘reconfigured’155 so as to be made a legitimate aim for an interference with Article 8 
ECHR. Thus the family life between parent and child ‘ought not to be gratuitously interfered 
with and which, if interfered with at all, ought to be so only if the welfare of the child dictates 
it.’156 The best interests of the child thus, ‘becomes an automatic justification within Article 
8(2) [ECHR]’.157 The family courts have thereby maintained the welfare principle’s status as 
automatically prevailing over other rights and the family courts have taken the view that if 
decisions meet the best interests of the child then they also fulfil the requirements of Article 8 
ECHR.158 
However, the kind of rights conflict that arises in family law do not map precisely onto 
the deportation context. In the kind of family law cases where the family life of the parent 
and/or child may be interfered with in order to further the best interests of the child, the state 
possesses the role of neutral arbiter (for example in custody disputes between parents).159 
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Alternatively, the state instigates the interference, but for the purpose of furthering the child’s 
best interests (for example in proceedings to take the child into care). In these cases the state is 
pursuing the private interests of the child, on behalf of the child, rather than a general public 
interest which is at odds with the best interests of the child. 
 In contrast, in deportation, the interference by the state is for a public policy reason that 
is independent from the child’s best interests; i.e. the public interest in preventing crime and 
disorder by deporting the FNO parent. The child’s best interests may ultimately be served by 
the deportation (e.g. where the FNO presents a risk to the child) but this is an ancillary benefit 
to the public interest championed by the state. In most cases, the best interests of the child are 
invoked in order to prevent the deportation of the FNO. In family law care proceedings, the 
conflict is whether the child’s best interests are best served by their continued relationship with 
the parent. The state pursues the course of action which is in the child’s best interests (even 
where this may interfere with rights to family life), whereas in deportation the state pursues 
deportation as a course of which may not be in the best interests of the child. 
 These kinds of family law decisions present a classic conflict of rights situation; the 
right to family life versus the welfare rights of the child. The rights conflict in deportation cases 
are, however, of a different character because the interference of a human right (the right to 
family life) is for a public interest (in deportation). The place of the best interests of the child 
within this balance is what gives deportation its polycentric nature – as explored in chapter 3 – 
and is at the heart of the problem which this thesis explores. 
 
3(c)(ii) Sentencing law 
Sentencing convicted offenders is another area of domestic law where the best interests of 
children should arguably be a central issue. Sentencing is not just one phenomenon and 
encompasses a number of different situations; including in what sentence to impose; what 
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contact arrangements should be permitted; and, accommodation should be made in a mother 
and baby unit. In contrast to family law, the sentencing of convicted offenders with children 
presents a problem more similar to the deportation of FNOs in that, as Lady Hale observed in 
P & Ors: 
 
A more complex dilemma has been created, in which there are a number of interests 
to be balanced: those of the state in the proper management of prisons, of the 
mothers in their family life, and of the children in the protection, not only of their 
family life but also of their best interests.160 
 
However, neither the right to family life nor the best interests of the child are established 
principles within sentencing law. Ashworth identifies the suffering of the family of the 
incarcerated to be considered a normal consequence of imprisonment,161 consistent with the 
general assumption that prison and its consequences are ‘natural’162 and an ‘inevitable and 
permanent feature of our social lives.’163 The normalisation of the separation of prisoners from 
their families is paralleled in the normalisation of deportation. Both are considered to be a 
natural facet of state power and in both cases, this means that, as Dembour argues with respect 
to immigration law, ‘European Convention law has nothing to say about the way in which […] 
laws force many families to live in a condition of dislocation’.164 
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Ashworth gives examples of mothers and fathers having prison sentences reduced or 
suspended ‘in order for them to look after young children’,165 but there are inconsistencies in 
approach.166 For example, in Bishop the judge relied on Article 8 ECHR, finding that: 
 
…a sentencing judge should […] have at the forefront of his or her mind the 
consequences for children if their sole carer is sent to prison and consider whether 
on balance to seriousness of the offence or offences justifies the separation of child 
and carer.167 
 
However, this provides no indication as to the relative weight to be given to either factor. 
It is also apt to provide little relief to offender parents where a judge considers the impact on 
children and family to be a normal consequence of imprisonment. Although Bishop invoked 
the ECHR, both Ashworth and Easton identify ‘mercy’ as the underlying discourse in most 
cases.168 However, a discourse of mercy does not change the unyielding focus on the offender; 
mercy is granted to the offender alone, or at best, co-identifies the child with their offender 
parent. Mercy is also discretionary, whereas s55, BCIA requires that the best interests of the 
child be considered to be an independent human right that must be given primary status.169 As 
a human right, the child affected by the deportation of an FNO parent can always require the 
                                                          
165 Ashworth (n161) 187 
 
166 Christine Piper, ‘Should Impact Constitute Mitigation?: Structured Discretion Versus Mercy’ [2007] Criminal 
Law Review 141, 145. Inconsistency of approach is also identified in Susan Easton, ‘Dangerous Waters: Taking 
Into Account of Impact in Sentencing’ [2008] Criminal Law Review 105, 112 
 
167 R v Bishop [2011] EWCA Crim 1446, [9] 
 
168 Ashworth (n161) 187; Easton (n166) 105. Both argue that the courts should develop consistent principles of 
adjudication to the issue. 
 




decision-maker to give effect to their best interests, whereas under a discretionary process of 
mercy the child has no means to affect the outcome of the sentencing decision. 
The question of accommodation in a mother and baby unit has, in P & Ors, attracted most 
authoritative judicial guidance which engages the best interests of the child. Lady Hale 
identified three competing aims that the prison service must balance when determining whether 
to accommodate together, and for how long, a mother and child; 
 
a) the necessary restrictions on liberty arising from the mother’s imprisonment; 
b) the good order and discipline within the prison; and, 
c) the welfare of the child, taking into account; the extent of the harm of separation; 
the extent of harm of remaining in a prison environment; the quality of alternative 
childcare arrangements.170 
 
Accommodation together in a mother and baby unit parallels with constructive removal, 
and the separation of mothers from children by imprisonment parallels with parent-child 
separation children caused by the deportation of a parent. In both mother and baby units and 
constructive deportation, the question is whether the child should be required to share the 
parent’s position of exile (either their exile from “mainstream society” whilst in prison, or exile 
from the UK through deportation to another state).171 Both present a dilemma as to whether the 
child’s best interests are better served through maintaining parental contact despite this being 
in a state of exile, or through relieving the child of the burdens of exile despite the separation 
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from the parent. Likewise, there are parallels between the parent-child separation caused by not 
accommodating in a mother and baby unit172 and deportation of an FNO parent, because either 
may lead to parent-child separation. As highlighted in the previous part, the best interests of the 
child are not necessarily protected simply by the presence of an alternative caregiver, nor are 
parent-child relationships immune from significant damage from prolonged separation. 
However, a direct transposition of this decision-making methodology to deportation is 
inapt. The question of access to mother and baby units is one about how a sentence should be 
served, rather than whether a custodial sentence should be served at all. Transposition of this 
decision-making methodology would presuppose the deportation of the FNO because the 
decision about accommodation in mother and baby units cannot relieve the parent of their 
incarcerated status. As such, the decision is about what is in the child’s best interests given the 
parent’s imprisonment as a starting and unchangeable pre-condition. In contrast, even where 
deportation decisions presuppose deportation to be the normal consequence of a foreign 
national’s offending, the deportation order itself can be lifted, unlike the mother’s prison 
sentence. 
 
3(c)(iii) How to give effect to the best interests of the child is not pre-determined (II) 
Neither family law nor sentencing law present precise analogies to deportation and both have 
different approaches to the best interests of the child. In many aspects of family law the best 
interest of the child are paramount; ‘children's welfare trumps and outweighs all other 
considerations; no other interests or values may affect the decision; children's interests are the 
only ones that count.’173 In sentencing law, the best interests of the child may be promoted only 
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within a nebulous understanding of ‘mercy’, or in decisions about mother and baby unit 
accommodation as one of a co-equal factors to be balanced alongside the mother’s family life 
and the needs of prison discipline. One can argue that the difference of treatment of the best 
interests of the child is due to the different cultural assumptions about what are the natural, 
unremarkable consequences of divorce and prison, or to the difference in statutory context 
within which the best interests of the child are present (or absent) in the two areas of law, or 
both. 
Deportation is sui generis in its combination of origin (offending and conviction), 
causes (state action), effects (either separation of child and parent or the constructive 
deportation of the child), and the consequence of decision-making (that the underlying cause, 
deportation, is precluded). However, what the case studies of family and sentencing law 
demonstrate is that the way in which the best interests of the child is given effect, and should 
be given effect, is different in different areas of law. This is consistent with the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child observation that the best interests of the child both context specific and 
‘dynamic’.174 Therefore the way in which the best interest of the child ought to be given effect 
in deportation decisions is neither pre-determined nor bound by pre-existing patterns of 
incorporation. In evaluating the way in which UK deportation law has given effect to the best 
interests of the child, this thesis is guided by the nature of deportation and by the specific legal 
context in which deportation exists. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The public policy context of this thesis evinces a core tension between deportation on the one 
hand, and the protection of children on the other. The deportation of FNOs has become a 
                                                          




normalised tool of public policy to deal with what are perceived to be particularly “bad”, 
“undeserving”, or “unwanted” migrants. Legal changes have focussed on a desire to deport 
more FNOs and to reduce barriers to deportation. On the other hand, children are constructed 
in the public policy imagination as vulnerable and dependent and therefore appropriate objects 
of legal protection, including through the extension of specific human rights protections such 
as found in the principle of the best interests of the child. Tension between these two public 
policy strands occurs when the deportation of a FNO results in some kind of harm to the child’s 
best interests. The available evidence strongly suggests that deportation does have negative 
effects on children, particularly in exposing them to emotional distress and financial 
disadvantage.  
Finally, in this chapter I also demonstrated that the legal responses to the best interests 
of the child are different in different areas of law. Short case studies of family law and 
sentencing law demonstrate that the best interests of the child may be incorporated into UK 
law in different ways depending on the context in which it is applied. This implies that the way 
in which the best interests of the child ought to be considered in deportation law is not 
predetermined by previous patterns of incorporation but instead is specific to the context of 
deportation law. This also means that there is space for alternative decision-making approaches 
to give effect to the best interests of the child in deportation decisions; space which I use in 
chapter 7 to suggest a means by which to resolve the problems identified in this thesis. 
In chapter 3, I outline the legal context of the deportation of FNOs and illustrate that 
the public policy tension between deportation and the protection of child in repeated in UK 
law. This tension manifests between the legal imperative to deport, and the legal command to 
give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. The focus on both the FNO and on 
the child is what I describe as giving deportation its polycentric nature. Chapters 4-6 of this 
thesis are therefore concerned with how UK law has attempted to address this tension. 
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In the previous chapter, I described how the public policy context in which deportation operates 
appears to pull in two competing directions; a public interest in deporting FNOs, and the 
protection of children as vulnerable and deserving objects of protection. In this chapter, I argue 
that the UK’s legal obligations also pull decision-makers in deportation cases in two competing 
directions between the deportation of FNOs and the protection of children. The first direction 
is that of the right to family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). This protects family life, but is subject to a public interest limitation under which the 
deportation of FNOs may be justified as preventing crime and disorder. The second direction 
is presented by Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC), under which the best interests of the child must be treated as a human right with a 
primary status. This chapter argues that these two human rights regimes create two inter-linked 
issues with which UK law must grapple; issues which I label as that of polycentricity and of 
the plurality of decision-making norms. 
 UK law must grapple with applying Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC because 
both have been domesticated into UK deportation law.175 The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 
require public authorities (including the Home Office and the Immigration Tribunals) to act 
compatibly with Convention rights,176 including Article 8 ECHR,177 and to take into account 
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the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).178 This has been 
emphasised in the immigration context by Lord Bingham in Huang.179  
The domestication of Article 3 UNCRC in to UK immigration law is more circuitous. 
From the UK’s ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) on 16 December 1991 the UK had a treaty reservation to the effect that the 
Convention was not to apply to the regulation of immigration.180  Article 3 UNCRC requires 
that: 
 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
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However, the reservation was withdrawn in November 2008 and as a direct result,181 
Parliament enacted s55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act (BCIA) 2009.  This 
requires that the Secretary of State must ensure that her immigration powers (including over 
deportation) are ‘discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of 
children who are in the United Kingdom’.182  
However, notwithstanding the textual differences, UK courts have drawn an equivalence 
between s55 BCIA and Article 3 UNCRC; effectively collapsing any distinction in language, 
meaning, interpretation, or approach. Different reasons have been advanced for this. Lady Hale 
in ZH (Tanzania) relied on the ‘spirit’ of the UK’s international obligations, finding that Article 
3 UNCRC, ‘is a binding obligation in international law, and the spirit, if not the precise 
language, has also been translated into our national law.’183 In R (TS),184 Mr Justice Wyn 
Williams found that the statutory guidance185 required the use of the UNCRC as an interpretive 
tool for correctly understanding the s55 duty186 and, moreover, that ‘the statutory guidance 
intends that when a decision maker is having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the 
welfare of a child he is for all practical purposes also having regard to the best interests of the 
child.’187 In JO (Nigeria), the Upper Tribunal relied on the similarity of substance and outcome: 
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In the field of immigration, therefore, the enactment of section 55 discharges an 
international law obligation of the UK Government.  While section 55 and Article 
3(1) of the UNCRC are couched in different terms, there may not be any major 
difference between them in substance, as the decided cases have shown.188 
 
 In public international law terms, “incorporation” may not be the correct description of 
what has occurred and instead this thesis prefers “domestication”.189 Whatever term is used to 
describe the precise relationship between Article 8 ECHR and the HRA, and between Article 
3 UNCRC and s55 BCIA, UK courts have undoubtedly understood UK law in the context of, 
and based its substantive decisions on, the international law. Although the issues addressed in 
this thesis arise from the application of international legal obligations, because of their 
domestication it remains an issue that is distinctly one of UK law. Therefore the purpose of this 
chapter is to explain the difficulty that UK law has encountered in giving effect to the best 
interests of the child in deportation decisions and I argue that this is because the legal 
obligations to the best interests of the child and to family life are ill-matching when they are 
required to be applied simultaneously in UK deportation law.  
 Parts 1 and 2 of this chapter disentangle polycentricity and the plurality of decision-
making norms from the dual requirements of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC, as 
domesticated into UK deportation law. Polycentricity refers to the fact that where an FNOs 
deportation affects their child or children, multiple rights and interests are at stake. Both the 
FNO and their children (and additionally any partners/spouses or other relations) have family 
life rights that are engaged by the threatened deportation and each can claim that their rights 
ought to be the centre of the human rights enquiry. At the same time, each child has their best 
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interests to be considered, which are to be given primacy. Finally, there is a public interest in 
deportation so as to prevent crime and disorder and maintain immigration controls. 
 The plurality of decision-making norms relates to the different formal legal 
requirements of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. Whereas Article 8 ECHR requires a 
simple balance between the family life and the public interest, Article 3 UNCRC demands that 
the best interests of the child be a primary consideration and that only rights-based 
considerations may be balanced against the best interests of the child. 
 Separately and individually polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms 
may be resolved relatively simply, at least in theory. However, because Article 8 ECHR and 
Article 3 UNCRC must be applied simultaneously in UK deportation decisions, the two issues 
must be resolved together. It is in having to coherently apply both Article 3 UNCRC and Article 
8 ECHR simultaneously that the issues arise. Part 1 of this chapter is therefore about 
polycentricity and part 2 is about the plurality of decision-making norms. In each I explain in 
full how these issues emerge from Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. In part 3, I explain 
how the compound nature of the issues arises and how this makes the coherent resolution of 
both issues problematic on a theoretical and practical basis. 
 Finally, throughout the chapter I will use a fictional example of a family affected by the 
deportation of an FNO parent in order to explicate the issues addressed. I will introduce this 
fictional family and their circumstances when they appear in part 1. Part 1 also identifies a core 
theoretical distinction between human rights and interests which underpins some of the analysis 
of the application in UK law of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. 
 
2. Polycentricity: Deportation Decisions Engage Multiple Rights and Interests 
This part argues that deportation cases involving children exhibit polycentricity. Deportation 
engages the human rights of many individuals. The FNO is to be deported, but their deportation 
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also affects their family members – their spouse/partner and children – whose life 
circumstances will be altered either by their own constructive deportation or by the enforced 
absence of the FNO. Each individual has a right to family life (Article 8 ECHR) and each child 
has a right to have their best interests considered as a primary consideration (Article 3 
UNCRC). Moreover, each can claim to be a direct and primary victim of the human rights 
interference. 
 Following the claim, made in the previous part, that Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 
UNCRC have been domesticated into UK immigration law (through the HRA and s55, BCIA 
respectively), for simplicity, this chapter will refer simply to legal obligations arising from 
Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. This should be understood as referring to UK legal 
obligations, except where it is contextually clear otherwise.  
 The answer to the question as to whose rights are at stake in deportation decisions is 
that the human rights of each individual in the family is at stake; the rights issue is therefore 
polycentric. In contrast, to view the rights problem of deportation through the lens of only one 
rights holder affects our perception of the act of deportation. I have suggested that when public 
policy focuses on the FNO as a “bad” migrant it obscures the children of FNOs who are 
innocent of their parent’s offending. This replicates itself in legal discourse. As Yeo observed, 
to focus on the human rights of the foreign national offender invites us to disregard the rights 
of other family members.190 The lens through which we view family life can therefore 
fundamentally alter our perception. For example, an FNO who has entered into a ‘precarious’ 
relationship will frequently find their Article 8 ECHR claim to be dismissed. Yet ‘a child 
cannot be accused of entering into a relationship with his or her parent in the knowledge that 
their immigration status was precarious’.191 
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 Polycentricity therefore requires the decision-maker to take seriously the individual 
rights claims of all the different individuals within a family affected by deportation. To explore 
this problem, I enlist the assistance of a fictional, but representative family. In our fictional 
family, ‘Marcus’ is a national of Freedonia. In the UK he committed a criminal offence and the 
Home Office seeks his deportation. Marcus is in a relationship with ‘Samira’, also a Freedonian 
national and lawfully resident in the UK. Together they have a child (Adam) who is a 
Freedonian national. Marcus is therefore the biological, social, and resident parent of Adam. 
Samira has a second child (Bryony) from a previous relationship with a British national. 
Because of the British nationality of Bryony’s father (but with whom Bryony has no contact), 
Bryony is British. Marcus is the social and resident parent of Bryony, although he is not the 
biological parent. Finally, Marcus also had a previous relationship with a British national, 
‘Sharon’. Marcus and Sharon had a child (Claude) who is a British national by virtue of 
Sharon’s nationality. Marcus is the social, biological, but not resident father of Claude. We can 
create a visualisation of these interconnected relationships by listing out the relevant 
individuals: 
 
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)   
       Bryony (Child)  
    Sharon (Ex-Partner)   Claude (Child) 
 
Engaging with different individual rights claims requires the decision-maker to engage 
with the different factual matrices which are relevant to each claim. Differences between a 
parent and child’s (inter alia) nationality, length of residence, language spoken and caring 
relationships with extended family, present different relevant factual matrices for assessing the 
proportionality of deportation. Balanced against the human rights of individuals is the public 
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interest in deportation. A deportation decision will exhibit polycentricity if it takes into account 
all of these separate human rights and interests, and gives them the status appropriate to their 
being rights or interests (i.e. does not treat a mere interest as a right, or treat a right as a mere 
interest). I expand on the distinction between human rights and interests in part 1(a), below. 
I argue that deportation decisions are polycentric because deportation interferes with 
the rights of multiple individual rights holders whose factual circumstances are different in 
relevant ways, but whose cases are inextricably interlinked. The problem is polycentric 
because each rights holder is affected directly by the rights interference and each rights holder 
has an equal claim to be a direct, primary victim of the interference, and because the public 
interest in deportation is argued in some of the deportation case law to be centrally relevant to 
the human rights question in deportation cases. 
This part (at 2(a)) expands on and defends an interest theory of human rights and the 
distinction between human rights and interests. Part 2(b) observes that the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child establishes the best interests of the child in Article 3 UNCRC as a human 
right. Part 2(c)(i) establishes that the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR is a right that is 
held ‘by everyone’ and that this includes children. Part 2(c)(ii) examines the nature of the public 
interest in deportation. Part 2(d) concludes the part and explains how its polycentric nature 
distinguishes deportation from other kinds of human rights questions. 
 
2(a) Distinguishing between human rights and interests 
The analysis in this part, and the evaluation in following parts which flows from it, rests on an 
interest theory of human rights. I argue from the perspective of an interest theory of human 
rights that posits that human rights law protect interests. Where an interest is protected as a 
human right it may only be interfered with if the interference serves a legitimate aim, where 
the interference rationally contributes to the legitimate aim, is necessary, and is proportionate 
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to the aim pursued. These legal tests must be met in order that an interference with a right is 
lawful. Subjecting an interference to these tests gives the human right a presumption of 
priority;192 enjoyment of the right is presumed, unless the tests are met so as to permit 
interference. Human rights are special because the presumption of priority applies exclusively 
human rights, and to no other form of legal right (such as contractual rights) or interest. 
 Not all interests are protected by corresponding human rights. However, these interests 
do not simply disappear from the decision-making process but exist independently, either as 
an individual’s interests, or the public interest. What distinguishes interests from human rights 
is that interests do not have the legal protection of the presumption of priority. An interest may 
be interfered with lawfully by the state without the interference needing to pass any of the tests 
inherent to the presumption of priority; that the interference serves a legitimate aim, that the 
interference rationally contributes to the legitimate aim, is necessary, and is proportionate to 
the aim pursued. 
Therefore, where the law demands that an interest be protected by a human right, to 
treat it as a mere interest devalues it. Similarly, to fail to have consideration of any specific 
interest that constitutes a human right leads to that protected interest being ignored. The public 
interest in deportation is also a form of interest which is intrinsic to the balancing exercise but 
its essential nature as a mere interest, distinguishes it from the nature of human rights. The 
difference in nature between interests protected as a human right and mere interests is essential 
to polycentricity because it is essential not to treat a mere interest as a human right, or treat a 
human right as a mere interest as each have different modes of legal protection.  
Distinguishing between human rights and interests is important for evaluating whether 
the reconciliation of the requirements of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC in UK 
deportation decisions is effective. If it is the human rights of the child at stake the presumption 
                                                          
192 Jack Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights (Croom Helm 1985), 5 
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of priority holds, whereas if they are merely the interests of the child then they are more likely 
to be subsumed into the rights of others. However, to treat the rights of the child as a mere 
interest devalues the protection afforded to the best interests of the child at stake in deportation 
decisions. Finally, distinguishing between human rights and interests is also important to part 
3(b)(ii) of this chapter as Article 3 UNCRC distinguishes between rights-based and non-rights-
based reasons for interfering with the best interests of the child. 
In the debate between the interest theory of rights and the will (also known as the agency 
or choice) theories of human rights,193 I argue that people, fundamentally, have interests. 
Interests are those things which are important to the individual.194 Interests are also the 
foundational basis for human rights; for example, I have an interest in bodily integrity and this 
interest is protected by the human right to life and freedom from torture.195 The decision to 
elevate an interest to the status of human right is a consequence of political choice and societal 
agreement.196 I argue that it is important for understanding the claim that human rights 
decisions in deportation cases are polycentric.  
I argue from an interest theory of rights because it more readily sustains the claim that 
children have human rights. If children have human rights, then deportation decisions are 
polycentric because they involve multiple sets of human rights held by multiple individuals, 
including children. I argue that human children are still human, and any theory of human rights 
that denies children equal human rights is therefore under-inclusive. Will theorists such as 
                                                          
193 Samantha Brennan, ‘Children’s Choices or Children’s Interests: Which Do Their Rights Protect?’ in David 
Archard and Colin M Macleod (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children (Oxford University Press 2002) 
 
194 For a fuller discussion of the nature of individual interests, see: Susan A Wolfson, ‘Children’s Rights: The 
Theoretical Underpinning of the “Best Interests of the Child”’ in Michael Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds), The 
Ideologies of Children’s Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1992). 
 
195 For example, the right to life is enshrined in Article 2 ECHR and Article 6 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and freedom from torture in Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR. 
 
196 What Dembour labels a ‘deliberative’ view of human rights: Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Who Believes in 




Robert Noggle and Laura Purdy argue that children do not possess human rights equal to those 
possessed by adults because children lack the essential characteristic of rights holders. Noggle 
and Purdy argue that this is essential characteristics is the ability to rationally choose.197 
However, this results in an under-inclusive conception of human rights which excludes young 
children, and some adults, from holding human rights. Instead, the ability to choose and that 
my choices be respected (in all manner of things) is an interest that I have as a rational agent. 
However, ceasing to have the ability to choose does not extinguish my human rights; I still 
have a human right to life even if I am unconscious, and not being able to actively choose life 
does not invalidate my human right to life simply because I am in an unconscious state. My 
human rights must therefore be grounded in something more fundamental if my rights as a 
human being are not invalidated by circumstances which rob me of rational capacity to make 
choices. Interests are, I argue, this necessary foundational grounding of human rights. This is 
important because it means that children have human rights too.  
The interest in choice gains weight and importance as children develop in maturity. 
Eekelaar argues convincingly that the content of children’s human rights evolve as they get 
older.198 For example, it is in the interests of children to have family. In chapter 2, I set out the 
research which suggests that its interruption through deportation impairs the child’s emotional 
wellbeing and development. As children develop in maturity they have a developing interest 
in making choices about their family, until finally they are determined to have attained 
sufficient maturity to decide to cease all contact with what family they had before, and/or begin 
a new family through marriage and/or procreation. Before this point, the child’s interests in 
                                                          
197 Noggle labels it ‘moral agency’, whereas Purdy labels it the ‘capacity for instrumental reasoning’. Robert 
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choosing family are still present, but the weight given to this depends on their maturity. For 
example, the wishes of children are relevant considerations in contact hearings and will be 
given increasingly greater weight as they mature.199 On a pure will theory of rights, the child’s 
human right to family life only materialises at the point of complete ‘moral agency’. However, 
that a will theory of rights denies children a human right to family life until the point of ‘moral 
agency’ renders it under-inclusive. A theory of human rights which would deny a child a right 
to family life until age 5, 10, or 16 years old (depending on the point at which moral agency is 
found) is clearly suspect because it denies such an important human right to some children. For 
this reason, I argue that interests are instead the foundation blocks of human rights. 
The second importance in situating human rights in the protection of interests is that it 
makes coherent sense of how and why human rights may be legitimately interfered with. This 
is again relevant to understanding polycentricity because not all factors to be considered in 
deportation decisions are human rights factors. The public interest in preventing crime and 
disorder in Article 8(2) ECHR is a factor relevant to deportation decisions, but it evidently does 
not have the status of a human right. However, this public interest may justify an interference 
with a human right. There must be some form of mutually intelligible relationship between 
human rights and the public interest for this to be the case. I argue that this relationship is that 
both human rights and the public interest are made up of interests. The difference is that human 
rights are interests which are given special protection in the form of a presumption of 
priority.200  
This means that an individual’s interests are not exclusively those that by societal 
agreement attain protection as human rights. This is evident from the fact that the social 
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agreement as to what interests to protect as rights may differ from place to place. For example, 
I clearly have an interest in an adequate standard of living for myself and my family, however, 
the ECHR does not protect this as a human right. These interests may be protected in the UK 
by other laws (e.g. minimum wage law, laws concerning the termination of employment), but 
these protections are not the same as the protections afforded by human rights because they do 
not possess the presumption of priority. In contrast, a domestic legal system which adopts the 
list of human rights found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICCPR) would recognise the right to ‘just and favourable conditions of work which 
ensure […] A decent living for themselves and their families’.201 
This is significant because a qualified human right, such as the Article 8 ECHR right to 
family life, may be lawfully interfered with by an interest. These interests – such as national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals202 – are concerned with interests which are not 
otherwise protected as a human right of any one individual. They do not possess the 
presumption of priority that human rights possess. The presumption of priority holds that the 
human right of the individual can only be overridden by the interests of others in circumstances 
where it is proportionate to do so. This is not the same as making all human rights absolute and 
where the test of proportionality is met, the human right can be lawfully interfered with.203 
However, the application of the presumption of priority to human rights and not interests is an 
important and relevant distinction. Mere interests may be interfered with by the state without 
the state having to demonstrate that the four tests in the presumption of priority are met; the 
reason for interference with an interest need not be restricted to a limited range of legitimate 
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aims, need not be demonstratively rationally capable of meeting that end, need not be the least 
intrusive means of meeting the state’s aim, nor must it be proportionate to that end. In contrast, 
for an interference with a human right to be proportionate it must meet four tests which are 
generally recognised in the academic literature as being inherent to the presumption of priority: 
 
(1) Where specified by the human rights measure in question, that the interference 
must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim. In the ECHR jurisprudence, the legitimate 
aims are generally co-identified with the public interest,204 although policies 
which may be considered by a government or the electorate to be in the public 
interest but not encompassed within the express legitimate aims would always be 
a violation of the right. Some ECHR rights do not have legitimate aims; they are 
absolute rights (such as Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR) and it is therefore never 
proportionate to interfere with these rights. 
 
(2) The second test, that of suitability or rationality, ‘requires that the limitation 
contribute to the achievement of a legitimate end.’205  
 
(3) The test of necessity requires that the action be the ‘least restrictive means to 
further that end’.206  
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Public International Law 483, 484. See also: Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture 
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(4) The final test of proportionality is that of ‘balancing’,207 also referred to in the 
literature as ‘proportionality stricto sensu’208 or ‘proportionality in the narrow 
sense’,209 inquires as to ‘whether the benefits of the governmental objective are 
proportionate to the violation of the […] right’.210 Thus the balancing test ‘requires 
that the limitation achieve the pursued end to a degree that justifies the extent of 
the constraint on the […] right’.211  
 
A strict delineation of each step in the presumption of priority does not necessarily 
reflect the practice of human rights adjudication in the UK or at the ECtHR.212 However, even 
if the application of the tests inherent to the presumption of priority are made to run into each 
other does not mean that they do not exist. Their loose rather than strict application does not 
undermine their importance to the overall decision as to the proportionality of a human rights 
interference. Therefore, it follows that if the decision-maker takes into account a relevant 
interest that should be protected as a human right but does not grant to it a presumption of 
priority (by applying the tests above), the decision-maker treats what should be a human right 
as a mere interest. By treating it as a mere interest, the decision-maker denies it two things. 
One, the interest is denied the level of protection that it ought to be granted and which the 
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presumption of priority of human rights is designed to give by way of the special decision-
making guarantees. Two, because only interests which are determined to be of special 
importance or value are elevated to the status of human rights, to fail to treat an interest as a 
human right when it should be robs that interest of that special importance or value. This is 
important because it reduces the decision-makers perception of the importance of the interest, 
and thus places the interest at a conceptual value equal to other interests which are of lesser 
importance. The polycentricity of deportation decisions requires that the human rights and 
interests inherent to deportation decisions are given their proper status as either human rights 
or interests, because their different status is a legally relevant distinction with specific legal 
consequences. 
This distinction between human rights and interests is not about the relative weight that 
either have in the balancing exercise, but is based on their different characters; human rights 
can only be lawfully interfered with in pursuit of a legitimate aim, if the interference rationally 
contributes to the legitimate aim, is the least restrictive means to further that end, and is 
proportionate, whereas mere interests may be interfered with lawfully without meeting any of 
these tests. Distinguishing between human rights and interests is therefore important for being 
able to evaluate whether the reconciliation of the requirements of Article 8 ECHR and Article 
3 UNCRC in UK deportation decisions is effective. If it is the rights of the child at stake then 
they share the presumption of priority, whereas if they are merely the interests of the child then 
their character is more likely to be subsumed into the rights of others. However, to cause to 
treat the rights of the child as a mere interest devalues the protection afforded to the child’s 
interests at stake in deportation decisions. 
Thus in the case of Marcus and his family, all the individuals have a human right to 
family life under Article 8 ECHR. However, on the other side of that balance is the interest in 
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deportation (the Article 8(2) ECHR public interest in preventing crime and disorder). We can 
add these to our visualisation: 
 
Article 8 ECHR Article 8 ECHR  Article 8 ECHR  
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)   
       Bryony (Child)  




 Because the public interest in deportation is only an interest, it can only outweigh the 
human rights on the other side of the balance if, and only if, it is rational, necessary, and strictly 
proportionate to do so. In part (b), below, I outline what Article 8 ECHR requires in more 
depth. 
 
2(b) Article 8 ECHR: the right to family life 
Article 8 ECHR protects those interests which are connected to the relationships between 
individuals in a ‘family’. Under the ECHR, children hold human rights as ‘petitioners, victims 
and subjects’ under the Convention regime.213 Article 1 ECHR states that the rights of the 
Convention are to be enjoyed by ‘everyone’, which Kilkelly argues is ‘significant’ for the 
application of the ECHR to children and which is ‘reinforced’ by the non-discrimination clause 
in Article 14.214 The family life of both the FNO and their children are therefore protected as a 
                                                          
213 Bernardine Dohrn, ‘Something’s Happening Here: Children and Human Rights Jurisprudence in Two 
International Courts’ (2006) 6 Nevada Law Journal 749, 772 
 
214 Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (Ashgate Dartmouth 1999), 3. 
Although Kilkelly also notes that Article 14 ECHR is limited by not being a freestanding right to non-
discrimination, rather it is conjunctive to the other rights of the Convention.  
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right by Article 8 ECHR. What relationships and what aspects of their family life relationship 
is explained in part 2(b)(i) of this chapter. In the introduction to this part, I stated that when 
human rights are not absolute, they may be balanced against the public interest. Part 2(b)(ii) 
describes the public interest of preventing crime and disorder; the public interest which has 
textual and case law authority for being relevant to deportation decisions. 
 
2(b)(i) The right to family life 
Neither family life, nor the interests that it protects, are defined in the ECHR and this 
definitional vacuum is filled by the case law of the ECtHR. Whilst the ECtHR has defined the 
nature of family life, it is UK case law that has defined in more concrete terms the status of the 
right vis-à-vis children. The ECtHR has found that protected under the rubric of Article 8 
ECHR are relationships between biological parent and child (even where a parent is non-
resident),215 parent and adopted child,216 and de facto parents.217 Likewise, relationships 
between two adults may be deemed family life through a lens of legality – i.e. marriage218 – or 
through the factual status of the relationship.219 Relationships outside of this nuclear family 
paradigm have previously been recognised by the Strasbourg organs as family life under Article 
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8 ECHR,220 but the more recent case law has tended to treat these relationships to be an aspect 
of a person’s private life rather than their family life.221 Although Article 8 ECHR protects both 
private and family life, the ECtHR treats these as being two separate areas for protection.222  
UK law has emphasised that children have equal status to adults as rights holders under 
Article 8 ECHR. In Beoku-Betts223 it is stressed, ‘that the Article 8 rights of all family members 
concerned, including children, must be taken into account when making a decision to remove 
a family member.’224 This finding was re-emphasised in Chikwamba which stated that the 
rights of all the appellant’s family members ‘must also be taken into account’.225 EM (Lebanon) 
reaffirmed that the decision-maker ‘must take account of the article 8 rights of all those who 
are affected by their decisions. This means […] that they call for separate consideration.’226 
UK law also stresses the diversity of family life, the Court of Appeal having found that ‘it is 
impossible to define, or even to describe at anything less than almost encyclopaedic length, 
what is meant by “family life” for the purposes of Article 8.’227 The child’s family life rights 
are important in deportation decisions because, as discussed in chapter 2, when family life is 
interfered with by deportation, children suffer a range of negative effects on their interests, 
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such as financial disadvantage and emotional distress. Family life is a right that his held equally 
by the FNO, their spouse/partner, and their children as individual rights holders.  
In our example family, all of the family members have a human right that are engaged 
by the possibility of deporting Marcus to Freedonia. Marcus (the FNO) has an Article 8 ECHR 
right to family life (with Samira, and with all three children). Samira has an Article 8 ECHR 
right to family life (with Marcus, and Adam and Bryony). Sharon has an Article 8 ECHR right 
to family life with Claude (which would be engaged by deportation if one possible outcome 
was for Claude to accompany Marcus to Freedonia). Adam has an Article 8 ECHR right to 
family life (with Marcus, Samira, and Bryony). Bryony has an Article 8 ECHR right to family 
life (with Marcus, Samira, and Adam). Claude has an Article 8 ECHR right to family life (with 
Marcus and Sharon). 
 
2(b)(ii) The public interest in deportation 
Although the protection of family life under Article 8 ECHR is as a human right, it is not an 
absolute right. Article 8(2) ECHR permits the state to lawfully interfere with family life if it is 
proportionate to do so for one of the six enumerated legitimate aims.228 UK courts have found 
that the legitimate aims of Article 8 ECHR are exhaustive229 but it is also settled doctrine of 
both the ECtHR and UK courts that the maintenance of effective immigration control230 and 
the deportation of FNOs are facets of the enumerated legitimate aim of preventing crime and 
disorder. Thus in Üner, the ECtHR found that, ‘in pursuance of their task of maintaining public 
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order, Contracting States have the power to expel an alien convicted of criminal offences.’231 
In the UK case law, the public interest in deportation has been found to stem from the deterrent 
and communication functions of deportation.232 
The public interest in deportation is an interest rather than a right because the right to 
family life enjoys a presumption of priority whereas the public interest does not. Marie-
Bénédicte Dembour would dispute this analysis. She argues that the ECtHR’s state 
sovereignty-first approach in immigration cases contrasts starkly with its rights-first approach 
in other non-immigration cases and she argues that there is a ‘problematic logical inversion’ in 
the ECtHR’s immigration jurisprudence: 
 
…the Court conceives of the rights guaranteed [to immigrants] in the Convention 
as exceptions which temper the general principle of state sovereignty regarding 
migration control, rather than the Court conceiving the state control prerogative 
as tempering human rights norms which would themselves be the foundational 
principle.233 
 
 I agree with Dembour’s analysis as a critique of the balance stuck by the ECtHR 
between the human rights of immigrants versus the public interest in immigration control. 
However, I want to distinguish the two stages of the ECtHR’s decision-making process. The 
first are the tests of legitimate aim, of rationality, and of necessity (i.e. the tests required by the 
presumption of priority excepting balancing). The problem is not that the ECtHR does not 
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apply them, rather the problem is that it gives them only lip service and assumes them to be 
met. As Dembour notes herself, the ECtHR takes for granted the suitability and necessity of 
deportation for the legitimate aim pursued by the state; ‘A detailed reasoning was manifestly 
not considered to be necessary. […] [They] presumably believe the link to be obvious.’234 This 
means that the ECtHR’s analysis is focussed entirely on the question of balancing and at this 
stage Dembour correctly identifies that the ECtHR’s rhetorical approach to balancing begins 
with the imperatives of state sovereignty over migration rather than the rights of the individual. 
Giving full attention to the tests of legitimate aim, rationality, and necessity, may allow the 
rights of individuals in deportation decisions to be safeguarded. In chapter 7, I expand on how 
a deportation decision-making process may be devised which fully realises each of the tests 
inherent to the presumption of priority. 
Finally, when the test of balancing is considered, the relationship between the right to 
family life of the individual and the public interest protected by the legitimate aim is described 
by the ECtHR variously as requiring ‘a fair balance between the relevant interests’235 or that 
the interference is ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.236 The structure of the 
balancing exercise has great potential for altering the outcome of individual cases, and 
identifying this is the aim of chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Because the relationship between the family life of the individual and the public interest 
is one of ‘balance’, we can represent this in Marcus’ case by adding the public interest on the 
other side of the balancing scales: 
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Article 8 ECHR Article 8 ECHR  Article 8 ECHR  
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)    
      Bryony (Child)  




 The public interest is therefore included in the polycentricity of rights and interests 
which must be taken into account in deportation decisions. 
 
2(c) Article 3 UNCRC: protecting the ‘best interests of the child’ as a human right 
If human rights are the means by which certain interests are granted special protection through 
the presumption of priority, then a human right highly relevant to deportation decisions 
involving children is the human right that is concerned exclusively with the interests of 
children; Article 3 UNCRC. Chapter 2 identified that the child is constructed in public policy 
as vulnerable and dependent, and that as a result, they are appropriate objects of concern and 
protection. The UNCRC is justified on these grounds and its preamble ‘reaffirms that children, 
because of their vulnerability, need special protection.’237 The lynchpin of the protective 
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regime of the UNCRC is Article 3; the best interests of children must be the primary 
consideration in decisions that may affect them. Both the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child and academic commentators238 agree that Article 3 UNCRC has three identifiable 
functions. Article 3 UNCRC acts as, to quote General Comment 14 of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child: 
 
(a) A substantive right […] Article 3, paragraph 1, creates an intrinsic 
obligation for States, is directly applicable (self-executing) and can be 
invoked before a court.239 
 
(b) A fundamental, interpretative legal principle: If a legal provision is open to 
more than one interpretation, the interpretation which most effectively 
serves the child’s best interests should be chosen. […]240 
 
(c) A rule of procedure […] Assessing and determining the best interests of the 
child require procedural guarantees.241 
 
We can thereby identify two key features of the best interests of the child. Firstly, 
drawing on the analysis in the previous part, the ‘best interests of the child’ is a human right 
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rather than simply an interest. It should therefore enjoy the presumption of priority inherent in 
the status of being a human right. Secondly, the force of Article 3 UNCRC is that it is a right 
that does not just protect the interests of children, but the best interests of children. 
In the consideration of Marcus’ family, each of the children affected by Marcus’ 
deportation all have a human right to their best interests. This requires a decision as to Marcus’ 
deportation to include consideration of the best interests of all the children, and that their best 
interests have the status of a human right, rather than a mere interest. This adds another set of 
human rights to the visualisation of the deportation decision regarding Marcus: 
 
Article 8 ECHR Article 8 ECHR  Article 8 ECHR UNCRC Article 3 
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)  Adam (Child)  
     Bryony (Child) Bryony (Child)




 This visualisation of multiple human rights, held by multiple individuals, plus the 
public interest, helps us to understand what it means to say that polycentricity is the multiplicity 
of human rights and interests. 
 
2(d) Polycentricity as the multiplicity of human rights and interests 
In this part, I have developed the claim that deportation decisions regarding FNOs with children 
are a polycentric human rights issue. By this, I mean that the rights and interests at stake are 
not a simple dyad of one individual’s rights and the interference of the state in the name of the 
public interest. Nor is it a case of the horizontal application of rights between two individuals 
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in which the state plays the role of arbiter. The rights problem is polycentric because the 
interference is with the rights of multiple individual rights holders whose factual circumstances 
are different in relevant ways, but whose cases are inextricably interlinked. The problem is 
polycentric because each rights holder is affected directly by the rights interference and each 
rights holder has an equal claim to be a direct, primary victim of the interference. 
 Viewing deportation as a polycentric rights problem requires decision-makers to 
consider all the relevant factual differences between the different rights holders. Differences 
between individuals in respect to their (inter alia) nationality, length of residence, language 
spoken and caring relationships with extended family, mean that different individuals present 
to the decision-maker different relevant factual matrixes. These factual issues may be different 
as between the FNO and their children, and between multiple children in the same family. The 
existence of different factual matrixes multiplies when one also considers the FNO’s 
partner/spouse and if they have multiple children. These again potentially multiply if the FNO 
had children with other partners, who themselves may have dependent children from other 
relationships; as in Marcus’ family in our example. To take into account all of these rights 
holders as having independent, separate and unique human rights is what polycentricity 
demands of the decision-maker. 
On the other side of the balancing scale is the public interest in deportation. It is settled 
doctrine of both the ECtHR and UK courts that the maintenance of effective immigration 
control and the deportation of foreign national offenders are facets of the enumerated legitimate 
aims of preventing crime and disorder under Article 8(2) ECHR. 
Deportation is therefore a polycentric rights problem because it engages each of these 




1. The foreign national offender’s interest in maintaining family life with their 
children and spouse/partner (this can be expressed as the foreign national 
offender’s right to a family life); 
2. The interests of the foreign national offender’s spouse/partner in maintaining 
family life with the foreign national offender and with their children (also 
expressible as the spouse/partner’s right to family life); 
3. The child’s interest in maintaining family life with the foreign national 
offender, any other parent(s), and siblings (the child’s right to family life); 
4. The child’s other multi-faceted interests (the child’s right that their best 
interests shall be a primary consideration); 
5. Society’s interest in preventing crime and disorder through the deportation of 
foreign national offender s (the public interest). 
 
This is the essential polycentricity of deportation decisions addressed by this thesis. Not 
only must each right and interest be reflected in deportation decisions, each must be given 
appropriate status as either a right or an interest. 
 
3. The Plurality of Decision-Making Norms in Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR 
The second consequence of the existence of two different human rights regimes which apply 
to deportation law – Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC – is that both regimes require 
different things of the decision-maker. I label this a plurality of decision-making norms. This 
second feature of deportation decisions arises because the two different human rights regimes 
present the decision-maker with two different sets of decision-making norms and they both 
claim priority. These different norms of decision-making present conflicting requirements to 
the decision-maker; like two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which do not fit together. 
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 What is the plurality of decision-making norms? Firstly, the Article 8 ECHR 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR requires a simple balance between the family life and the public 
interest in deportation. In its more recent jurisprudence it has also adopted the best interests of 
the child as a facet of the right to family life. In part 2(a) of this chapter, I briefly describe these 
top level structural requirements of Article 8 ECHR. The second set of decision-making norms 
arises from Article 3 UNCRC. In part 2(b), I argue that Article 3 UNCRC makes two demands 
of the decision maker that Article 8 ECHR does not. The first is that the best interests of the 
child must be a primary consideration; it must be considered separately, and no other 
consideration may be given more inherent weight than the best interests of the child. Secondly, 
only rights-based considerations may outweigh the best interests of the child.  These present a 
clear theoretical challenge to the balancing exercise under Article 8 ECHR because, as part 
2(c) observes, there is no account of the proper relationship between the best interests of the 
child as a separate, primary consideration, and the right to family life. Nor is there a resolution 
of the conflict between Article 8 ECHR which permits non-rights-based considerations to be 
placed in the balancing exercise, and Article 3 UNCRC which does not permit this. In effect, 
the jigsaw pieces of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC appear irreconcilable. 
Polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms present themselves 
simultaneously and must both be resolved in making deportation decisions. This is because 
they are both a consequence of the requirement in UK law to apply both Article 8 ECHR and 
Article 3 UNCRC (or at least, their statutory domestications). However, separating out these 
issues in this way enables us to see why the problem is difficult to resolve in both theory and 
practice; it enables us to make sense of what would otherwise be an impenetrable problem 





3(a) Article 8 ECHR 
In part 2(c)(ii) I stated that the ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 8 ECHR requires a balance 
between the right to family life and the public interest in deportation. The ECtHR places the 
best interests of the child into the balancing scale when weighing family life. Part 3(a)(ii) 
outlines this, and this is followed up in chapter 4 which explains how the best interests of the 
child sits (or fails to sit) alongside the other interests inherent to the human right to family life 
under Article 3 UNCRC. 
 
3(a)(i) Article 8 ECHR as requiring balance 
The relationship between the right to family life of the individual and the public interest 
protected by the legitimate aim, is described by the ECtHR as requiring that the interference is 
‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.242 Proportionality is central to the decision-
making of the ECtHR.243 The ECtHR’s role is: 
 
ascertaining whether the expulsion order in the circumstances of the present case 
struck a fair balance between the relevant interests, namely the applicant’s right 
to respect for his family life, on the one hand, and the interests of public safety 
and the prevention of disorder and crime on the other.244 
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Proportionality analysis ‘helps judges manage disputes that take a particular form; it 
does not dictate correct answers to legal problems.’245 Both the individual right and the public 
interest have value, but ‘Saying that something is a value does not yet say anything about the 
relative priority of that value over another, either abstractly or in a specific context.’246 This 
thesis is concerned with the abstract value, priority, and relationships between the right to 
family life, the best interests of the child, and the public interest in deportation decisions. 
 
3(a)(ii) The best interests of the child as an aspect of Article 8 ECHR 
The best interests of the child have been recognised by the ECtHR as an essential part of the 
Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise, despite the fact that the ECHR ‘contains no formula 
referring to the child’s best interests.’247 In the 2006 case of Üner,248 the ECtHR found that one 
of the criteria for determining Article 8 ECHR claims in deportation cases was ‘the best 
interests and well-being of the children’.249 This was justified as a development of its own 
Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence and to be implicit in its previous judgments.250 It is not then 
obvious that the ECtHR at this stage was attempting to set out a principle of best interests of 
equal content or status as to that in the UNCRC. However, the Court later found in Neulinger 
and Shuruk that the principles of the UNCRC were relevant for the proper interpretation of 
Article 8 ECHR: 
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The Court notes that there is currently a broad consensus – including in 
international law – in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning 
children, their best interests must be paramount251 
 
The background of the decision of Neulinger and Shuruk was an inter-country 
abduction252 and the relationship between The Hague Convention253 and Article 8 ECHR. 
Although in its judgment the ECtHR drew on its jurisprudence on ‘the expulsion of aliens’,254 
the ECtHR did not preface its judgment with its standard recitation of what it perceives as the 
inherent limitations of the ECHR’s role in oversight of the immigration (including deportation) 
decisions of Contracting States, namely that: 
 
…a State is entitled, […] to control the entry of aliens into its territory and their 
residence there […] The Convention does not guarantee the right of an alien to 
enter or to reside in a particular country.255 
 
Given that the factual matrix in Neulinger and Shuruk was like, but not the same as, other 
migration cases it is perhaps surprising that the principle of the best interests of the child was 
carried over into the wider Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence with respect to migration. Barely a 
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year later the ECtHR placed reliance on both Article 3 UNCRC and Neulinger and Shuruk to 
ground its finding of a violation of Article 8 ECHR in Nunez,256 which centred on the removal 
of an unlawful resident. The ECtHR referred to the best interests of the child in both its 
recitation of general principles, and in judgment on the specific case, finding that: 
 
…the Court will examine whether particular regard to the children’s best interests 
would nonetheless upset the fair balance under Article 8.257 
 
…the Court is not convinced in the concrete and exceptional circumstances of the 
case that sufficient weight was attached to the best interests of the children for the 
purposes of Article 8 of the Convention. Reference is made in this context also to 
Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, according to which the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all actions taken by 
public authorities concerning children258 
 
In part 1(d) I argued that a human right does not necessarily protect a single interest, but 
a number of different ones; for example, the human right to freedom of religion protects both 
the interest in private worship and the interest in congregational worship. In different 
circumstances an individual may invoke the same right to protect one or more than one specific 
interest. In Üner and Neulinger and Shuruk, the ECtHR appear to recognise the best interests 
of the child as an interest which is protected under the umbrella of family life. The ECtHR in 
                                                          
256 Nunez v Norway (n255) [84] 
 
257 ibid [78] 
 




both cases is concerned in part with the weight that the best interests of the child has, given 
that it exists under that umbrella with other interests.  
This is significant because in the rest of this chapter, I argue that treating the best interests 
of the child as a constituent interest to the human right to family life under Article 8 ECHR is 
problematic for UK courts because they are required by Article 3 UNCRC to treat the best 
interests of the child as a human right. That this is the case, and is problematic to achieve, is 
part of the plurality of decision-making norms which this thesis argues is created by Article 8 
ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC in UK deportation law.  
 
3(b) Article 3 UNCRC 
In developing an understanding of the plurality of decision-making norms which arise from 
Article 3 UNCRC, this thesis draws heavily on General Comments of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child. Despite the soft-law character of General Comments, I argue that I am 
justified in doing so. Although the existence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child is 
established in Articles 43-45 UNCRC, its only stated role is to receive state reports as to 
examine progress in ‘achieving the realization of the obligations undertaken’259 Neither the 
drafting of General Comments, nor the status of such comments, are established by the 
Convention. The importance of General Comments of UN Treaty Bodies as a whole, and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child in particular, is therefore disputed. It is clear that General 
Comments are not binding in the legal sense; Kanatake describes them as being ‘formally non-
binding’, in that they are not themselves treaties nor reflect customary international law or 
general principles of law.260 However, the formally non-binding nature of General Comments 
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does not mean that they are without any kind of status. Kanatake finds no shortage of evidence 
for the conclusion that: 
 
Domestic courts have frequently taken account of General Comments and 
Recommendations, which not only inform judges about the substance of law, but 
also give flexibility to judges in determining how they should be reflected.261 
 
Despite the General Comments as formally non-binding, the status of the UN Treaty 
Bodies within the UN treaty system affords their General Comments an authoritative status. 
This applies to the Committee on the Rights of the Child:262 
 
The CRC Committee elaborates its general comments with a view to clarifying the 
normative contents of specific rights […] General comments constitute an 
authoritative interpretation as to what is expected of States parties as they 
implement the obligations contained in the CRC.263 
 
 Thus, although not binding, the General Comments present an authoritative statement 
as to the meaning of Article 3 UNCRC. In this part I expand on two such authoritative 
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statements as to the content of Article 3 UNCRC; that the best interests of the child has a 
primary status, and that in the balancing exercise only rights-based arguments may outweigh 
the best interests of the child. I will return to these also in chapter 6 where I explain how the 
Supreme Court domesticated these principles into UK deportation law in its judgment in ZH 
(Tanzania)264 
 
3(b)(i) Article 3 UNCRC as having a primary status 
Article 3(1) UNCRC states clearly that ‘In all actions concerning children […] the best interests 
of the child shall be a primary consideration.’ The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
have stated that as a ‘primary’ consideration the best interests of the child ‘may not be 
considered on the same level as all other considerations.’265 This has two logical consequences. 
Firstly, the best interests of the child must be considered separately; i.e. that it is a 
distinct and independent consideration to which the deportation decision-maker must concern 
itself with. Considering the best interests of the child separately ensures both that they are 
considered at all, and that they possess primary status. As the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child observe, ‘If the interests of children are not highlighted, they tend to be 
overlooked.’266  
 The second logical consequence is that no other consideration may have more intrinsic 
weight than the best interests of the child, and that this applies to whether the best interests of 
the child are considered a right or an interest. Alston suggests that Article 3(1) UNCRC, and 
its provision of primary status to the best interests of the child, acts as ‘a mediating principle 
which can assist in resolving conflicts between different rights where these arise within the 
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overall framework of the Convention.’267 This would mean that in any conflict between the 
Article 3 UNCRC right of the child and the right of another, that the other right must not be 
treated as being inherently more significant. This does not mean, however, that the best 
interests of the child must always outweigh other human rights.268 Instead, no other right may 
be treated as having greater intrinsic or a priori weight, or greater weight in the abstract. An 
example illustrates this distinction. With respect to freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR), 
the ECtHR frequently grants a greater intrinsic weight to certain forms of expression (e.g. the 
political) than to others (e.g. for entertainment),269 and a greater intrinsic weight to expressions 
which contain criticism of government than of private individuals.270 This does not mean that 
political expressions that critique the government are inviolable, only that they immediately 
weigh more heavily in the balance. 
 As a primary consideration the best interests of the child cannot, therefore, go into the 
balance with an intrinsic level of weight less than the right being balanced against it. Where 
the weight of circumstances on both sides are equal the best interests of the child cannot be 
outweighed, although the individual circumstances of the case may result in the best interests 
of the child being outweighed. 
 
3(b)(ii) Proportionality in Article 3 UNCRC – rights-based arguments only 
In this part I argue that Article 3 UNCRC anticipates that the best interests of the child may be 
outweighed where other human rights are engaged, and where the other human right is more 
weighty. This might be the human rights of others, or of the child. The flip-side of this is that 
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only rights-based considerations may outweigh the best interests of the child. I address each 
side of this in turn. 
The primary status – rather than a be-all-and-end-all paramount status – afforded to the 
best interests of the child strongly suggests that the UNCRC anticipates that Article 3 UNCRC 
is subject to a proportionality assessment; i.e. other human rights might outweigh the best 
interests of the child.271 The Committee on the Rights of the Child interprets Article 3 UNCRC 
as requiring a careful balance between the rights of all parties, and: 
 
If harmonization is not possible, authorities and decision-makers will have to 
analyse and weigh the rights of all those concerned, bearing in mind that the right 
of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration 
means that the child's interests have high priority and not just one of several 
considerations. Therefore, a larger weight must be attached to what serves the 
child best.272 
 
Deportation may affect a child directly in one of two ways. Firstly, it may result in the 
constructive removal of the child where the child leaves the UK to accompany the parent, 
despite the child’s own right to residency in the UK or, secondly, in the separation of parent 
and child. With respect to the first possible outcome, the closest parallel to the constructive 
deportation of a child through the deportation of a parent can be found in the asylum context 
in which a child may be directly removed. The Committee on the Rights of the Child argues 
that unaccompanied asylum seeking children (UASC) may be returned to their country of 
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nationality even when it is not in their best interest to do so, but only so long as such a decision 
is taken: 
 
after careful balancing of the child’s best interests and other considerations, if 
the latter are rights-based and override best interests of the child. Such may be 
the case in situations in which the child constitutes a serious risk to the security 
of the State or to the society. Non-rights-based arguments such as those relating 
to general migration control, cannot override best interests considerations.273  
 
 To permit only rights-based considerations to outweigh the best interests of the child 
also makes sense because there are not any apparent limitation clauses in Article 3 UNCRC, 
nor in some of the other Articles, such as Article 16 UNCRC which merely provides that ‘No 
child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, 
home or correspondence’. This is considerably different to the equivalent Article 8(2) ECHR 
obligations to family life which specifically list non-rights-based circumstances which may 
limit the rights of the individual in ‘the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ The absence of 
a limitation clause which permits specific non-rights-based arguments, and yet the recognition 
that Article 3 UNCRC may be subject to a balance between the best interests of the child and 
other considerations, strongly suggests that only considerations grounded in other human rights 
claims are legitimate under the UNCRC. These rights claims may arise from conflicts within 
the child’s rights (e.g. between family life and best interests in the case of parental abuse or 
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neglect), between the child’s rights and the rights of their parents (e.g. the right of the child to 
family life and the parent’s rights on divorce), or between the child’s rights and the rights of 
other individuals in society 
 Finally, we must recall the interpretative function of Article 3 UNCRC; ‘If a legal 
provision is open to more than one interpretation, the interpretation which most effectively 
serves the child’s best interests should be chosen.’274 Thus, if in doubt, Article 3 UNCRC 
requires us to give the maximum protection to the best interests of the child. In this context, 
that means restricting the kinds of considerations which may outweigh the best interests of the 
child to rights-based considerations only. 
This part highlights the importance of the distinction between human rights and interests 
that I drew in part 1(a). It is a distinction that appears crucial to giving full effect to Article 3 
UNCRC but one that even Lady Hale in the UK Supreme Court case of ZH (Tanzania)275 
admits to finding ‘difficult to understand’ in the context of Article 8(2) ECHR.276 She argued 
that ‘Each of the legitimate aims listed there may involve individual as well as community 
interests.’277 But the ECHR rights and freedoms of others are different in character to the public 
interest to the prevention of crime and disorder and of maintaining immigration control.  
To help explicate the difference between rights and interests in this context, let us 
consider an example case under Article 8 ECHR. The ECHR permits the state to interfere 
lawfully with the Article 8 ECHR rights of others in order to (where proportionate) uphold the 
economic wellbeing of others.278 For example, in Gillow, the ECtHR has upheld a requirement 
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for state authorisation to occupy a home on Guernsey in order to ensure that the population was 
limited to promote the economic development of the island.279 However, at stake in Gillow was 
not the individual right of any one resident of Guernsey but rather the collective public interest. 
The public interest is protected by the limitation clause in Article 8(2) ECHR rather than as a 
separate right.  
In contrast, where two interests are protected as rights, conflict may arise but the conflict 
is of a different character. For example, a parent may argue an interest in maintaining family 
life with their child, which is protected by a right. The child may argue that it has an interest in 
bodily integrity, which is also protected by a right; to be free from inhuman and degrading 
treatment (Article 3 ECHR). Therefore in a situation of child abuse two interests are in conflict, 
but unlike in Gillow both have the character of individual rights. Whilst there may be a general 
public interest in preventing child abuse, the interest primarily at stake for the child is the 
individual right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment. This conflict between the 
child’s Article 3 ECHR and the parent’s Article 8 ECHR rights is relatively easy to resolve; 
Article 8 ECHR explicitly permits interference on the basis of protecting the rights of others, 
in this example, the Article 3 ECHR right of the child. 
Therein lies the distinction between an argument based on individual rights and an 
argument based on the public interests which Lady Hale overlooks. Whereas I have a general 
interest in living in a society free from crime or disorder, I only have a personal right in 
circumstances where there is a real and immediate risk to me as an identifiable individual.280 
Lady Hale acknowledges that it will be a more weighty consideration that a person ‘poses a 
specific risk to others’ and thus ‘more easily outweigh the best interests [of the child]’ than 
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arguments based on ‘a more general threat to the economic well-being of the country’.281 It 
may also not be immediately obvious where the line lies between a specific risk to another and 
a general threat. However, I argue that the text and authoritative interpretations of Article 3 
UNCRC preclude the possibility that arguments founded in a generalised public interest are 
incapable of outweighing the best interests of the child. Lady Hale’s analysis does not 
distinguish between human rights and interests and their different modes of protection, which 
I argued to be essential in part 1(a) of this chapter, and therefore the essential difference 
between what considerations Article 3 UNCRC permit to be balanced against the best interests 
of the child, and why they are more restrictive than those permitted under Article 8 ECHR to 
limit the right to family life. 
I argue therefore that the UNCRC does envisage a balancing exercise of the kind found 
in the proportionality analysis. However, Article 3 UNCRC permits only a narrower set of 
permitted limitations than those under Article 8(2) ECHR; under Article 3 UNCRC only human 
rights-based considerations may outweigh the best interests of the child, whereas Article 8 
ECHR permits some (listed) interests to outweigh the individual’s right to family life, including 
the prevention of crime and disorder. 
 
3(c) The Plurality of Decision-Making Norms 
The plurality of decision-making norms refers to the different requirements that Article 3 
UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR place on decision-makers in deportation decisions. Article 3 
UNCRC makes two demands on the decision maker that Article 8 ECHR does not make. The 
first is that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration; it must be considered 
separately, and no other consideration may be given more inherent weight than the best 
                                                          




interests of the child. Secondly, only rights-based considerations may outweigh the best 
interests of the child. This is different to Article 8 ECHR which permits consideration of a 
wider range of public interest considerations. 
 We can visually map these onto the range of rights and interests that are engaged in the 
deportation decision in the case of our fictional family. Article 3 UNCRC must be considered 
separately and not be given less inherent weight than other considerations. We can therefore 
draw a box around these rights in order to emphasise their separation and special treatment. 
We can also separate out the two conceptions of the public interest. The first allows a broader 
range of considerations to be considered under the public interest; the human rights and 
freedoms of others, the prevention of crime and disorder, and the maintenance of immigration 
controls. whereas under Article 3 UNCRC only rights-based considerations – the rights and 
freedoms of others – may be balanced against the best interests of the child. 
 
Article 8 ECHR Article 8 ECHR  Article 8 ECHR UNCRC Article 3 
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)  Adam (Child)  
     Bryony (Child) Bryony (Child)
  Sharon (Ex-Partner)   Claude (Child) Claude (Child) 
 
Rights and Freedom of Others           Rights and Freedom of Others 
Prevention of Crime and Disorder 
Maintaining Immigration Control 
 
 Two theoretical problems clearly emerge from this visualisation. The first is what is the 
proper relationship between the Article 3 UNCRC best interests of the child (when they are 




family life right? The second theoretical problem is that there are two different conceptions of 
the public interest; one that is more expansive than the other because it permits consideration 
of the prevention of crime and disorder and the maintenance of immigration controls, as well 
as the human rights and freedoms of others. Article 3 UNCRC does not permit us to balance 
the best interests of the child against the more expansive public interests (crime and disorder 
and immigration control), only the human rights of others. But to place into the balance only 
rights-based considerations means that these other interests (crime and disorder and 
immigration control) are not considered. Resolving these theoretical issues in the application 
of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC in UK deportation decisions is therefore a core 
requirement against which we can evaluate the approaches to deportation decision-making 
present in UK law and explored in chapters 4-6, and my own suggestion as to how this might 
be achieved in chapter 7. 
  
4. Polycentricity and the Plurality of Decision-Making Norms as a Compound Issue 
The polycentricity and plurality of decision-making norms are inherent in deportation decisions 
in UK law because they arise from the simultaneous presence of Article 3 UNCRC and Article 
8 ECHR. Because they arise simultaneously from the same source, polycentricity and plurality 
of decision-making norms are therefore two aspects, facets or layers of the requirement in UK 
law to give simultaneous effect to both Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR; they present a 
compound issue. 
 The compound nature is clear when we observe theoretical solutions to the plurality of 
decision-making norms alone. The first is to consider only one set of human rights; to choose 
between Article 3 UNCRC or Article 8 ECHR. To make a deportation decision which gives 
effect to Article 8 ECHR only, or to Article 3 UNCRC only, is a coherent response to the 






decision-making norms. To do so resolves the two theoretical problems attached to the plurality 
of decision-making norms by avoiding the existence of the conflict in the first place. We can 
revise the account of the relevant balancing exercise in our example family by greying out of 
consideration one or other of Article 3 UNCRC or Article 8 ECHR. To apply Article 8 ECHR 
only: 
Article 8 ECHR Article 8 ECHR  Article 8 ECHR UNCRC Article 3 
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)  Adam (Child)  
     Bryony (Child) Bryony (Child)
  Sharon (Ex-Partner)   Claude (Child) Claude (Child) 
 
Rights and Freedom of Others          
Prevention of Crime and Disorder 
Maintaining Immigration Control 
     
Or, to apply Article 3 UNCRC only: 
 
Article 8 ECHR Article 8 ECHR  Article 8 ECHR UNCRC Article 3 
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)  Adam (Child)  
     Bryony (Child) Bryony (Child)
  Sharon (Ex-Partner)   Claude (Child) Claude (Child) 
 
Rights and Freedom of Others          
Prevention of Crime and Disorder 
Maintaining Immigration Control 
     
Rights and Freedoms 
of Others 




 The problem with these solutions is that whilst they resolve the plurality of decision-
making norms they must offend the essential polycentric nature of deportation decisions. To 
exclude consideration of one of the rights means that the rights and interests that come under 
those areas are also excluded from the decision-maker’s consideration. By excluding 
consideration of Article 3 UNCRC, the decision-maker must fail to consider the best interests 
of Adam, Bryony, and Claude (represented by them appearing in red text). To exclude 
consideration of Article 8 ECHR, the decision-maker must fail to consider the family life rights 
of Marcus, Samira, and Sharon, and the family life rights of the children (insofar as any aspect 
of their family life is not contained within consideration of their best interests). Excluding 
consideration of Article 8 ECHR also excludes consideration of those aspects of the public 
interest (crime and disorder and immigration control) which are non-rights-based 
considerations. Because polycentricity requires the consideration of all the relevant rights and 
interests, either solution to the plurality of decision-making norms is mutually exclusive of 
giving effect to the polycentricity of deportation decisions. 
 Polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms are not therefore, per se, 
separate issues which UK law permits independent resolution. Rather in practical terms they 
present themselves simultaneously and thus must be resolved simultaneously as they arise 
consequent to the requirement in UK law to apply both Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC 
(or at least, their statutory domestications). However, separating out the two issues on the 
theoretical level in this way enables us to see why it is difficult in both theory and practice to 
give effect to the best interests of the child in UK deportation law; it enables us to make sense 







In this chapter, I have sought to unpick why applying Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR 
may be difficult to achieve coherently in UK deportation decisions. I have labelled two strands 
of inter-twined issues as polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms. Presented 
by a knotted string, it helps to begin by determining whether the knot is made up of two strings 
tied together, or whether it is a knot in a single string. Identifying that there are two strings does 
not alter the nature of the knot, but does enable us to better identify strategies for undoing it. 
However, in undoing the knot, we must untangle both strings; we cannot untangle one string 
from the knot whist leaving the other in place. If we do, we fail in our overall goal of undoing 
the knot by simply replacing our two stringed knot with a one stringed one. 
 In deportation decisions which affect children, which this thesis is concerned with, the 
first string is that of polycentricity. I have argued that polycentricity is the requirement on 
deportation decision-makers to include effective consideration of all the human rights and 
interests which are engaged by the deportation of FNO with children. Furthermore, the 
decision-maker must afford the relevant human rights the presumption of priority so that they 
have the status of human rights, rather than of mere interests. The second string is that of the 
plurality of decision-making norms, whereby Article 8 EHCR requires a balance between the 
right to family life and the public interest in preventing crime and disorder. At the same time, 
Article 3 UNCRC requires the best interests of the child to be a primary consideration; it must 
be determined separately, first, and of no less inherent weight than other interests. Moreover, 
the best interests of the child under Article 3 UNCRC cannot be balanced against the public 
interest, only the human rights of others where there is a conflict between them. 
 Pulling at on one string by resolving one of the two problems of either polycentricity or 
the plurality of decision-making norms independently makes the problem more intractable 
because to resolve one appears incompatible with resolving the other. The problem that 
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deportation decision-makers face is that they are required by UK law to give effect to both the 
right to family life and the best interests of the child simultaneously. 
 In an alternative analogy it is like two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which do not fit 
together, however the instruction is that they must be made to. One can ignore the instruction 
to make them fit together, or one may break one piece in order to get them to superficially 
mesh, but neither are solutions which achieve what is required. 
 In this chapter we have observed again the two themes which reassert themselves 
throughout this thesis. Firstly, Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC present two competing 
aspects of public policy. Article 8 ECHR is focussed on the foreign national offender whose 
threat to the public interests in preventing crime and disorder and the maintenance of 
immigration control – the things which make the foreign national offender a “bad” migrant – 
may solely justify the interference of his human rights as a consequence of his offending. 
Article 3 UNCRC, on the other hand, reflects the vulnerable, innocent child who must be 
protected by the law. The child’s best interests are a primary consideration because of their 
unique vulnerability, and their best interests may only be balanced against the human rights of 
others, rather than against an amorphous public interest. 
 Secondly, the ad hoc layering of legal obligations from different human rights regimes 
creates tensions between them. Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC were developed 
separately, both in terms of institutional separation (the Council of Europe and the United 
Nations) and separated by time (1959 and 1989). However, they do not exist in a vacuum and 
Article 3 UNCRC has influenced the development of the ECtHR’s understanding of what 
Article 8 ECHR requires.282 When each of these are domesticated into UK law (as will be 
explored in the following chapters) the fact that they each impose apparently irreconcilable 
obligations on the decision-maker presents real problems. These are problems that I have 
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disentangled in theoretical perspective in this chapter as polycentricity and the plurality of 
decision-making norms. 
The theoretical disentanglement engaged in by this chapter is important because in 
chapters 4-6 I use polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms as ways to 
effectively evaluate three approaches of deportation decision-making that are identifiable in 
UK law; a “simple balancing approach” based on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, a “modified 
balancing approach” so as to attempt to treat the best interests of the child as being a primary 
consideration, and an “exception approach” which treats the best interests of the child as an 
exception to deportation because none of these succeed in resolving polycentricity and the 
plurality of decision-making norms, in chapter 7, I suggest a fourth possible approach to 
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Chapter 3 explored the theoretical issues that arise as a consequence of the UK’s obligations in 
the deportation law context to both Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. I labelled these as 
the polycentricity of deportation decisions and the plurality of decision-making norms. I argued 
that polycentricity arises because of the many different rights and interests that are engaged in 
deportation decisions. I argued that the plurality of decision-making norms is a consequence of 
Article 3 UNCRC’s unique characteristics; that the best interests of the child must be a primary 
consideration, and that it may only be balanced against rights-based considerations. I argued 
that, in theoretical terms, accommodating both the polycentricity of deportation decisions and 
the plurality of decision-making norms appeared impossible within a single unified decision-
making process. A decision could be polycentric but not give effect to the unique characteristics 
of Article 3 UNCRC, or give effect to the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC but not 
be polycentric. I argued this to be the doctrinal cause of why UK law has found it difficult to 
give effect to the best interests of the child in deportation cases. 
 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine the ways in which UK law in different stages between 
2007 to 2014 has formulated the decision-making process in deportation cases and explains 
how each attempt has been unable to coherently accommodate both the polycentricity of 
deportation decisions and the plurality of decision-making norms simultaneously. In this 
chapter, chapter 4, I examine a “simple balancing approach” to deportation cases and I associate 
this with the case of Huang.283 Chapter 5 examines a “modified balancing approach” which I 
associate with ZH (Tanzania).284 Chapter 6 examines an “exception approach” which I identify 
as being found in s19, Immigration Act 2014. Each chapter reflects a chronological and 
conceptual development in UK deportation law from 2007 to 2014. 
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 This chapter is therefore concerned with a “simple balancing approach” to deportation 
decision-making, evident in UK deportation law from the 2007 House of Lords authority of 
Huang.285 It is a decision-making approach which uses the familiar metaphor of the merchant’s 
balance to weigh two competing principles; in the case of deportation, the right to family life 
against the public interest in deporting the FNO. As Barak observes, ‘To speak of “balancing” 
is to speak metaphorically, but the mode of thought is normative.’286 
 This “simple balancing approach” arises in UK deportation law through analysis of 
Article 8 ECHR. As observed previously, the UK’s ‘domestication’287 of the ECHR occurred 
through the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 and thus pre-dates, by almost a decade, the 
domestication of Article 3 UNCRC in s55 BCIA. This ad hoc layering of legal obligations is 
one of the central themes as to why UK law has found it difficult to give effect to the best 
interests of the child in deportation decisions. What the first part of this chapter will observe is 
that the House of Lords decision in Huang is part of a process of UK courts coming to terms 
with the fullness of the UK’s obligations under the HRA to act in accordance with the ECHR 
in deportation cases. This observation will also be significant in the following chapter whereby 
the modification in the “modified balancing approach” is an attempt to bolt-on the unique 
characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC onto the pre-existing Article 8 ECHR balance. 
The decision in Huang required for the first time UK decision-makers to undertake a 
fact-sensitive proportionality exercise in deportation cases,288 guided by the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).289 Such guidance is found in the ECtHR case 
                                                          
285 Huang (n8) 
 
286 Barak (n11) 745 
 
287 Fordham (n40) 111 
 
288 Huang (n8) [20] 
 




of Üner290 in which the ECtHR states that it will consider a range of principles in deportation 
cases which come before it. One such principle is ‘the best interests and well-being of the 
children’,291 which UK courts have determined to mean that the best interests of the child ought 
to be an integral part of the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise.292 This is a facet of the other 
theme running throughout this thesis; that the law, like public policy, pulls decision-makers in 
competing directions which approves the deportation of FNOs, but also requires the protection 
of children. 
 The second and third part of this chapter analyse the ECtHR Article 8 ECHR case law 
as to the structure of the balancing exercise and its ability to give effect to the best interests of 
the child in deportation decisions. This analysis identifies two structural requirements of this 
“simple balancing approach”. The first argues that the ECtHR’s approach to Article 8 ECHR 
is best understood as viewing family life as a commonly-held right; a right that examines the 
family of foreign national offenders as a whole, rather than as a right that is held and examined 
individually. This characteristic of being commonly-held provides the super-structure of the 
decision-making approach to balancing presented by the ECtHR. Secondly, that the weight 
assigned to the family life side of the balance is constructed with reference to a relationship 
between the ECtHR’s assessment of the value of family life and the gravity of the interference 
with family life presented by deportation.  
I argue in each part that these structural aspects of the “simple balancing approach” 
mean that as a decision-making process it is not polycentric, nor consistent with the plurality 
of decision-making norms. 
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2. Huang: The Delayed Emergence of Proportionality in UK Article 8 ECHR 
Jurisprudence  
The HRA requires UK public authorities to act compatibly with Convention Rights (s6 HRA) 
and requires courts to take into account the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (s2 HRA). The extent 
of the role assigned to courts to review decisions of public authorities on human rights grounds 
exercised UK courts for some time; the successful ‘migration’293 of proportionality principles 
to UK law was not assured. Before the HRA, the immigration rules: 
 
…had emphasised the discretionary nature of deportation of overstayers and 
offenders, requiring officials (and judges on appeal) to consider their situation in 
the round, taking into account “every relevant factor” – age, length of residence, 
family ties, character, employment record and so on.294 
 
However, rather than pursue a consideration of all relevant factors in the round under a 
human rights analysis, as they had been accustomed to doing so before the HRA (albeit under 
the Secretary of State’s residual discretion), early case law under the HRA in the deportation 
context was marked by judicial deference to executive decision making. In the 2003 case of 
Edore, the Court of Appeal articulated a role similar to a hands-off judicial review standard of 
Wednesbury unreasonableness, finding that the appellate court was to determine whether the 
Secretary of State’s decision was ‘properly one within the decision maker’s discretion, i.e. was 
a decision which could reasonable be regarded as proportionate and as striking a fair balance 
between the competing interests in play.’295 The appellate adjudicator was not to find a 
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violation of Article 8 ECHR ‘if he personally would have preferred the balance to have been 
struck differently […] he cannot substitute his preference for the decision in fact taken.’296 
Where the Secretary of State made immigration decisions in line with her Immigration Rules, 
the courts found that Article 8 ECHR violations would only occur in cases which exhibited 
‘exceptional circumstances’ not covered by those Rules.297 This deference to the Immigration 
Rules is consistent with a critique of the use of proportionality-based decision-making by 
judges which argues that: 
 
Striking a balance between competing aims and values is a decision about what 
kind of society we want to live in. This is the task of the elected representatives, 
who are accountable to the members of this society, not a decision of courts.298 
 
The use of an ‘exceptional circumstances’ test led to immigration appeals being refused, 
even when they exhibited strong factual circumstances.299 Webber argues that, perversely, it 
was the introduction of the HRA itself that led to this restrictive regime. By seeking to defend 
the integrity of the HRA against its detractors, ‘the executive and the courts clamped down on 
so-called “abuse” of human rights by the “undeserving”, [so] the floor of human rights 
protection became an ever lower ceiling.’300  
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Given this context, Lord Bingham gave mixed signals to adjudicators in Razgar as to 
whether Article 8 ECHR required a full, independent proportionality review or deference to 
the executive’s immigration rules.301 In one paragraph, Lord Bingham argued that the courts 
must engage in a full proportionality review of individual cases because: 
 
In considering whether a challenge to the Secretary of State's decision to remove a 
person must clearly fail, the reviewing court must, as it seems to me, consider how 
an appeal would be likely to fare before an adjudicator, as the tribunal responsible 
for deciding the appeal if there were an appeal. This means that the reviewing court 
must ask itself essentially the questions which would have to be answered by an 
adjudicator.302 
 
 But Lord Bingham also concluded by seemingly endorsing a test of exceptional 
circumstances finding that, ‘Decisions taken pursuant to the lawful operation of immigration 
control will be proportionate in all save a small minority of exceptional cases, identifiable only 
on a case by case basis.’303 Razgar clearly confused rather than evolved the law and the issue 
was returned to again in 2007 in the case of Huang.304 In Huang, the House of Lords found that 
unless a case fell to be allowed within the Immigration Rules, the appellate authority was to 
undertake a fact-sensitive proportionality exercise.305 ‘Exceptional circumstances’ was rejected 
as the relevant legal test: 
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He [Lord Bingham in Razgar] was there expressing an expectation, shared with the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, that the number of claimants not covered by the 
Rules and supplementary directions but entitled to succeed under article 8 would be 
a very small minority. That is still his expectation. But he was not purporting to lay 
down a legal test. 306 
 
 Through Huang proportionality was adopted by UK courts as the appropriate decision-
making tool in immigration cases argued on the basis of Article 8 ECHR307 and the House of 
Lords ‘received the principle of proportionality into domestic law’.308 Where Razgar retains its 
influence309 is in Lord Bingham’s articulation of a structured approach to proportionality, 
comprising five questions: 
 
(1)  Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of the applicant's right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) 
family life? 
(2)  If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to 
engage the operation of article 8? 
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(3)  If so, is such interference in accordance with the law? 
(4)  If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others? 
(5)  If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to 
be achieved?310 
 
Although formally expressed in different terms, the Razgar questions substantively 
include the tests introduced in chapter 3 as being essential to the presumption of priority that 
human rights possess, and that mere interests do not. Razgar questions (1) and (2) concern the 
existence of a right which engages the ECHR. Razgar question (3) requires the interference ‘to 
have some basis in domestic law and to be compatible with the rule of law’.311 Question (4) 
requires there to be a legitimate aim to be pursued. It also requires the interference to be 
‘rational’ and ‘necessary’ to achieving the legitimate aim. Finally, Razgar question (5) engages 
balancing. This fifth question requires the assessment of the balance between the weight of the 
family life on the one side, and the weight of the public interest on the other. 
Razgar dictates a structure to proportionality as a whole, but does not suggest a structure 
for balancing the foreign national offenders’ family life and the public interest in their 
deportation. For this, we must turn to the ECtHR. In the 2001 judgment of Boultif, the ECtHR 
felt ‘called upon to establish guiding principles’312 in deciding deportation cases which engage 
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Article 8 ECHR. In Boultif, neither the applicant nor his wife had children.313 Although the 
general principles established in Boultif included limited abstract reference to the situation of 
children,314 Üner explicitly expanded the principles in Boultif to include reference to ‘the best 
interests and well-being of the children’.315 
Üner is itself typical of a deportation case of a polycentric character. Mr Ziya Üner was 
a Turkish national lawfully resident in the Netherlands. He had a Dutch partner and two Dutch 
children, none of whom spoke Turkish. Mr Üner was sentenced to seven years imprisonment 
for manslaughter (following earlier, minor assault convictions) and the Dutch authorities 
deported him consequent to his conviction.316 In deportation decisions, including when they 
exhibit polycentricity, the principles that the ECtHR states that it will consider in each case are, 
in the order given in the Üner judgment: 
 
- the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;  
- the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to be 
expelled;  
- the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant's conduct 
during that period;  
- the nationalities of the various persons concerned;  
- the applicant's family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other 
factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple's family life;  
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- whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered 
into a family relationship;  
- whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age;  
- the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in 
the country to which the applicant is to be expelled 
- the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness 
of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter 
in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and  
- the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host317 country and 
with the country of destination.318 
 
UK courts in both DS (India)319 and LD (Zimbabwe)320 relied on the Üner principles as 
the ‘leading Strasbourg authority’321 as to the relevant considerations in assessing the 
proportionality of deportation decisions. More recently, Üner was identified by the Court of 
Appeal to be authority for the relevant factors to be considered in the Article 8 ECHR balancing 
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exercise, finding that, ‘There is an abundance of authorities in which the courts have applied 
the principles stated in […] Üner to the facts of individual cases.’322  
 The final Razgar question of balancing is a “simple balancing approach” in UK law 
because to determine whether the interference is ‘proportionate to the legitimate public end’323 
requires the decision-maker to compare only two competing principles; the weight of the right 
to family life with the weight of the public interest in deportation. The balancing approach is 
also “simple” because, whereas a test of exceptional circumstances could be said to require the 
right to family life to weigh more heavily than the public interest before a court may intervene 
to prevent the deportation, a “simple balancing approach” requires only that the right be as 
weighty, (or only marginally more weighty) than the public interest in order to prevail.324 The 
basic principles of proportionality require that the greater the interference with the right, the 
greater the public interest needs to be in order to justify that interference.325 
 The next two parts of this chapter seek to unpick the normative implications of this 
“simple balancing approach” and of the adoption of the Üner criteria in UK deportation law, 
and to assess their ability to give effect to the best interests of the child and to accommodate 
both the polycentricity of deportation decisions and the plurality of decision-making norms 
inherent in the UK’s obligations under Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. 
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3. Article 8 ECHR; Individual Right or Commonly-held Right? 
The first normative implication of the “simple balancing approach” to deportation cases is that 
the family life aspect of Article 8 ECHR is treated as being a commonly-held right. By this I 
mean that rather than assessing whether the actions of the state in deporting a foreign national 
offender has violated the family life right of one individual, or of a series of individuals, the 
ECtHR assesses whether the right of the family as a common group has been violated. 
 Article 8 ECHR as a commonly-held right is significant because it ensures that the 
balancing exercise in deportation decisions conforms to the metaphor of the balancing scales 
which weigh two competing values within one decision. As a commonly-held right, the 
balancing scales must hold all the relevant rights and interests of the family unit in order to be 
a polycentric decision-making process. This includes the best interests of the child and the right 
to family life of each family member. However, as part 2(c) argues, by identifying the interests 
of the foreign national offender and their children as part of the same right means that the best 
interests of the child cannot be fully or properly considered and therefore the “simple balancing 
approach” cannot be truly polycentric. Secondly, if family life is a right commonly-held by the 
family unit how can the best interests of the child be a primary consideration; considered 
separately, and of no less inherent weight than other considerations? Part 2(d) argues that as a 
commonly-held right, the “simple balancing approach” also cannot uphold the plurality of 
decision-making norms between Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. 
This part continues by describing how the shape of legal analysis of the right to family 
life would look if it were assessed as an individual right; either as an individual right viewed 
through the lens of the child as a rights holder, or the lens of the foreign national offender as 
the rights holder, or the lens of both as equal rights holders. This demonstrates the contrast with 




3(a) An Individual Right 
Approaching the right to family life as an individual right would place the emphasis on the 
individual’s relationships. This presents the question as to whose rights are considered to be at 
stake, the FNO, their child/ren, and their spouse/partner? Whether the “bad” migrant FNO, or 
the innocent, vulnerable child is the centre of the enquiry affects what factors and moral 
judgments are relevant to the assessment of family life.  
Perceiving Article 8 ECHR as an individual right means that the interference is with 
one person’s relationships. If Article 8 ECHR is approached as an individual’s right to 
relationship with family, then the question of who is the individual rights holder is of 
fundamental importance because the shifting lens through which the enquiry is conducted alters 
the assessment as to whether the interference with family life is proportionate. Even the same 
factual matrix, viewed through a lens which focuses on the foreign national offender, or on 
their partner, or the child, is liable to point to different outcomes of proportionality. 
 To work through an example, in the case of Antwi v Norway,326 viewing the relationship 
through the lens of the FNO or through the child alters how the facts of that relationship are 
presented, processed and understood. Mr Antwi was a Ghanaian national with no leave to 
remain in Norway and who had committed immigration offences in order to enter the country. 
He had lived and grown up in Ghana until he was 23 years old and when he committed his 
offences to enter Europe. As an adult he was personally responsible for his offending. There 
was no issue raised suggesting that Mr Antwi was forced to leave Ghana, nor that he was unable 
to return there and reintegrate into Ghanaian society. Indeed, he had returned to marry there 
before entering Norway again on false papers. Although Mr Antwi actively engaged with his 
                                                          




daughter’s upbringing she presented no special care needs which made her dependent on his 
care, or to suggest that she could not be cared for by her mother. 
 In contrast, the same factual circumstances considered through the lens of the child’s 
circumstances appear considerably different. The 11 year old child (unnamed in the ECtHR 
judgment) was a Norwegian national from birth, having been born there. She was described as 
being well integrated into Norwegian society and spoke Norwegian at home. It was her father 
who she spent most time with, and he supported her education by helping her with homework 
and being the parental contact for school. He facilitated her participation in extra-curricular 
sports activities. She had lived in Norway all her life, had only visited Ghana for two short 
visits, and had little knowledge of the languages of Ghana. Her mother, with whom she lived 
in a nuclear family unit with Mr Antwi, was a naturalised Norwegian national, and her maternal 
grandparents and uncles/aunts were resident in Norway. Because the child was a Norwegian 
national, it could not be said that there was any public interest in her constructive deportation; 
the child did not offend, posed no risk to the public, and cannot be said to represent a conflict 
with the immigration law of the state. The factual matrix is identical and shared with the foreign 
national offender, but the lens through which those facts are viewed – the family life 
relationship of the child or the adult – fundamentally alters the dimensions of the balancing 
exercise.327  
 Pursuing a lens that is exclusively and individually focussed on either the FNO, or their 
spouse/partner, or on the child, presents theoretical problems. If one pursues a balancing 
exercise analysis through the lens of the foreign national offender’s relationship right, then 
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much of what is in the child’s interests are excluded from the ECtHR’s consideration. This is 
because (as explained in chapter 2) the best interests of the child are not exhausted by 
consideration of the relationship a child has with one family member, but encompasses 
considerations of, for example, the child’s views, their identity, care, protection and safety, 
their vulnerability, and their health and education.  
However, it does not appear that the ECtHR approaches its analysis of family life as an 
individual human right. Eekelaar suggests that the ECtHR does not ‘clearly separate the 
interests of the children from the applicant’s own Article 8 rights.’328 Either this means that the 
best interests of the child are a relevant interest for the determination of the Article 8 ECHR 
right of the adult foreign national offender, or that the Court does not analyse Article 8 ECHR 
as an individual right, but rather than a form of commonly-held right vested in a group of 
people. Part 3(b) is therefore dedicated to exploring these two suggestions and how they differ. 
It pursues the argument that an objective explanation of the ECtHR’s case law is that it does 
approach the right to family life as a commonly-held right, rather than an individual right. This 
has consequences for the shape of the balancing methodology pursued by the ECtHR. 
 
3(b) A Commonly-held Right 
By a commonly-held right I mean that rather than assessing whether the actions of the state in 
deporting a foreign national offender has violated the family life right of one individual, or of 
a series of individuals, the ECtHR assesses whether the rights of the family as a common group 
have been violated. The right is held in common rather than individually because the analysis 
and assessment of the factual matrix of the family life is considered in the round by the ECtHR 
in a way that combines all the interests that can be said to be held by all the individuals. The 
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suggestion that the right to family life is a form of commonly-held right is an attractive one 
because family life is necessarily relational; it cannot be conducted by an individual in 
isolation.  
 As a commonly-held right, the interference of deportation is an interference with a 
relationship, and therefore the right to family life protects relationships rather than individuals. 
Because the protection is afforded to the relationship, interference with the relationship must 
affect both/all individuals in the family relationship. Because deportation is a binary institution 
(either the FNO is deported or they are not) either the relationship is broken by the deportation 
or it is not. It is therefore not possible to protect the family life of one individual in the family 
relationship without protecting the family life of the other. In the web of family relationships, 
breaking the strand between two individuals breaks that strand for both and therefore the right 
to family life must require the same outcome for both parties.  
As a commonly-held right, the focus is on the relationship and the context for that 
relationship rather than on the individual. Observed as a commonly-held right, it is the child-
parent relationship which is interfered with, rather than the child’s relationship or the parent’s 
relationship alone. If the example of Antwi (explored above) is viewed as an individual right, 
then the parent’s right to family life would not have been disproportionately interfered with by 
his deportation because of his connection to Ghana. Thus where the choice is made to view the 
interference through the lens of Antwi’s individual right alone, no Article 8 ECHR violation is 
found, despite the obvious negative consequences for the child. In contrast, as a commonly-
held right, the negative consequence of deportation on the child’s relationship becomes an 
integral aspect of the proportionality exercise which may alter the overall assessment. 
Approaching Article 8 ECHR family life as a commonly-held right also makes sense 
of the ECtHR’s failure (as Eekelaar sees it) to make ‘no systematic distinction between […] 
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cases directly about children and decisions affecting children indirectly.’329 Eekelaar maintains 
that there is a logical and relevant distinction between decisions which are ‘about’ a parent or 
‘about’ a child, which he argues alters the nature of the human rights decision and the role of 
the best interests of the child. The failure to recognise the distinction between cases directly 
and indirectly affecting children is, in Eekelaar’s analysis, a failing. Eekelaar uses the example 
of cases where the courts are called upon to make a decision about the extradition of a parent, 
and cases where the decision is whether to authorise the voluntarily relocation of a parent, with 
their child, to another country upon divorce thereby denying the estranged parent meaningful 
contact. Extradition, Eekalaar argues, is only indirectly about the child because it is a decision 
‘about’ the parent; the consequence for the child is collateral to what the decision is about. In 
contrast, relocation is directly about the child, despite what Eekalaar describes as a ‘superficial’ 
similarity with extradition. Relocation is not ‘about’ the parent’s ability to move to another 
country rather, Eekalaar argues, it is ‘about’ the child’s best interests in maintaining contact 
with both parents.330 
In contrast to Eekalaar’s analysis, if family life is a commonly-held right then there is 
no relevant distinction to be drawn between the direct and indirect effects of an interference 
with human rights, because regardless of the type of decision which is being made – be it about 
relocation, contact, extradition or deportation – because the child is always a fundamental and 
indivisible part of the family commonality. In cases which may affect the relationship between 
the child and one or more parent, the assessment should be of the relationships between the 
family as a whole. When viewed as a commonly-held right it is irrelevant to the process of 
balancing, or to the outcome, whether deportation is interpreted as an action directly taken 
against the FNO and thus the child is only an indirect victim of the interference, or whether 
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deportation is interpreted as directly interfering with the child’s relationship with the FNO. By 
ignoring the distinction between direct and indirect interference, the ECtHR avoids having to 
determine the case through the lens of only one individual rights-holder. However, by ignoring 
the difference between direct and indirect interference the only rationally remaining option 
open to it is to approach the right to family life as being commonly-held. 
Support for the idea that the ECtHR approaches the Article 8 ECHR right as being 
commonly-held can also be found in the Üner criteria themselves. The Üner criteria are clearly 
not applicable for determining Article 8 ECHR as an individual right of the children of FNOs. 
For example, the length of marriage of the child’s parents is irrelevant to an assessment of the 
child’s family life, not least because the child’s legitimacy is not a requirement for family 
life.331 Nor are the Üner criteria concerned only with the family life of the FNO as the child’s 
best interests may be harmed whereas the parent’s family life is substantially unaffected. For 
example, where the child is constructively deported along with the parent, the child’s best 
interests may be impaired by their dislocation from the UK, but the parent maintains their 
family relationship with the child because they remain resident with the child, albeit in a 
different country.  
If the ECtHR were to analyse the right to family life as being an individual right, the 
Üner criteria throws up a number of these theoretical inconsistencies. Instead, by viewing 
family life as being commonly-held, the ECtHR is able to construct a list of relevant interests 
which encompass the relevant interests of the FNO, their partner/spouse, the best interests of 
children, and the public interest. 
 
 
                                                          




3(b)(i) A commonly-held right to family life in UK law 
I argue that Article 8 ECHR as being a right that is commonly-held by the family unit as a 
whole is evident in UK case law. This stems in particular from the House of Lords judgment 
in Beoku-Betts.332 In Beoku-Betts, the court was asked to determine: 
 
…should the immigration appellate authorities take account of the impact of his 
proposed removal upon all those sharing family life with him or only its impact 
upon him personally (taking account of the impact on other family members only 
indirectly ie. only insofar as this would in turn have an effect upon him)?333 
 
The practical consequences for the conduct of appeals was central to the argument and 
decision in Beoku-Betts, and the normative implications of the questions for human rights were 
thereby somewhat side-lined. However, concluding the decision, the court suggested that ‘if 
the impact of removal on other family members is relevant only in so far as it causes the 
appellant distress and anxiety, that puts a premium on the appellant exaggerating his 
feelings.’334 More importantly, although not touched on by the court, is that if the impact of 
deportation on other family members is relevant only in so far as it causes the appellant distress 
and anxiety, then any consequence of deportation on other family members must be entirely 
ignored by the decision-maker. Any financial hardship, emotional distress, or negative practical 
consequence for the lives of other family members becomes irrelevant if they are not shared 
by the FNO. The best interests of the child would be rendered irrelevant because the FNO 
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parent does not feel the impact of deportation on the child’s education, health, identity, or 
emotional wellbeing. 
 As a consequence of the desire to ensure that the interests of other family members 
were included in Article 8 ECHR decisions, the House of Lords adopted a commonly-held right 
approach to family life finding that: 
 
…“there is only one family life”, and that, assuming the appellant's proposed 
removal would be disproportionate looking at the family unit as a whole, then each 
affected family member is to be regarded as a victim335 
 
In this formulation, the interference is with what they share – family life – rather than 
with a right that any of them can meaningfully possess individually. This commonly-held 
approach also appears to be the basis of argument by counsel for Mr Betts: 
 
The appellant submits that the legislation allows, indeed requires, the appellate 
authorities, in determining whether the appellant's article 8 rights have been 
breached, to take into account the effect of his proposed removal upon all the 
members of his family unit. Together these members enjoy a single family life and 
whether or not the removal would interfere disproportionately with it has to be 
looked at by reference to the family unit as a whole and the impact of removal upon 
each member. If overall the removal would be disproportionate, all affected family 
members are to be regarded as victims. In making her initial decision on removal 
                                                          




the Secretary of State must necessarily have regard to the article 8 rights of each 
and all of the family members.336 
 
In a short concurring decision Baroness Hale reinforced that the focus is on a totality of 
family life enjoyed by the family unit as a whole: 
 
the whole is greater than the sum of its individual parts. The right to respect for the 
family life of one necessarily encompasses the right to respect for the family life of 
others, normally a spouse or minor children, with whom that family life is 
enjoyed.337 
 
 However, two reasons may be advanced for suggesting that Beoku-Betts did not 
envisage a commonly-held right to family life, and instead envisaged an independent and 
separate Article 8 ECHR decision made for each individual affected by an FNO’s deportation. 
The first reason focusses on the central question in Beoku-Betts; are the Article 8 ECHR rights 
of the FNO’s family to be excluded from consideration in a deportation appeal because the 
family members were not parties to the appeal (as no deportation order was made against the 
family members). The consequence of considering the family members as ‘victims’ could be 
said to elevate the family members to a de facto status of parties to the appeal, and thus with 
individually distinct legal personality.  
 The second reason relies on the language describing ‘each’ family member as a victim. 
‘Each’ distinguishes the individuals as separate rather than conglomerated; linguistically we 
‘each’ claim our individual rights, but ‘all’ claim rights that we share. The focus on ‘each’ 
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member of the family as victims of a human rights breach in Beoku-Betts might suggest Article 
8 ECHR as individually, rather than commonly, held right. 
 There is some support for this in the cases which were determined in the immediate 
aftermath of the promulgation of the House of Lords judgment.  In R (Rainford), the language 
deployed is about the Article 8 ECHR claims of the family members being ‘separate’: 
 
 The Secretary of State did not consider as a separate matter as she should have 
done the consequences for the members of the claimant's family sharing family life 
with him of his removal338 
 
In CO (Nigeria), the focus was placed on the individuals: 
 
in Beoku-Betts it was said that proportionality of the impact of removal must be 
considered by reference to each family member and that […] involves consideration 
of J's right to a family life with his father.339 
 
In R (Kaplan),340 the Article 8 ECHR rights of the children involved appear to have been 
considered by the High Court independently and separately: 
 
Mr Collins [Kaplan’s counsel] put the education of the children in a different way 
in the alternative, which was that they too had a private life and the private life 
involved their education in this country, and that by being deprived of that 
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education, there was a realistic prospect that an IAT might take the view that, if 
they were to have to be deprived of that, there would be a breach of Article 8.341 
 
However, R (Kaplan) can be distinguished on the basis that the Article 8 ECHR claim 
advanced by the children in this case is explicitly one which relied on the private life aspect of 
Article 8 ECHR as a separate and alternative argument to family life.  
I argue that these examples are overwhelmed by cases which present a commonly-held 
basis to their understanding of how the right to family life works.  Baroness Hale had a later 
opportunity to comment on Beoku-Betts, this time in the context of entry clearance. Her 
comments coincide with a commonly-held approach to the right to family life, describing the 
assessment of family life to be conducted ‘in the round’: 
 
In Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 39, 
[2009] 1 AC 115, it was held that the interests of all family members have to be 
taken into account when assessing the article 8 claims of any of them. Thus the right 
to respect for the family life enjoyed by the sponsor and all three of these children 
should be looked at in the round. As I said in Beoku-Betts, at para 4, the totality of 
family life is greater than the sum of its individual parts.342 
 
The idea of a commonly-held right can also be found in decisions of the High Court and 
Court of Appeal. A number of judgments refer to the family life rights of partners and children 
making up part of the overall balancing exercise after Beoku-Betts, whereas they had been 
excluded from consideration before. For example, in AM (Jamaica): 
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The Immigration Judge in this case clearly considered the Article 8 rights of the 
appellant. He did not know that he was supposed also to bring into the balance the 
Article 8 rights of the partner and of the children of the whole family. He did not 
ask himself, “What is going to be the effect on these children of not having their 
father?”343 
 
Although the second question posed is about the effect on the children, it is framed within 
the context of bringing into the balance the Article 8 ECHR rights of the partner and child; the 
inference is that there is only one balancing decision to be made. The effect of Beoku-Betts 
appears to be that that the single balance should be populated not just by the family life rights 
of the FNO but also by the family life rights of his partner and child, considered as a unit. There 
is no indication that the issue is understood to be one of multiple balances which must be 
individually and separately considered. 
That there need not be a separate consideration of the situation as it applies to specifically 
to a child was forcefully applied in MA (Turkey) when permission to appeal to the Court of 
Appeal was refused: 
 
it is contended that the AIT did not have proper regard to the Article 8 rights of the 
son, contrary to the House of Lords decision in Beoku-Betts [2008] UKHL 39. Mr 
Yeo submits that no separate consideration is given to the impact on the son's 
Article 8 rights as is required by that decision. I am not persuaded that that is a 
properly arguable point which merits permission to appeal. It is important that one 
                                                          




should not be too impressed by the particular form of a decision. In this particular 
case the Tribunal expressly reminded themselves at paragraph 12 that they had to 
pay due regard to the interests of the applicant's five year-old son and to the impact 
on his rights of the deportation of the applicant. That being so, their subsequent 
consideration of the continuation of the limited contact between the two people, the 
son and the applicant, if the applicant were deported, has in my view to be seen as 
reflecting the impact on the child as well as the impact on the applicant. It was not 
incumbent upon the Tribunal to go through the exercise again spelling out 
specifically the effects on the child as well as on the applicant; the relationship was 
a two-way relationship.344 
 
In part 3(a) of this chapter, I argued that a separate and individual assessment of family 
life shifts the lens through which the enquiry is conducted and that this may fundamentally 
alter the assessment as to whether the interference with family life is proportionate. However, 
this approach is dismissed by the Court of Appeal here. Instead of a separate consideration of 
the son’s Article 8 ECHR rights, MA (Turkey) endorsed a single consideration of the ‘two-way 
relationship’. 
In Card345 the dispute was whether the Immigration Judge had considered the Article 8 
ECHR family life right of the FNO’s partner and child adequately after Beoku-Betts. 
Summarising Beoku-Betts, HHJ Waksman stated that: ‘the appellate authorities were to take 
account of the impact of the relevant person's proposed removal upon “all those sharing family 
life with him”.’346 To do so in this case: 
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in considering Mr Card's Article 8 rights, inevitably a view would need to be 
formed about whether Ms Knighton and her daughter could go to Jamaica to join 
him. It would be difficult to see how that could not form part of the tribunal's general 
considerations in a case of this kind. That in my judgment is not the same as 
considering directly the impact on their Article 8 rights of the removal of Mr Card 
in the context of the overall proportionality balancing exercise. So I do not accept 
that a Beoku-Betts-compliant exercise was undertaken in the second tribunal 
decision.347 
 
Beoku-Betts required the expansion of the enquiry from simply a question of whether the 
FNO’s partner and daughter could go to Jamaica to carry on their family life with the FNO, 
and thereby render the FNO’s Article 8 ECHR claim null for lack of interference. Instead, 
Beoku-Betts required that consideration be given to whether the partner’s ties to the UK and 
the daughter’s medical needs means that they should be required to leave the UK.348 This 
would clearly ensure that there was recognised an Article 8 ECHR interference in the family 
and that this interference weighed more heavily in the balancing exercise, but the context is 
still explicitly of a single ‘overall proportionality balancing exercise.’ 
 In AF (Jamaica), the language used is again that of the ‘family unit as a whole’349 and 
‘the overall balance of proportionality.’350 The language of a ‘whole family’ is repeated in SA 
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(Somalia); ‘the impact of a decision on the whole family has to be looked at rather than 
focussing on the impact indirectly on other members onto the particular applicant.’351 In DS 
(India),352 the description of what was required focussed on ‘all members of the family unit’ 
and the effect of the deportation on them contributing to the ‘overall’ issue of Article 8 ECHR 
proportionality.353 A single balancing exercise reappears in BM (India), and in this judgment 
the idea of a commonly held Article 8 ECHR right is described as being whether their rights 
‘together’ made the deportation order disproportionate: 
 
whether in the light of Article 8 he ought to be deported or whether this was a case 
where his Article 8 rights and those of his partner and his children, together with 
his Article 8 rights, should result in the deportation order not being confirmed. The 
Tribunal in terms reminded itself that the first instance determination was legally 
flawed because the interests of the children had not been properly weighed in the 
balance, and they sought then to balance these conflicting factors.354 
 
 Other judgments which grapple with Beoku-Betts seem to use both possible 
interpretations; that the Article 8 ECHR family life rights are both commonly- and individually-
held. In Sison, the issue was whether Beoku-Betts could be ‘read across’355 onto a claim based 
on the private life element of Article 8 ECHR. The appellant’s representative presented Beoku-
Betts in terms of considering ‘family as a unit’:  
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a Tribunal hearing an appeal by an individual who relies upon his or her Art 8 
right to respect for their family life should consider the family as a unit and 
consider the impact upon the family life of the other members of that family 
unit.356 
 
In deciding that there was a similarity between private and family life in this respect, UT 
Judge Grubb commented that ‘I see no reason in principle why private life existing between 
two individuals cannot be seen in the same way as family life in an appropriate case.’357 The 
similarity highlighted in this judgment seems to be that private life between individuals is 
relational and that it is the relationship between two individuals at stake, rather than the 
individual rights of either individual. However, in his conclusion, the judge talks in terms of a 
decision that was specifically about the rights of the third party and not the appellant Sison; the 
decision was taken about the ‘interference with Mrs Jost's rights’.358 
Similarly ambivalent between the two possible interpretations of Beoku-Betts is Mr 
Justice Coulson in Tshiteya. Here Beoku-Betts is described as requiring the Article 8 ECHR 
rights of an FNO’s child to be considered ‘separately’359 and requiring a consideration of ‘their 
individual Article 8 rights.’360 However, his conclusion then talks in terms of the Tribunal (to 
whom the decision was remitted) having to consider whether proper consideration of the 
circumstances of the child would ‘make a difference to the strength of the claimant's Article 
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8.’361 This reference to the child affecting the claimant FNO’s rights, not the decision being 
taken on the basis of the child’s independent Article 8 ECHR rights, rather undercuts the earlier 
reference to separate and individual rights held by the child. 
 Other decisions do not make it clear as to which possible interpretation of Beoku-Betts 
is preferred, such as in this paragraph from R (Myckoo): 
 
It also seems to me that since Beoku-Betts there is a more explicit basis for 
submissions to be made than would have been possible in 2004, to the effect that 
Taliah's human rights must themselves be given consideration in addition to those 
of the claimant.362 
 
 In this paragraph, there is no indication as to how the FNO’s daughter’s human rights 
ought to be ‘given consideration’. Nor is there clarity as to what it means to consider them ‘in 
addition’ to that of the claimant; a separate and independent human rights consideration that 
ought to be considered additionally to that of the FNO, or a human rights consideration which 
is additional to the FNO’s claim within a single balancing exercise? 
 There is a lack of clarity to Beoku-Betts. It confirms that the human rights of other 
family members is integral to deportation appeals, and that the effect of deportation on family 
is to be directly considered. However, there is no direct instructions on how this ought to occur. 
Although the House of Lords could have intended that the rights of the FNO’s family members 
ought to be considered separately and independently, it fails to make this clear. Instead the 
references to ‘there only being one family life’ and that family life is ‘greater than the sum of 
its parts’ have tended to trickle down to the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal, 
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particularly in the immediate period after the promulgation of the Beoku-Betts decision when 
many appeals and judicial reviews were being brought on the basis that Beoku-Betts 
represented a significant change in the law. The trend in these cases is to refer to a ‘whole 
family’ whose family life are relevant to the single Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise. The 
use of this language tends to support the idea of Article 8 ECHR family life as being commonly-
held rather than individually. Indeed, when the argument was explicitly made that there should 
be separate sequential consideration of the human rights of family members, this was explicitly 
rejected by the Court of Appeal. This lack of clarity in the judgments of the UK’s highest court 
is a phenomenon which is observable in chapter 6 with respect to the Supreme Court judgment 
in ZH (Tanzania). 
 
3(c) Polycentricity 
To interpret Article 8 ECHR as a commonly-held right ensures that the balancing exercise 
conforms to, and works within, the confines and limitations of the metaphor of the two-sided 
balance; a “simple balance approach”. Balancing scales are designed to compare the relative 
weights of two items and analysing family life as a commonly-held right simplifies the exercise 
into this familiar pattern. Unlike the analysis of family life as a series of individual rights, the 
balancing exercise required by a commonly-held right is one test which weighs two things; 
family life against the public interest. In order to be a polycentric decision-making process, the 
“simple balancing approach” must be able to ensure that all the relevant rights and interests of 
all the individuals affected by a deportation decision are considered. Under a commonly-held 
right, because there is only one family life, all the interests relevant to family life and the best 
interests of the child must be taken into account within the assessment of family life. However, 
by viewing family life as a commonly-held right, the “simple balancing approach” is unable to 
be truly polycentric. 
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 To look at ‘the family unit as a whole’,363 as required by Beoku-Betts, engages a specific 
version of a general critique of balancing as a decision-making tool in legal argument, namely 
that it cannot take into account all the relevant interests in the family life rights decision in 
deportation cases. Aleinikoff argues that balancing requires decision-makers to include 
consideration of a much wider range of relevant interests than the Üner criteria represent and 
that courts (including the ECtHR and UK courts) show willingness to engage with; ‘Taking 
balancing seriously would seem to demand the kind of investigation of the world that courts 
are unable or unwilling to undertake.’364  
Asking which holders of relevant interests should be counted within the family unit as a 
whole presents a significant question which a commonly-held right dynamic leave unanswered. 
First and foremost, when determining the value of family life, is the question considered 
through the perspective of the parent, the child, or a kind of amalgam of both? For example, in 
Joseph Grant the ECtHR felt unable to ‘overlook the fact that the applicant has never co-habited 
with any of his children.’365 In so finding, the ECtHR fails to consider the importance of a 
child’s relationship with non-resident parents and instead views the value of relationship 
through an adult-centric lens which equates resident nuclear families with responsibility and 
commitment. The ECtHR’s relies on an evidence-free assumption as to the value that the non-
resident parent places on the relationship with the child and non-residence is cited as evidence 
of lack of value placed on the relationship by the adult foreign national offender.  
However, even if the decision-maker were to assign the value of family life on the basis 
of an average achieved by combining the result of a child-centric lens and an adult-centric lens, 
then the decision-maker would fail to take into account the best interests of the child, as the 
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interests being taken into account fall short of what is best for the child. This is because the 
result of taking an average (either through a mean or a median) of two positions can never give 
a result equivalent to the highest value; the existence of a lower value will always result in the 
average being lower than the highest value in the range.  Therefore, in the process of averaging 
out the value of family life in a commonly-held right between the adult-centric and child-centric 
perspectives the resulting value cannot be what is in the best interests of the child. Only by 
assessing the value of family life through a child-centric lens can the decision-maker take into 
account the best interests of the child because assigning lesser value is necessarily less than 
best. Therefore approaching Article 8 ECHR as a commonly-held right has the effect of 
undermining the child’s best interests. 
 
3(d) Plurality of Decision-Making Norms 
The plurality of decision-making norms arise from the unique characteristics of Article 3 
UNCRC described in chapter 3. The best interests of the child under Article 3 UNCRC ought 
to be a primary consideration; ‘the child’s best interests may not be considered on the same 
level as all other considerations.’366 Secondly, only rights-based considerations ought to be 
balanced against the best interests of the child. The ECtHR itself is clearly not bound to the 
unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC; the Council of Europe is not (and may not be 
capable of being)367 a signatory of to the UNCRC, nor is it clear that the ECtHR’s introduction 
of the best interests of the child into the Üner criteria was intended by the Court to import a 
standard which it understood to be identical to the Article 3 UNCRC standard. However, this 
part argues that the “simple balancing approach” cannot address any of the issues thrown up 
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by the plurality of decision making norms and therefore the adoption of the “simple balancing 
approach” by UK courts would fail to give effect to the best interests of the child in deportation 
decisions. 
The first unique characteristic of the best interests of the child under Article 3 UNCRC 
is that the best interests ought to be a primary consideration. However, because the “simple 
balancing approach” to family life treats the family life right as commonly-held means that the 
child’s best interests are considered as part of an overall assessment of the family life right. To 
treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration must require that they are 
considered as a distinct and separate concern. As the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
observe, ‘If the interests of children are not highlighted, they tend to be overlooked.’368 Instead 
of being treated separately, in the “simple balancing approach” the best interests of the child 
must be folded into the assessment of family life of the family unit as a whole, alongside and 
part of the assessment of the interests of the FNO, and their partners/spouses. 
 The second unique characteristic of Article 3 UNCRC is that non-rights based 
arguments, such as those relating to general migration control, cannot override the best interests 
of the child.369 As argued in chapter 3, the public interest in crime and disorder are not, per se, 
rights based arguments because the public interest is not a right. However, the nature of the 
“simple balancing approach” clearly requires the balancing of the child’s interests (aggregated 
as the commonly-held family life right) against the expansive public interest rather than only 
the rights of others. 
 Again, we can see deportation law pulling in two competing directions between the 
protection of the innocent, vulnerable child and the deportation of FNOs as a public policy 
good. Sociologically, Webber suggests that the necessity of the deportation of FNOs has 
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become ‘axiomatic’ in public and political discourse.370 As de Noronha points out, foreign 
national criminals are the absolute opposites of the ‘good citizen’; bad foreigners.371 The FNO 
is therefore perceived as the architect of their own misfortune and Dembour argues that it is a 
pervasive feature of the ECtHR’s migration case law that: 
 
…it is the migrants who have provoked the family separation of which they 
complain. They are responsible for the situation which has arisen from their own 
actions, decisions, and choices, adopted of their own free will. They are also the 
ones on which the onus falls for sorting it out. If family relationships are so 
important to them, they can return to their country of origin. Family dislocation has 
nothing to do with the government – nor, then, with human rights.372 
 
This helps explain an emphasis in the case law (both at the ECtHR and in UK law) on 
deportation being a natural and automatic consequence of criminal offending by a foreign 
national. In UK law, there are ‘three “parts” of the public interest – avoiding the risk of 
reoffending, deterrence and public revulsion.’373 Although the ECtHR will engage in a forward 
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looking assessment of risk of reoffending,374 it is not consistent in doing so.375 Backward 
looking assessments based on such as the type of offence committed or the length of sentence 
imposed are as important to the ECtHR’s assessment of the weight of public interest in 
deportation. Therefore, at the ECtHR ‘The defendant state does not have to explain in detail 
how it understands its duty to act in its country’s best interests as regard its policy and practice 
on the admission/rejection of aliens.’376 
As a commonly-held right the emphasis for the court’s assessment is on the family unit 
and their relationships. This results in the child, as part of the family unit and the relationship 
with the foreign national offender, being identified with their parent’s offending. The focus 
becomes an adult one; is the offender’s family relationship worth preserving? This permits the 
family life as a whole, including the best interests of the child, to be balanced against the 
offending of the foreign national offender parent. 
The “simple balancing approach” therefore offends Article 3 UNCRC by balancing non-
rights-based considerations against the best interests of the child. This is predominantly a 
problem of content rather than structure; it is a decision of the ECtHR and UK courts to include 
non-rights-based considerations such as public revulsion at offending in its assessment of the 
public interest. The structural problem that is revealed is the apparent inability to reconcile the 
decision-making norms of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. To exclude non-rights-based 
considerations from the public interest would satisfy Article 3 UNCRC but would mean that 
some of the public interest considerations which Article 8 ECHR considers to be relevant to 
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deportation decisions would be ignored. This would offend the polycentricity of deportation 
decisions by excluding relevant interests from consideration in the decision. This structural 
problem in the “simple balancing approach” presents an impenetrable impasse. Because the 
“simple balancing approach” folds the best interests of the child assessment into the Article 8 
ECHR balancing exercise, it appears unable to give effect to the specific decision-making 
norms of both sets of human rights in deportation decisions. 
 
4. The Weight of Family Life: The Value of Family Life and the Gravity of Interference 
The second argument pursued in this chapter is that the ECtHR determines the overall weight 
of the family life side of the simple balance by reference to a relationship between the value of 
family life and the gravity of the interference with family life. Whereas the previous part of 
this chapter explored the nature of family life under Article 8 ECHR as being commonly-held 
addressed the framework for the balancing exercise, this part drills down to explore how the 
weight to family life is said by the ECtHR to be determined in practice. This is important 
because the process for assigning weight to family life within the balancing assessment engages 
both the polycentricity of deportation decisions and the plurality of decision-making norms.  
I argue that consideration of the value of family life and the gravity of the interference 
with family life derives from the ECtHR’s attempt to make rational use of the Üner criteria 
which it set out for itself. The adoption of the Üner criteria was in part driven by the charge of 
arbitrariness, and indeed one of the ECtHR’s own judges described its deportation case law as 
being ‘tainted with arbitrariness.’377 Academic analysis has generally agreed with this 
assessment. Dembour’s review of the deportation case law caused her to conclude that an 
analysis of the factual matrixes of the cases provided ‘little help in explaining the variation’ in 
                                                          





decision-making outcome.378 Warbrick likewise concluded that it was ‘undeniable’ that ‘there 
is a degree of unpredictability about the outcome of cases under Article 8’379 and Spijkerboer 
argued that the ECtHR’s case law is ‘inconsistent’.380 
Others have sought an empirically sound, definitive doctrinal statement as to the content 
of Article 8 ECHR, such as that deportation will be disproportionate when the foreign national 
offender is a second-generation migrant381 or where the child is not ‘adaptable’.382 However 
each have been faced with decisions which appear to contradict such definitive statements. 
Summarising the case law, Janis et al conclude that:  
 
Close individualized examination of the applicant’s family life in the deporting and 
destination countries, and of the applicant’s record of criminal behaviour, has 
resulted in a jurisprudence about which few generalizations are possible.383  
 
The Üner criteria might be seen as an appropriate response to the absence of generalisable 
principles. The Üner criteria seek to impose a checklist of relevant factors to guide decision-
makers as to the content of Article 8 ECHR family life. However, the articulation of the Üner 
criteria as a linear checklist is problematic. As the dissent to the Üner judgment observed: 
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…apart from the seriousness of the offence, all the “[Üner] criteria” seem to us to 
point to a violation of Article 8. […] Hence, the only way in which the finding of a 
non-violation can possibly be justified, when the “[Üner] criteria” […] are applied, 
is by lending added weight to the nature and seriousness of the crime.384 
 
The multitude of criteria therefore causes problems of weight and priority which the 
ECtHR does not address directly in the Üner judgment or its subsequent case law. The joint 
dissent in Üner asks rhetorically: 
 
…how do we assign relative weight to the various factors on the basis of some ten 
guiding principles – are we not seeing here the implicit emergence of a method 
which gives priority to one criterion, relating to the offence, and treats the others as 
secondary or marginal?385 
 
 The challenge is laid down for the ECtHR to explain whether the Üner criteria do 
indeed require that the factors which make up the family life are secondary or marginal to the 
offence committed. The Spartan use of language in ECtHR judgments can make it difficult to 
assess, as an external observer, how the ECtHR has weighed individual factors in specific 
cases. As Dembour observes in this context, ‘Facts are vulnerable to contrasting interpretations 
and different people, including judges, dress them differently’.386 What follows is a post-facto 
analysis of the ECtHR’s case law, the aim of which is to determine some pattern in the ECtHR’s 
                                                          
384 Üner v Netherlands (n20), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Zupančič, and Türmen, [81]  
 
385 Üner v Netherlands (n20), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Zupančič, and Türmen, [82]  
 




case law as to the balancing exercise in deportation cases. I do not suggest that any one judge, 
or the court collectively, consciously engages with Article 8 ECHR cases in the way outlined 
by this analysis. However, I do argue that it reflects the pattern of decision-making which 
emerges from the body of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in deportation cases. 
 Instead of a list of ten guiding principles addressed in a linear checklist, I argue that the 
ECtHR determines the weight of family life by reference to a relationship between the value 
of the family life and the gravity of the interference. However, despite the Üner criteria’s 
explicit reference to the best interests of the child, the reduction of family life to the value of 
the family life and the gravity of the interference means that much of what is otherwise 
considered to be part of the best interests of the child is excluded from consideration; for 
example, considerations of the health and physical wellbeing of the child, the safety of their 
physical environment, or aspects of the child’s emotional welfare, including the continuity and 
stability of their life circumstances. Instead, the value of family life and gravity of interference 
are reduced to simple markers of cohabitation, and of belonging or integration in the deporting 
state. By eschewing a rich understanding of the best interests of the child, the ECtHR case law 
fails the test of polycentricity. Furthermore, by considering the child’s best interests across two 
different metrics rather than as a single, separate factor in its own right, the ECtHR is unable 
to give effect to the requirement under Article 3 UNCRC that the best interests of the child be 
a primary consideration. Each of these critiques is addressed in depth in parts 3(b) and 3(c). 
Part 3(a) begins by analysing the ECtHR Article 8 ECHR case law and its reduction of the 
Üner criteria into a pattern of value of the family life and the gravity of the interference. 
 
4(a) The Value of Family Life and Gravity of the Interference with Family Life 
Instead of using the Üner criteria as a linear checklist, I argue that the ECtHR determines the 
weight of family life as a relationship between the value of the family life and the gravity of 
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the interference. It is important to note here the definitional distinction between value and 
weight. The metaphor of a balance, as in the “simple balancing approach” to Article 8 ECHR, 
suggests that what is placed on either side of the balance has weight and that the relative weight 
of one side over the other determines the outcome of the balancing exercise. I argue that the 
value of family life and the gravity of interference are the two ultimate factors relevant to 
determining the overall weight assigned to the applicant’s side of the balance. Value and gravity 
are two organising principles under which the ECtHR corrals the multiple Üner criteria relevant 
to the weight of family life. By organising the Üner criteria into two simpler concerns the 
ECtHR is able to rationally assign relative weight to the multiple factors which would 
otherwise overwhelmingly point towards a violation of Article 8 ECHR in all cases (as 
identified by the dissenting judges in Üner). 
The assessment of the relative value of family life is only one aspect of the overall 
weight of the family life, and as such the value of family life is not singularly determinative of 
its weight in the balancing exercise. I argue that this relationship between the value of family 
life and the gravity of interference thereby comprises the way in which the overall weight of 
family life is measured in order to place it in the balancing exercise against the public interest 
in deportation. The interests which are taken into account in an assessment of the value of 
family life are magnified by those interests expressing the gravity of interference. 
There is also a difference in the ECtHR’s enquiry as to the existence of family life and 
its value. This part delineates the difference between these enquiries (part 3(a)(i)) before 
examining the way in which the ECtHR determines the value of family life (part 3(a)(ii)) and 
the gravity of the interference (part 3(a)(iii)). The relationship between the two concerns is 





4(a)(i) The Difference Between the Existence of Family Life and its Value 
The value of family life is a different enquiry from whether there is family life that engages 
Article 8 ECHR in the first place; a logically prior enquiry because if there is no family life 
which exists to engage the substantive Convention right, then there is no right to protect. 
Indeed, the first two questions of the Razgar enquiry in UK law are concerned precisely with 
this issue; is there an interference which engages with a right?387 Therefore the ECtHR’s first 
enquiry is as to the existence of family life, which it determines on the basis of de jure and de 
facto family life. The Court will presume that family life exists on the basis of blood or marriage 
and conducts a short enquiry as to whether there are sufficient de facto ties to amount to family 
life in other relationships.388 
 However, whilst the ECtHR will readily find family life to exist, this does not mean 
that it considers all family lives to have equal claims to protection. The ECtHR finds that some 
family relationships are closer, more committed – of more value – than others. This distinction 
between the existence of family life and its value is illustrated in Joseph Grant. In this case, 
the ECtHR found that there existed a family life that engaged Article 8 ECHR between Grant 
and his daughter because children born to a married couple are ‘ipso jure part of that family 
from the moment of birth’.389 However, the family life established by Grant and his daughter 
was found to have a low relative value because the ECtHR ‘cannot overlook the fact that the 
applicant has never co-habited with any of his children.’390 Lack of cohabitation between Grant 
and his daughter did not invalidate the existence of family life between them so as to engage 
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Article 8 ECHR – after all, ‘cohabitation is not a sine qua non of “family life” for the purposes 
of Article 8’391 – but cohabitation was clearly relevant to the Court’s assessment as to some 
other metric in the balancing exercise.  This other metric is what I describe as being the value 
that the family life held. 
 
4(a)(ii) Defining the Value of Family Life 
Van Walsum argues that ‘Decisions concerning the admission of family members inevitably 
touch on fundamental questions regarding the definition and value of family bonds.’392 In the 
balancing exercise, the ECtHR concerns itself with the value of the family life of the applicant. 
The value of family life is therefore the ECtHR’s assessment of the relative quality of family 
life and thus how much protection from interference it might deserve.  
The value of the family life is an obvious place to look for evidence of the ECtHR’s 
consideration of the ‘the best interests and well-being of the children’, as per its commitment 
in the Üner criteria. However, the lapse of time involved in the development of legal 
obligations to the best interests of the child means that it is difficult to disentangle precisely 
when the ECtHR considered the best interests of the child to be an essential component of the 
Article 8 ECHR right to family life. The addition of the best interests of the child into the list 
of criteria was described by the ECtHR in the 2006 Grand Chamber decision in Üner as a ‘wish 
to make explicit two criteria which may already be implicit393 As authority the Court cited two 
of its earlier decisions; Tuquabo-Tekle394 and Şen.395 Both these earlier cases were related to 
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challenges against the state refusal to allow the entry of a foreign national child into its territory 
for the purpose of family reunion. The factual background of these cases was therefore 
substantially different from cases involving the deportation of a FNO, and the ECtHR found in 
both Tuquabo-Tekle and Şen that the positive obligations of the state were engaged396  (in 
contrast to deportation cases where the ECtHR collapses the distinction).397 Neither Tuquabo-
Tekle nor Şen use the language of the best interests of the child. Instead, the ECtHR states it 
‘will have regard to the age of the children concerned, their situation in their country of origin 
and the extent to which they are dependent on their parents.’398 
 Moreover, it is not clear whether in Üner the ECtHR had in mind a definition of the 
best interests of the child which was commensurate with Article 3 UNCRC as only much later 
is the ECtHR’s explicitly finds that the principles of Article 3 UNCRC are relevant for the 
proper interpretation of Article 8 ECHR. In the 2010 Grand Chamber case of Neulinger and 
Shuruk, the ECtHR found that ‘there is currently a broad consensus – including in international 
law – in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must 
be paramount’.399 In 2011, the ECtHR further developed its jurisprudence and placed reliance 
on both Article 3 UNCRC and its own judgment in Neulinger and Shuruk to ground its finding 
of a violation of Article 8 ECHR in a removal case, Nunez.400 It is not then obvious at what 
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stage the ECtHR sought to set out a principle of the child’s best interests of equal content or 
status as to that in the UNCRC. 
I argue that consequently the ECtHR’s case law on deportation has adopted a very narrow 
view of what considerations are relevant to the best interests of the child and this narrow 
understanding has made it difficult for UK courts, following the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to 
give effect to the best interests of the child to its fullest extent. In chapter 2, although it was 
clear that there was some disagreement as to the precise content of the best interests of the 
child, there was general agreement that it encompassed the child’s emotional and physical 
welfare and development. This includes considerations of the child’s education, health and 
social networks beyond the nuclear family. However, when it comes to assessing the value of 
family life between foreign national offender applicant and their child, the ECtHR appears to 
use cohabitation with the foreign national offender parent as the only relevant consideration. 
For example, in Üner itself, the Court found that: 
 
…it cannot overlook the fact that the applicant lived with his partner and first-
born son for a relatively short period only, that he saw fit to put an end to the 
cohabitation, and that he never lived together with his second son.401 
 
The Court engages in an evidence-free judgment of the value of family life based on 
parent-child cohabitation in other cases such as Onur, where again, the ECtHR finds without 
reference to any evidence in support of its assertion that deportation ‘is unlikely to have had 
the same impact as it would if the applicant and his daughter had been living together’.402 The 
ECtHR takes no account of the benefit to children with non-resident parents. Such benefits may 
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include intangible emotional support, as well as practical assistance with homework, extra-
curricular activities, etc. These were precisely the aspects of parent-child relationships which 
the ECtHR cited in Antwi403 when finding a high value of family life between cohabiting parent 
and child, and yet the ECtHR ignores it where the parent and child do not live together. 
However, the ECtHR’s assessment of the value of family life between applicant and 
their children cannot by itself account for its decision making.  Even in cases where the Court 
assesses the value of family life to be similar, the outcome is not always the same. In Udeh, the 
applicant did not live with his children and custody was ‘awarded to the mother but the first 
applicant was granted access right’404 but ultimately the ECtHR found that Article 8 ECHR 
was violated. In Onur, the applicant also did not live with his child but had a contact 
arrangement, ‘spending on average two to three days a week with him.’405 Notwithstanding the 
similar nature of the family life to that in Udeh, no violation of Article 8 ECHR was found in 
Onur. On the other hand, cases with evidence of different value to family life will not 
necessarily result in correspondingly different outcomes; although Joseph Grant did not cohabit 
with his daughter and no violation of Article 8 ECHR was found by the ECtHR, there was also 
no violation found in El-Habach where ‘the applicant lived together with his younger daughter 
N. from her birth’.406 
To account for the different outcomes of these cases I argue that the value of family life 
cannot be the only consideration relevant to the overall weight to given to the ECtHR to the 
family life. I argue that the ECtHR engages in a more complex analysis of the weight of family 
life by placing the value of family life in relationship with factors which express the gravity of 
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the interference. Therefore where two family lives share the same value, greater weight in the 
balancing exercise will be given where the gravity of interfering with that family life is greater.  
 
4(a)(iii) The Gravity of the Interference with Family Life 
If family life can be of variable value then the interference with family life can also be 
experienced with greater or lesser intensity. The value of family life is not determinative of 
how interference with it is felt. Even if a family life is of great value, interference may be felt 
less keenly than in situations where family life is of low value. Where the interference is felt 
with more intensity the gravity of the interference is greater. The overall weight given to family 
life in the balancing exercise is therefore a combination of both the factors expressing the value 
of family life and gravity of the interference. The gravity of interference can be expressed with 
reference to the Üner criteria: 
 
- the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to be 
expelled;  
- the nationalities of the various persons concerned;  
- whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age;  
- the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in 
the country to which the applicant is to be expelled 
- …the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are 
likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; 
and  
- the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with 
the country of destination.407 
                                                          




Each of these reflects aspects of the family members’ membership, belonging, or 
integration in the receiving and deporting country. The overriding concern is whether the 
circumstance of the family’s integration in the deporting state and continuing relationship, if 
any, with the receiving state means that the interference is believed by the ECtHR to be felt 
more or less keenly. These factors are, I argue, used by the ECtHR to determine whether the 
interference with family life is of more or less gravity in the case before it. 
Two of the Üner criteria are concerned with whether the family can follow the foreign 
national offender to the receiving state. The only reasonable underlying rationale, albeit one 
that is absent from explicit exposition in the ECtHR’s case law, is that where family unity can 
be maintained in the receiving state (normally the state of nationality of the foreign national 
offender) the primary objection to deportation – family separation – is overcome. The primary 
interference in such circumstances is with other interests which make up the family life right; 
what the ECtHR calls ‘social and family ties’, but which I argue are also interpreted by the 
Court as being markers of integration or belonging. 
These other interests also reintroduce previously typical aspects of private life as relevant 
interests in the assessment of the family life right. Although Article 8 ECHR protects both 
private and family life, the ECtHR treats the private life or family life of an applicant as being 
two separate area of protection and will choose to focus its rights analysis to exclusively one 
or the other.408 After Slivenko409 the ECtHR restricted: 
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…its formerly wide understanding [of family life] with a new focus on the 
‘nuclear family’ of spouses and minor children, while at the same time 
broadening the protective reach of Article 8 ECHR to the network of personal, 
social and economic relations that make up the private life of every human 
being410 
 
Thus in Sarközi and Mahran411, the applicants had family life with each other (as mother 
and son) and this family life would be interfered with by Sarközi’s deportation to Hungary 
because Mahran was an Austrian national who would be able to remain there with his Austrian 
father, thereby splitting up mother and son.412 In addition, Sarközi had relationships with ‘her 
[adult] daughter from a first marriage, her daughter’s husband and child, her brother and her 
parents.’413 However, the human right to family life under Article 8 ECHR was restricted by 
the ECtHR to consideration of the nuclear family relationship between Sarközi and Mahran as 
mother and son. Only this parent-child relationship was protected by the presumption of 
priority afforded to Article 8 ECHR as a human right, and not the family relationship between 
Sarközi and her extended family. Because the ECtHR will focus on either family or private 
life, the ECtHR examined the case as one of family life between Sarközi and Mahran only.414 
Despite this focus on family life as the sole right engaged, the ECtHR considered Sarközi’s 
‘close family and social ties in Austria’415 with her extended family as a relevant interest to be 
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considered in determining the proportionality of the interference with her right to family life 
under Article 8 ECHR. These private life considerations were clearly relevant as an interest 
protected by family life equal in status to other interests such as the severity of offending, the 
length of exclusion from Austria, and the length of Sarközi’s residence in Austria.416 
Similarly in Paposhvili the ECtHR took into account ‘the fact that the applicant’s wife 
and children […] have developed social ties there [Belgium]’.417 Again, rather than protect 
these as a right to private life, the social ties of the Paposhvili family were taken into account 
as interests relevant to their family life. Where an interference with Article 8 ECHR is found 
to be disproportionate because of the interference with the family’s social ties with the 
deporting state,418 the violation is of the right to family life, not with the individual right to 
private life of the foreign national’s wife and children. This is also further evidence that Article 
8 ECHR is considered to be commonly-held. 
 Although whether the nuclear family can follow the foreign national offender to the 
receiving state is a relevant factor in the ECtHR’s decision making419 that the family cannot go 
does not guarantee that a violation of Article 8 ECHR will be found. In Mbengeh the ECtHR 
found that because the foreign national offender’s wife and son were Finnish nationals who 
had never lived in Gambia, did not speak the language and had no other ties there, they could 
not ‘be expected to follow the applicant’.420 Nevertheless, not only was this not a barrier to the 
deportation of the applicant, the whole case was found to be manifestly ill-founded.421  
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 Whether the child can be expected to go to the receiving state with the deported foreign 
national offender is a question which the ECtHR uses to conflate three of the Üner criteria; 
age, nationality, and ‘the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are 
likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled’. The ECtHR reduces 
these to a question of the ‘adaptability’ of the child to a change of environment.422 Where the 
children ‘are young and able to adapt to a new environment’ no infringement of Article 8 ECHR 
will be generally be found.423 This operates on the level of presumption, with little 
consideration made of the other subjective factors which may make it more or less likely that 
an individual child would actually be able to adapt.424 The ECtHR also presupposes that young 
children are adaptable, yet it does not also maintain a presumption that older children are not 
adaptable.425 But more fundamentally, the focus on the child’s adaptability is clearly 
problematic because of the fact that the best interests of the child is concerned above all with 
what is in the best interests of the child. A child may adapt to conditions which are sub-optimal, 
but the capacity of the child to adapt does not transform a condition from being sub-optimal to 
being in the child’s best interests. 
The nationality of the child is used by the ECtHR as a criterion but on its face, its use 
is inconsistent in the extreme. In Udeh, the applicant’s daughter’s Swiss nationality seemed 
influential in the ECtHR’s finding that they ‘could hardly be obliged to follow the first 
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applicant to Nigeria.’426 In Shala, although the children were Kosovar nationals, they had been 
born and brought up in Germany and ‘could not be expected to move to Kosovo’.427 But the 
ECtHR does not apply a general principle that the constructive deportation of national or 
‘quasi-national’428 children should be avoided. Indeed, being nationals of the deporting state 
was actively disadvantageous in the cases of Üner and Onur as in both cases the ECtHR found 
that the child’s citizenship of the deporting state meant that the gravity of the interference with 
the child’s family life was lessened because they could regularly visit other family members 
being left behind.429 The only sensible way of distinguishing the way in which the ECtHR 
treated the issue of nationality in these cases is to point to the ages of the children involved. In 
Shala the children were (at the time of decision) aged between 11 to 21 years old430 and in 
Udeh they were ten years old.431 In contrast, the children were much younger in Onur (just 
under two years old)432 and Üner (six years old).433 The Üner criteria of nationality appears 
thus to be entirely redundant in the ECtHR’s analysis as no greater protection is given to 
national children from constructive deportation. The ECtHR therefore appears to assess the 
belonging of the family not on the basis of de jure ties of nationality, but on de facto 
connections. This has the unfortunate side-effect of the ECtHR making a decision that although 
a child may be a national of the state, they do not truly belong. Assessment of the gravity of 
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interference on the basis of their de jure nationality ties to the state would have demanded equal 
outcomes in all four cases. The differences in treatment of the deporting state’s nationals can 
therefore only be accounted for by reference to the de facto connections that the children were 
able to show to the state; connections that older children (as in Shala and Udeh) are more likely 
to have established. 
If nationality is not a marker of belonging in the ECtHR, then what factors are considered 
as marking a foreign national offender and their family as belonging to the deporting state? 
That belonging or integration is an increasingly important dimension of the Article 8 ECHR 
jurisprudence, particularly in relation to the Üner criteria has been recognised by scholars.434 
The factual circumstances found to be relevant to the Court’s decision about the belonging 
related criteria are those things which touch on, ‘the acquisition of nationality; links to the 
country of nationality; language; and labour market integration’.435 Other scholars have 
attempted to decode a ‘hidden agenda’ behind the introduction of a standard of belonging or 
integration. Cholewinski argued that this agenda was designed to uphold the right of residence 
of second-generation migrants by strengthening their hand in the balancing exercise.436 Such a 
development would be consistent with wishes of the Parliamentary Assembly who have 
declared that second-generation migrants should be afforded the same protection against 
deportation as citizens.437 On the other hand, others have identified the integration standard as 
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a malleable device which is used to reject claims for protection; ‘that relatively tenuous links 
have been seen to establish significant ties to the country of origin’.438 Whether a person can 
be assumed to be able to integrate into the receiving state has also been recently explored in 
UK law. In Kamara, the Court of Appeal found that: 
 
The idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to 
whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding 
how life in the society of that other country is carried on and a capacity to 
participate in it, so that as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, 
to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within 
a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the 
individual’s private or family life.439 
 
The tensions created by the adoption of an integration standard are vividly described by 
de Hart in her description of the Omeregie440 case. Whereas the applicants sought to portray 
Nigeria as a dangerous ‘other’,441 the ECtHR described Nigeria as being similar to the 
deporting state; a commonly spoken language in both countries was English and the applicant’s 
Norwegian wife had previously lived in South Africa (‘as if Africa was one country, and 
everything was the same.’)442 
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It is not however only the applicant FNO’s belonging and integration which are 
assessed as part of the gravity of the interference with their family life, but also the presumed 
belonging and integration of their family. In particular, the ECtHR will consider the possibility 
of the family of the FNO relocating elsewhere.443 This is a common thread in the ECtHR case 
law comprising two strands; how well they are integrated into the deporting state and what 
links they have with the receiving state. For example, in Omojudi the ECtHR examined on the 
one hand the fact that the FNOs wife had lived in the UK for 26 years and had ‘strong’ ties to 
the UK, and the children were born in the UK and had spent their whole lives there. On the 
other hand, the wife had left Nigeria as an adult and so it was determined to be ‘likely that she 
would be able to re-adjust to life there’, although the children would ‘likely encounter 
significant difficulties’ in relocating.444 In Antwi, a similar direct comparison of the child’s 
belonging between the deporting and receiving state was conducted. On the one hand, the child 
was a Norwegian national who had spent her whole life there, ‘is fully integrated into 
Norwegian society’ and spoke Norwegian. In comparison, her links to Ghana were ‘very 
limited’ as she had only visited three times and had ‘little knowledge’ of the local language.445  
The dual concern with whether the applicant’s family can be said to belong in either the 
deporting or receiving state places trans-national and diaspora families at a considerable 
disadvantage in having their situation recognised as a violation of human rights. If indicators 
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of belonging to the receiving state cancel out those indicators which indicate belonging to the 
deporting state then, as Murphy observes, ‘This approach would seem to require migrants to 
relinquish the identity of their country of origin in order to secure their place in the deporting 
society.’446 Article 3 UNCRC includes considerations of the child’s identity explicitly 
according to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,447 and implicitly under the welfare 
checklist in s1(3) Children Act 1989.448 Moreover, Article 8 UNCRC grants children a right to 
identity; a right with potential application to issues of cultural identity.449 The right to private 
life aspect of Article 8 ECHR also includes protection for one’s identity.450 This means that the 
ECtHR overlooks this important identity aspect of the child’s rights under the European 
Convention as well as an essential aspect of their best interests under Article 3 UNCRC. 
The gravity of interference is therefore an assessment by the ECtHR as to how intensively 
the FNO and their family are assumed to feel any interference with their family life. The ECtHR 
assumes that any interference with family life will be of less gravity where the foreign national 
offender and their family cannot be said to properly “belong” to the deporting state. Likewise, 
the ECtHR assumes that interference with family life will be of lesser gravity if the family 
“belong” in the eyes of the ECtHR in the receiving state. 
 
4(a)(iv) The Relationship Between Value of Family Life and the Gravity of Interference 
I have argued in this chapter that both the value of family life and the gravity of interference 
with the family life right are important independent factors in the ECtHR’s Article 8 ECHR 
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balancing exercise, but that individually they do not account for the outcome of decisions. That 
value and gravity are independent concerns is evident; the factors of belonging cannot be said 
to go to the value of the family life of the applicant because a foreign national offender’s 
relationship with their children or partner may be strong, close and dedicated, even if they lack 
any of the significant markers of integration with the deporting state. Visa versa, the foreign 
national offender may have a relatively weak relationship with their family, but have no 
connection with the receiving state other than de jure nationality. The overall weight given to 
the family life in the ECtHR’s balancing exercise is, I argue, therefore determined by a 
relationship between the value of family life and the gravity of interference with that family 
life. 
This relationship between two factors better accounts for the ECtHR’s decisions than 
scholarly accounts to date which have focused on one factor alone to explain the ECtHR’s case 
law. For example, Spijkerboer observes that: 
 
…the Court both interprets the (in)voluntary nature of the separation between 
parents and children, and considers it not to be decisive. […] The Court 
addresses whether the family can move to the country of origin, and considers it 
not to be decisive.451 
 
Where the weight of family life is comprised of a relationship between two independent 
factors – the value of family life and the gravity of interference – neither can be independently 
decisive or determinative. A high level of value may be offset by a low level of gravity (or visa 
versa) and thus the overall weight of family life is not determined independently by either one 
                                                          




or the other. Hence in a decision such as Omojudi an Article 8 ECHR violation was found 
despite the unexceptional circumstances of the value of the family life in question, comprising 
in that case a relationship with his wife and children.452 Key to that decision appeared to be the 
‘considerable weight’ that the ECtHR placed on the length of residence and strength of ties that 
the applicant’s wife and children (including citizenship in the latter cases) had with the UK.453 
Likewise, a violation was found in AW Khan, despite his heroin importation offence attracting 
a seven year custodial sentence.454 In this case, the applicant had a significantly limited family 
life comprising of a recently born British citizen child, and a recent girlfriend whom the court 
found could relocate to Pakistan.455 In contrast, the applicant’s markers of belonging to the UK 
– the ‘strength of ties with the UK’, lack of ties with Pakistan, the length of his residence in the 
UK, and the young age at which he entered the UK456 – all magnified the gravity of the 
interference to the extent to which his deportation was found disproportionate to the public 
interest.457 
 The markers of belonging clearly affect the outcome of cases. For example, in both 
Aponte458 and El-Habach459 the value of family life was substantially similar to that in 
Omojudi; in all cases comprising a relationship with a spouse or partner, and children.460 
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However, the applicants in Aponte461 and El-Habach462 had considerable ties to their countries 
of nationality and El-Habach463 had low labour market integration in the deporting state. In 
both cases no violation of Article 8 ECHR was found464 whereas a violation of Article 8 ECHR 
was found in Omojudi where his integration in the deporting state was greater and therefore 
could be expected to feel the gravity of the interference more keenly. 
 I argue that this relationship between the value of family life and the gravity of 
interference thereby comprises the way in which family life is measured in order to place it in 
the balancing exercise against the public interest in deportation. The interests which are taken 
into account in an assessment of the value of family life are magnified by those interests 
expressing the gravity of interference. Thus in the overall evaluation of family life the weight 
is a combination of the two. Where both the value of family life and the gravity of interference 
is high, the overall weight given to family life will be greater than situations where the value 
is low and gravity high, or value is high and gravity low. Correspondingly, the weight given to 
family life will be least where both the value of family life and the gravity of interfering with 
it are low. The weight of family life, assessed on this basis, is then placed on one side of the 
Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise and weighed against the public interest on the other. 
 
4(b) Polycentricity 
Although the Üner criteria require consideration of the ‘best interests and well-being of the 
children’, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the ECtHR’s case law discloses inadequate 
engagement with the best interests of the child, either substantively or procedurally. This is an 
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inevitable consequence of the ECtHR’s case law which boils down the Üner criteria to a 
consideration of the value of family life and the gravity of the interference, to the exclusion of 
many of the other factors which make up the best interests of the child. 
 This is reinforced as the ECtHR’s engages only with the dimensions of the child’s best 
interests which reflect their family bond, age and country ties. This only reflects a partial 
picture of what Article 3 UNCRC envisions as being encompassed by the ‘best interests’ of the 
child (as is clear from chapter 2). As Ciara Smyth observes, ‘it is unclear why the Court fastens 
onto these particular factors. Approaching the best interests of the child from a rights-based 
perspective, there are, arguably, more obvious factors to consider.’465 For example, a focus on 
the dimension of belonging as between the deporting and receiving state places ‘greater weight 
to the strength of past connections than to the significance of future potentialities, including 
the potential for a child to realise and enjoy her Convention rights.’466 Furthermore, both the 
assessment of value of family life and the question of belonging are also determined abstractly 
by the ECtHR without reference to the child’s own views. In contrast, the child’s age-
appropriate view is both a component of Article 3 UNCRC,467 and a free-standing right under 
Article 4 UNCRC.468  
 Socio-economic rights are directly relevant to the child, such as health and education.469 
An example of how the ECtHR could take into account the right to education is to be found in 
its own deportation case law. In Keles, the Court found that: 
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…the applicant’s four sons […] entered Germany at a very young age where 
they received all their school education. Even if the children should have 
knowledge of the Turkish language, they would necessarily have to face major 
difficulties with regard to the different language of instruction and the different 
curriculum in Turkish schools.470 
 
 Clearly the overriding concern here was with the children’s education as an aspect of 
their best interests. The ability or otherwise to engage in the curriculum because of its different 
content, or language of instruction, are clearly relevant to the child’s effective access to the 
educational content. Compare the attitude in Keles to that in Palanci where assessment of the 
child’s interests in education is exhausted by an observation by the ECtHR that ‘they were to 
return to Ankara, a city with a well-established education system.’471 The differences the 
children would experience in terms of the language of instruction and curriculum would be the 
same as between the dislocation to Turkey in Keles and in Palanci, but the decision to consider 
education as a relevant aspect of the best interests of the child in Keles is a conscious decision 
by the Court. It is clear then that, other than the exception in Keles, the ECtHR’s interpretation 
of the Üner criteria of ‘the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the 
seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the 
country to which the applicant is to be expelled’ is exhausted by considerations of the children’s 
adaptability rather than being coincident with a full understanding of the best interests of the 
child. 
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The first clear problem with the ECtHR’s case law is therefore that it excludes 
consideration of a great deal of what is otherwise an aspect of the best interests of the child. 
When it comes to assessing the value of family life between FNO and their child, the ECtHR 
appears to use cohabitation with the foreign national offender parent as the only relevant 
consideration. As for the gravity of the interference, the ECtHR’s balance only measures the 
membership, belonging, or integration of the family members in the receiving and deporting 
country. These reflect only a partial picture of what Article 3 UNCRC envisions as being 
encompassed by the ‘best interests’ of the child. It excludes, for example, considerations of the 
health and physical wellbeing of the child, the safety of their physical environment, or aspects 
of the child’s emotional welfare, including the continuity and stability of life circumstances.472 
This may be partly as a function of the narrow scope of the ECHR as against the broader scope 
of the UNCRC. Whereas the ECHR only explicitly includes civil and political rights,473 the 
UNCRC ‘covers not only civil and political rights but also social, economic, cultural and 
humanitarian rights.’474 The UNCRC clearly presents a richer concept of the best interests of 
the child than the ECHR. A narrow understanding of the best interests of the child means that 
the “simple balancing approach” to Article 8 ECHR is not effectively polycentric because it 
cannot accommodate all the relevant aspects of the best interests of the child. 
  
 4(c) The Plurality of Decision-Making Norms 
The “simple balancing approach” also fails to give effect to the unique characteristic of the best 
interests of the child under Article 3 UNCRC, that the best interests ought to be a primary 
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consideration. To treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration must require 
that they are considered as a distinct and separate concern. However, instead of being treated 
separately, in the “simple balancing approach” the best interests of the child are folded into the 
factors of importance of family life and gravity of interference, alongside and part of the 
assessment of the interests of the FNO, and their partners/spouses. By dividing the relevant 
factual matrix in this manner, the ECtHR cannot make an assessment as to what is in the best 
interests of the child as a separate and independent consideration.  
Instead, different aspects of what make up the best interests of the child are subject to 
consideration which is paradoxically both isolated and indivisible. In the “simple balancing 
approach”, the different aspects of the child’s interests are given isolated assessment because 
they are split between the importance of family life and gravity of interference, rather than 
considered holistically as a view taken as to what is in the best interests of the child. At the 
same time, the best interests of the child are made part of an assessment which is indivisible as 
between the interests of the child and the interests of others. If we take again the example in 
Joseph Grant where the ECtHR assessed the value of family life on the basis that the foreign 
national offender had never cohabited with their child,475 it is impossible to divide the 
assessment made as to the best interests of the child and the family life assessment of the 
foreign national offender. Rather than a separate consideration of the best interests of the child, 
the “simple balancing approach” looks more like a meringue. One cannot pick apart the egg-
whites and sugar, and one cannot pick apart the best interests of the child from the interests of 
the foreign national offender when the decision-maker assesses the value of family life in this 
way. 
                                                          




Despite the best interests of the child being one of the explicit Üner criteria, the “simple 
balancing approach” does not therefore actually permit an assessment of the best interests of 
the child as a separate consideration. It is therefore also not possible for the decision-maker to 
elevate the best interests to a primary consideration if the decision-maker does not actually 
know what the child’s best interests are because there is no means of disaggregating them from 
the interests of other individuals. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The “simple balancing approach” has, I have shown, two central aspects to its decision-making 
process. The first is that the right to family life is one that is considered to be commonly-held 
by the family unit, rather than being a right that is held by one individual or a series of isolated 
individuals. The second is that in practice the linear Üner criteria are rearranged so that the 
weight given to family life is determined by a relationship between what the ECtHR considers 
to be the value of family life and the gravity of the interference. 
 The primary advantage of the “simple balancing approach” is that it formulates the 
Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise so as to fit within the confines of the metaphorical 
balancing scales with which courts are familiar with. It also recognises that family life is 
necessarily relational; one cannot have a family life by oneself. 
 However, the “simple balance approach” runs into significant theoretical problems in 
the context of reconciling Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC, which is what UK decision-
makers are required to do. The “simple balancing approach” cannot be fully polycentric 
because it requires the exclusion of the best interests of the child. As a commonly-held right, 
the best interests of the child must give way to an assessment of the weight to family life which 
is necessarily tempered by the weight of any rights or interest of other family members which 
are lower than the best interests of the child. This is heightened by the use of value and gravity 
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as the defining features of the weight to family life because they exclude much of what is 
unique to the best interests of the child. 
 The “simple balancing approach” is also unable to accommodate the plurality of 
decision-making norms introduced by the best interests of the child under Article 3 UNCRC. 
The best interests of the child cannot be a primary consideration because the nature of the 
“simple balancing approach” as being commonly-held and split between value and gravity 
mean that the best interests of the child cannot be considered separately or first. Instead, the 
best interests of the child are folded into the common family life along with the separate rights 
of the other family members, and split between the different metrics of value and gravity. The 
commonly-held aspect of the “simple balancing approach” also means that the child’s best 
interests (to the extent to which they are considered at all) must be directly weighed against the 
general public interest in deportation of the foreign national offender. 
 These obvious failings in the “simple balancing approach” underscore the difficulties 
in accommodating both Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR is clearly torn 
between a focus on the “bad” foreign national offender on whom the negative consequences of 
deportation naturally and reasonably fall,476 and the protection of ‘the best interests and well-
being of the children’.477 As Dembour argues, the ECtHR begins with a foundational 
assumption in favour of state control over immigration which may be tempered by recognition 
of the ‘poignancy of their personal circumstances’.478 The decision in Üner was an attempt by 
the ECtHR to formalise the factors relevant to the balancing exercise so, in theory, decisions 
would be guided by principles more consistent than reliance on the sympathy engendered in 
individual cases. However, the best interests of the child has been layered onto the right to 
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family life many years after the general principles of Article 8 ECHR have been otherwise 
determined; in particular that family life is a commonly-held right, placed in to a simple balance 
against the public interest. This ad hoc development has resulted, I have argued, in the “simple 
balancing approach” being ill-suited to reflect adequately both the best interests of the child 
and the pre-existing structures of Article 8 ECHR. In the next chapter, UK courts can be seen 
to develop the case law in a way which emphasises the need to maintain the primary status of 
the best interests of the child. However, this modification of the balancing exercise merely 
emphasises the essential difficulty in a unified decision-making process for both the family life 
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In the previous chapter, I described how and why UK law first viewed the best interests of the 
child in deportation decisions through the prism of Article 8 ECHR. Under that “simple balance 
approach” of decision-making, the best interests of the child were treated as an interest which 
was folded into the right to family life enjoyed by the family unit. This chapter is about the 
next stage of development in UK deportation law when it first began to articulate the best 
interests of the child as being a separate statutory obligation inherent to s55 of the Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act (BCIA) 2009, that the SSHD must ‘safeguard and promote 
the welfare of children’. 
 I argue in this chapter that in the seminal 2011 case of ZH (Tanzania),479 the Supreme 
Court articulated s55 BCIA as having characteristics which make it similar to Article 3 
UNCRC, and different to the approach of the ECtHR and UK courts after Huang480 to the right 
to family life under Article 8 ECHR. These characteristics are that the best interests of the child 
have a primary status, meaning that they must be treated first, separately and of no less inherent 
weight than other interests, and that only rights-based considerations may be balanced against 
the best interests of the child. I outlined in chapter 3 of this thesis how each of these 
characteristics have been identified in Article 3 UNCRC. The theoretical problems of operating 
simultaneously the right to family life and the best interests of the child in the forms that they 
take under Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC were also described in chapter 3. I argued 
that polycentricity describes the existence of multiple rights and interests which belong to 
multiple individuals within any family where a child (or children) are affected by the 
deportation of a parent. The plurality of decision-making norms relates to the different formal 
legal requirements of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. I demonstrated that it appeared 
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impossible to create a decision-making process which both respected the plurality of decision-
making norms and yet remained polycentric by taking into account all the relevant rights and 
interests at stake in deportation decisions. 
 Explaining and analysing this “modified balancing approach” pursued by the Supreme 
Court in ZH (Tanzania) is therefore significant for this thesis because it represents one of the 
first and clearest attempts by the UK courts to grapple with the best interests of the child as a 
statutory duty in deportation decisions separate from, but simultaneous to, the right to family 
life. This required the court to engage with the theoretical issues that this thesis has argued are 
inherent to approaches which attempt to give simultaneous effect to Article 3 UNCRC and 
Article 8 ECHR. On a theoretical level the decision-maker is, I suggested, presented with three 
choices for resolving these issues; first, to pursue a balancing approach by emphasising the 
difference in language between s55 BCIA and Article 3 UNCRC; second, to adopt a principle 
of paramountcy, akin to that found in UK family law, or; third, to try to resolve the tensions of 
trying to give effect to both family life and the best interest of the child. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that following the House of Lords case of Huang481 
UK courts treated the best interests of the child as an interest which was folded into the human 
right to family life enjoyed by the family unit under Article 8 ECHR. This can be described as 
a practical expression of the first possible choice; to give effect to Article 8 ECHR through a 
“simple balancing approach”, but to ignore the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC. I 
argued this did not respect the plurality of decision-making norms, and additionally, the nature 
of the way that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) constructed the balance means 
that the best interests of the child is sidelined, and so this “simple balancing approach” is not 
polycentric either. 




In this chapter I argue that from 2011-2014, UK courts (starting with ZH (Tanzania)) 
attempted to resolve the tension and so create a decision-making approach which gave effect 
to the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC, but also the Article 8 ECHR balancing 
exercise, whilst also maintaining polycentricity. It is a “modified balancing approach” because 
it seeks to modify the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise to accommodate the best interests of 
the child, rather than adopt an entirely new form of decision-making process. In chapter 3 I 
suggested that to effectively reconcile the right to family life and the best interests of the child 
in this manner requires the decision-maker to be able to also answer two questions which arise 
under the plurality of decision-making norms; (a) what is the proper relationship between the 
best interests of the child (when they are considered separately, as a human right, and of no 
less weight than other considerations) and the family life rights of both the children and of 
others in the family; and, (b) if only rights-based considerations are permitted to be balanced 
against the best interests of the child, but Article 8 ECHR permits non-rights-based 
considerations to be balanced against the best interests of the child, how can the decision-maker 
do both simultaneously? I conclude in this chapter that UK courts provide no answer to these 
questions. Ultimately, these problems were introduced into UK deportation law by ZH 
(Tanzania) and not resolved, and that subsequent case law ultimately resort to restating the 
problem rather than articulating solutions.  
Throughout this thesis I have identified s55 BCIA as the site of domestication of Article 
3 UNCRC. The s55 duty states that that the Secretary of State must ensure that her immigration 
powers (including over deportation) are ‘discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom’. There is therefore an 
undeniable divergence of language between s55 BCIA and Article 3 UNCRC. This divergence 
of language opened up to UK courts choices as to how the s55 duty could have been interpreted.  
171 
 
Part 2 of this chapter therefore explains the background to s55 BCIA and to the ZH 
(Tanzania) case and analyses the interpretive choices that were open to, but ultimately rejected 
by, UK courts; (a) to ignore the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC, follow the ECtHR 
jurisprudence and continue the “simple balancing approach” described in the previous chapter, 
or (b) to adopt a position of paramountcy for the best interests of the child. Understanding these 
helps contextualise the interpretive decisions made by the Court as a compromise position, but 
also that it was not an inevitable compromise. Part 2(c) outlines the decision in ZH (Tanzania) 
and the effective domestication of Article 3 UNCRC. Part 3 is therefore concerned with an 
evaluation of this “modified balancing approach”, using polycentricity and the plurality of 
decision-making norms as the basis for this analysis. The conclusion to this chapter is that the 
compromise position of merging Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC does not work. 
 
2. Section 55 BCIA and Choices: Balancing, Paramountcy, or Another Way? 
From the UK’s ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) on 16 December 1991, the UK had a treaty reservation to the effect that the 
Convention was not to apply to immigration.482  However, the reservation was withdrawn in 
November 2008 and as a direct result,483 Parliament enacted s55 BCIA which came into force 
on 2 November 2009.484 Even though s55 BCIA was a direct consequence of the withdrawal 
of its reservation, the wording of the s55 statutory duty and Article 3 UNCRC is different. S55 
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BCIA requires that the Secretary of State must ensure that her immigration powers (including 
over deportation) are ‘discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the 
welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom’.485 Article 3 UNCRC, in contrast, states: 
 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.486 
 
Although there may be little difference in practice between the ‘welfare’ of the child 
and the child’s ‘best interests’,487 s55 BCIA does not (on its face) require the best interests of 
the child to be a primary consideration. The act of judicial decision-making is one of making 
choices, and the wording of s55 BCIA presented the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania)488 with 
choices as to how to interpret s55 BCIA. The facts of ZH (Tanzania) are not concerned with 
deportation, but the principles of law arising from it are equally applicable. The relevant facts 
of ZH (Tanzania) cannot be described any more succinctly than they are in the Supreme Court 
judgment itself: 
 
[ZH] is a national of Tanzania who arrived here in December 1995 at the age of 20. 
She made three unsuccessful claims for asylum, one in her own identity and two in 
false identities. In 1997 she met and formed a relationship with a British citizen. 
They have two children, a daughter, T, born in 1998 (who is now 12 years old) and 
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a son, J, born in 2001 (who is now nine). The children are both British citizens, 
having been born here to parents, one of whom is a British citizen. They have lived 
here with their mother all their lives, nearly all of the time at the same address. They 
attend local schools. Their parents separated in 2005 but their father continues to 
see them regularly, visiting approximately twice a month for 4 to 5 days at a time.489 
 
The Supreme Court had three discrete choices open to it as to how to interpret s55 BCIA 
in the context of its relationship with the UK’s international law obligations under Article 3 
UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR. The first possible choice was to adopt a balancing approach to 
the best interests of the child. This choice would have placed emphasis on the language of s55 
BCIA and rejected the domestication of the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC. This 
would have committed UK courts to the “simple balancing approach” of decision-making that 
I outlined in chapter 4 as representative of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, and the UK’s decision-
making in deportation decisions after Huang. The second choice open to the Supreme Court 
was to adopt a principle of paramountcy. Under a paramountcy principle the best interests of 
the child would be the sole determinative factor in deportation decisions, as it is in some family 
law contexts. Indeed, the children’s representatives in ZH (Tanzania) floated precisely this 
argument.490 The third option was to attempt some kind of melding or fusion of the 
incompatible structural requirements of Article 8 ECHR’s “simple balancing approach” and 
the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC. I argue in part 2(c) of this chapter that this is 
the option that the Supreme Court ultimately took. This part explores each in turn. 
 
 
                                                          
489 ibid [2-3] 
 





The first option open to the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) would have been to interpret s55 
BCIA narrowly so as to maintain the pre-2009 status quo of the “simple balancing approach” 
to deportation decision-making. Under this approach, no special status is attached to the child’s 
best interests and they are just one of many interests to be considered. As already observed, the 
wording of s55 BCIA is different from that of Article 3 UNCRC. S55 BICA requires only that 
the Secretary of State ‘have regard’ for the welfare of children. Interpreted narrowly, this duty 
only requires the Secretary of State to take into account the welfare of the child in her decisions 
as a mandatory consideration. The welfare or best interests of the child must then be included 
for consideration in the “simple balance”, but has no special, primary status. Failure by the 
decision-maker to take into account mandatory considerations is an error of law491 and thus s55 
BCIA would simply render any decision which did not have regard to the welfare of the child 
unlawful. This would be an additional obligation upon which the child could rely to ensure that 
their interests were at least included in the balancing exercise of Article 8 ECHR. However, it 
changes nothing about how the “simple balancing approach” should be undertaken. 
Such a narrow reading of s55 BCIA was well within the range of possible decisions 
open to the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania). Although UK courts will presume that Parliament 
does not intend to legislate contrary to international law,492 this principle does not 
transubstantiate the ‘spirit’ of the UNCRC (as Lady Hale describes it in ZH (Tanzania))493 into 
the incorporation of the specific language of that treaty where Parliament has used different 
words. The UK’s international obligations include those to the ECHR (via s6 of the Human 
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Rights Act 1998) and chapter 3 demonstrated that the unique characteristics of Article 3 
UNCRC appear incompatible with the requirements of the ECtHR’s Article 8 ECHR 
jurisprudence, thus creating the plurality of decision-making norms with which this thesis is 
concerned. In order to avoid these theoretical problems the Supreme Court could have placed 
emphasis on the plain language of s55 BCIA which appears entirely compatible with the 
“simple balancing approach” of the ECtHR jurisprudence. Under this first interpretive route 
s55 BCIA would impose only a narrow obligation that the decision-maker must pay genuine 
regard for the welfare interests of the child in their determination of the right to family life. To 
this extent, s55 BCIA may be seen as only being a statutory reinforcement of the requirement 
that already existed in the Üner criteria for determining Article 8 ECHR (and relied on in 
Huang) regarding ‘the best interests and well-being of the children’.494 This requirement was 
already obliquely present in UK law via the requirement to take into account the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR,495 but elevating it to a separate statutory requirement would have ensured child 
litigants a way to directly enforce this in all cases, whilst avoiding the apparent theoretical 
conflict created by the plurality of decision-making norms between Article 8 ECHR and Article 
3 UNCRC. To follow this route would have allowed the Supreme Court to sidestep the 
problems inherent in the plurality of decision-making norms, but without giving any 
prominence to the best interests of the child as envisioned in Article 3 UNCRC. 
This may well have been the then government’s intention when it placed the s55 duty 
before Parliament. It would be consistent with policy development leading up the Children Act 
2004 – a family law measure – in which reference to the UNCRC were purposefully dropped 
in order to avoid extending children’s human rights.496 The language of s55 BCIA of 
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discharging immigration functions ‘having regard’ for the welfare of children also mirrors the 
language of the public sector quality duty which requires public authorities to ‘have due regard’ 
to eliminate discrimination and promote equality.497 A narrow interpretation of s55 BCIA 
would also be consistent with the views of ministers who suggested ‘that withdrawal of the 
[UNCRC] reservation is unlikely to have much practical effect.’498 A narrow mandatory 
relevant consideration, rather than a substantive change in the structure of deportation decision-
making, would have been consistent with this prediction. This narrow obligation may also be 
what the then President of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) sought to 
describe as the general effect of s55 BCIA: 
 
…twofold, inter-related duties […] (i) to have regard to the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of any children involved in the factual matrix in question and 
(ii) to have regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance.499  
 
President McCloskey derived these duties from the administrative law principle that the 
decision-maker must ‘have regard to all material considerations.’500 To meet her s55 duty, the 
SSHD ‘must be properly informed’ and ‘conduct a careful examination of all relevant 
information and factors.’501 In a later case, developing the natural consequence of finding that 
s55 is a discrete statutory duty, McCloskey found that failure by the SSHD to fulfil her s55 
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duty would render the SSHD’s deportation decision ‘not in accordance with the law’.502 A 
similar finding was also made in DS (Afghanistan).503 Being an independent statutory duty 
means that children affected by deportation decisions can rely on s55 BCIA to require the 
Secretary of State to have regard for their welfare and factual circumstances. Failure by the 
Secretary of State to do so would render deportation decisions unlawful, independently of other 
substantive or procedural aspects of the decision-making. 
  However, a narrow reading of s55 BCIA to require the SSHD to simply ‘have regard’ 
for the best interests of the child says nothing about the priority that the best interests of the 
child ought to have in decision-making. This mirrors Fredman’s critique of the public sector 
equality duty in which she argues that it reflects ‘a fundamental ambivalence as to the 
importance of equality, deferring to public authorities’ view as to what priority equality 
deserves.’504 In contrast, Article 3 UNCRC clearly says something about the priority that the 
best interests of the child should have in decisions; it ought to be a primary consideration. 
The obvious consequence of interpreting s55 BCIA as imposing only a mandatory 
relevant consideration within the established “simple balancing approach” to deportation 
decision-making is that the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC must be effectively 
ignored by the court. This narrow reading of s55 BCIA would fall considerably short of a 
substantive human right which must determine the structure of the decision-making process. 
Furthermore, a narrow reading of s55 BCIA only requires that the SSHD must have regard to 
the welfare of the child but is silent as to the primacy or otherwise of the child’s welfare 
interests. Because of this language, s55 BCIA also does not preclude the child’s welfare 
interests being outweighed by non-rights-based considerations. This might be consistent with 
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the wording of s55 BCIA, but not with the underlying international law obligations to Article 
3 UNCRC. I also argue in part 2(c) below that this is also inconsistent with what ZH (Tanzania) 
itself otherwise requires. 
 
2(b) Paramountcy 
The second option available to the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) was to rely on a principle 
of paramountcy. Instead of a narrow reading of s55 BCIA, paramountcy would be an expansive 
one. The paramountcy of the best interests of the child is familiar to UK courts. In family law, 
s1(1) Children Act 1989 requires that in any question related to the upbringing of the child, 
‘the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration’. Paramountcy means that 
‘children’s welfare trumps and outweighs all other considerations; no other interests or values 
may affect the decision; children’s interests are the only ones that count.’505  
The UK’s family courts have found that any decision taken in support of the best 
interests of the child will be consistent with Article 8 ECHR, even where the family life rights 
of the parent and child, or between parents, are in conflict.506 Thus adopting a principle of 
paramountcy would resolve both polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms 
between Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC in the deportation context by assuming that to 
treat the best interests of the child as paramount also encompasses all the requirements of 
Article 8 ECHR. Furthermore, as Eekelaar argues, the chief benefit of the paramountcy 
principle is that ‘it requires a decision made with respect to a child to be justified from the point 
of view of a judgment about the child's interests.’507 This alters the position of children from 
being ‘instruments for the promotion of the interests of others […] to one where children's 
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carers were expected to use their position to further the children's interests.’508 The state is 
explicitly required to use its position to ‘safeguard and promote the welfare of children’ in its 
immigration functions by s55 BCIA 2009 and in the family law context by s1(1) Children Act 
1989. Just as disputing parents cannot reasonably complain that their children’s interests are 
put first by the courts in determining their dispute, the UK state cannot complain that its 
interests in deportation are placed secondary to the best interests of children when itself has 
committed to do so through primary legislation. 
 In ZH (Tanzania) the children’s representatives (the children had separate 
representation) argued that s1(1) Children Act 1989, and thereby the principle of paramountcy, 
should apply.509 But Lady Hale dismissed the argument that either s1(1) Children Act 1989 
itself should apply, or that s55 BCIA imports an equivalent paramountcy principle in 
deportation cases. She stressed that ‘questions with respect to the upbringing of a child must 
be distinguished from other decisions which may affect them.’510 Deportation is, according to 
Lady Hale, of the latter type of decision. Lady Hale relied on the UNCRC for this distinction, 
finding that the UNCRC only requires that the best interests of the child must be paramount 
only in some cases, ‘notably adoption (Article 21) and separation of a child from parents against 
their will (Article 9)’.511 Other decisions ‘affecting’512 the child are only a primary rather than 
a paramount consideration.  
However, if deportation is perceived through the lens of the child’s experience, the 
deportation of an FNO parent intimately concerns their upbringing. The deportation of an FNO 
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parent will leave different families different options, but boil down to one of two possible 
outcomes: 
 
1. the child leaves the UK with their FNO parent, despite the child’s own right of abode 
or leave to remain in the UK being otherwise unaffected by the parent’s deportation; 
or, 
2. the child remains in the UK, either with the non-offender parent, other relative, private 
fostering arrangement, or in the care of social services. The child’s ability to have direct 
physical contact with the FNO parent is significantly impaired, the child is (as per 
Article 9 UNCRC) separated from a parent against their will. 
 
Both options define who the child lives with, where, and what contact they have with 
the deported parent.  It appears that ‘the decision is in fact about where the child should live 
and how the child is to maintain contact with both parents.’513 To this extent, the practical 
outcome of deportation decisions for children is identical to other decisions by the family courts 
as to contact arrangements between a child and their parents and to which the paramountcy 
principle applies. Only if deportation is viewed through a state-control or adult-centric lens is 
deportation not about the child but about the proper disposal of a foreign national offender. 
Through an adult-centric lens the impact on the child is side-lined as being an unfortunate 
collateral consequence and thus deportation is not a decision ‘with respect to’ their upbringing, 
but one merely ‘affecting’ them in a secondary way. 
Approaching ZH (Tanzania) from a paramountcy perspective would resolved the issues 
of polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms from a child-centric perspective. 
                                                          




Paramountcy of the child’s best interests in deportation would require them to be the overriding 
interest, to the exclusion of other interests (and particularly the public interest in deportation). 
A polycentric rights problem would be reduced to a mono-centric decision.  
As for the plurality of decision-making norms, paramountcy would require the UK 
courts to effectively ignore the “simple balancing approach” of the ECtHR in favour of the 
unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC. As in family law, the UK courts could maintain an 
assumption that pursuing the best interests of the child as a paramount consideration in 
deportation decisions is consistent with the requirements of Article 8 ECHR.514 This would be 
well founded. An outcome of a deportation decision which positions the best interests of the 
child as the only relevant factor in the decision-making exercise would always be Article 8 
ECHR compliant where the opposing interest is that of the public interest rather than the rights 
of another individual. The public interest is an optimisation permission; the state is merely 
permitted to pursue the public interest to the full degree compatible with the human rights of 
the individual, but is not obliged to do so.515 In contrast, the individual right is an optimisation 
requirement; the state is always obliged to maximise the individual human right.516 Thus only 
where the conflict is between the rights of two individuals can the state be critiqued for giving 
too much weight to one right and too little to another. This is not the situation in deportation 
decisions as the state cannot be found in breach of the ECHR by giving too much weight to the 
individual right at stake and/or for giving too little weight to the public interest. Thus the 
paramountcy of the best interests (as a facet of the individual right at stake) over the public 
interest in deportation would be Article 8 ECHR compliant. 
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2(c) A “Modified Balancing Approach”: The s55 Duty as Incorporating Article 3 UNCRC 
into UK Law 
The alternative path forged by the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) was to try to give effect to 
the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC as well as the balancing exercise of Article 8 
ECHR. ZH (Tanzania) can therefore be described as pursing a “modified balancing approach”. 
This could be described alternatively as an attempt to merge the two rights regimes, or to bolt-
on the best interests of the child to the existing balancing framework. Jane Fortin interprets ZH 
(Tanzania) as imposing ‘the need to fulfil the requirements of Article 3 [UNCRC] […] in the 
context of carrying out the balancing exercise required by Article 8 [ECHR]’.517 So did the 
Court of Appeal in AJ (India), finding that ZH (Tanzania) ‘has incorporated the section 55 
[BCIA] test within the proportionality assessment under Article 8 [ECHR].’518 Regardless of 
how one describes the relationship, it is clear – as I argue below – that UK courts have used 
s55 BCIA as a means by which to domesticate those aspects of Article 3 UNCRC which give 
rise to the plurality of decision-making norms; (i) that the best interests of the child has a 
primary status, and (ii) that only rights-based arguments may outweigh the best interests of the 
child. 
Although the language of s55 BCIA is different to that of Article 3 UNCRC, UK courts 
have drawn a general equivalence between the two. Lady Hale in ZH (Tanzania) relied on the 
‘spirit’ of the UK’s international obligations, finding that Article 3 UNCRC, ‘is a binding 
obligation in international law, and the spirit, if not the precise language, has also been 
translated into our national law.’519 In R (TS),520 Mr Justice Wyn Williams found that the 
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statutory guidance521 required the use of the UNCRC as an interpretive tool for correctly 
understanding the s55 duty522 and, moreover, that ‘the statutory guidance intends that when a 
decision maker is having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of a child he 
is for all practical purposes also having regard to the best interests of the child.’523 In JO 
(Nigeria), the Upper Tribunal relied on the similarity of substance and outcome: 
 
In the field of immigration, therefore, the enactment of section 55 discharges an 
international law obligation of the UK Government.  While section 55 and Article 
3(1) of the UNCRC are couched in different terms, there may not be any major 
difference between them in substance, as the decided cases have shown.524 
 
 The Supreme Court have also found that there is something special to this relationship 
of translated ‘spirit’ between Article 3 UNCRC and s55 BCIA. In R(SG), the Supreme Court 
distinguished the immigration law context (to which the ‘spirit’ of Article 3 UNCRC applies 
through the s55 duty) from the context of welfare benefits law which lacks this domesticated 
‘spirit’ and which therefore lacks substantive obligations to the best interests of the child.525 
 I argue that ZH(Tanzania) also makes some specific findings which gives flesh to the 
spirit of Article 3 UNCRC, findings that must be interpreted as the domestication into the UK’s 
deportation case law of the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC; that the best interests 
of the child are a primary consideration and that only rights-based considerations ought to be 
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balanced against the best interests of the child. In part 2(c)(i) and (ii), below, I describe how 
the decision in ZH (Tanzania) emphasised each of these. The adoption of these unique 
characteristics by UK courts resulted in an increasing tension in UK deportation law along the 
lines of the larger themes addressed in this thesis. Firstly, the decision in ZH (Tanzania) 
describes the children as being ‘innocent victims’526 who are contrasted with the “bad” migrant 
parent who has an ‘appalling’ immigration history.527 Secondly, the introduction of the best 
interests of the child is treated as an ad hoc development in the law rather than as an integrated 
part of it. This characteristic of it being bolted-on to the “simple balancing approach”, giving 
rise to a “modified balancing approach”, reflects what I critique below528 as an internal 
incoherence in ZH (Tanzania) as to the relationship between the best interests of the child and 
the right to family life. 
 
2(c)(i) The best interests of the child have a primary status 
ZH (Tanzania) is authority in UK law for the principle that the best interests of the child have 
primary status.529 The primary status of the best interests of the child means two things 
according to Lady Hale; firstly, ‘this means that they must be considered first’530 and second, 
that the decision-maker must ‘not treat any other consideration as inherently more significant 
than the best interests of the children’.531  
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The primacy of the best interests of the child, according to ZH (Tanzania), means that 
the best interests of the child be put first ‘temporally’532 in the decision-making process. Bolton 
argues that the principal importance of ZH (Tanzania) is in the establishment of the temporal 
primacy of the best interests of the child as a procedural rule, rather than in establishing any 
additional substantive understanding to what the best interests of the child requires.533 
However, the temporal primacy of the best interests of the child does more than simply require 
that as a mandatory relevant consideration it be the consideration looked at first by the decision-
maker. Instead, considering the best interests of the child first temporally is designed to support 
the substantive dimension of the primacy of the best interests of the child. As Lord Kerr 
observes, accounting for the best interests of the child first ensures that those interests receive 
adequate attention, so that considering the best interests of the child first: 
 
…is not merely a mechanistic or slavishly technical approach to the order in which 
the various considerations require to be evaluated. It accords proper prominence to 
the matter of the child’s interests. […] where a child’s interests are involved, it 
seems to me that there is much to be said for considering those interests first, so 
that the risk that they may be undervalued in a more open-ended inquiry can be 
avoided.534 
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 Considering the best interest of the child first ensures that they are considered 
separately. As the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child have observed, ‘If the interests of 
children are not highlighted, they tend to be overlooked.’535 
 An additional rationale for considering the best interests of the child first arises from 
the other unique characteristic of Article 3 UNCRC,536 that the child must not be blamed for 
matters for which they are not responsible. As the Upper Tribunal observed, the best interests 
of the child: 
 
…is a matter which has to be addressed first and as a distinct stage of the inquiry. 
[…] The underlying rationale must be that unless, when children are concerned, the 
Article 8 proportionality assessment is conducted in this way there is a risk of the 
best interests of the child consideration wrongly taking into account extraneous 
factors such as the parents’ poor immigration history.537 
 
The strict necessity to address the best interests of the child first in the temporal sense is 
not a view universally shared in the UK’s case law after ZH (Tanzania). Both Lord Judge and 
Lord Wilson in HH argued that judges ought to decide for themselves the order in which they 
consider the relevant factors in decision-making.538 President McCloskey thus found that it was 
not an error of law if a First-tier Tribunal judge did not determine the child’s best interests first 
as there is no direct statutory requirement to do so.539 However, these cases confirm that if the 
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best interests of the child are not considered temporally first, they must still be substantially 
considered separately, and as a primary consideration. Considering the best interests of the child 
temporally first will make it easier for the decision-maker to demonstrate that they have given 
the best interests of the child substantive primary status.540 
 Substantively, the primacy of the best interests of the child requires the decision-maker 
‘not treat any other consideration as inherently more significant than the best interests of the 
children’. 541 The weight given to the child’s best interests must be no less than any other 
consideration, but it may be given the same weight as other considerations. As Lord Hodge 
describes the position in Zoumbas: 
 
…the best interests of a child must be a primary consideration, although not always 
the only primary consideration […] Although the best interests of a child can be 
outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations, no other consideration 
can be treated as inherently more significant542 
 
 By itself, this says very little. It requires that the decision maker assign only equal 
weight between the best interest of the child and other considerations such as the public interest 
in deportation. In other words, the public interest in deportation may be held to be as important 
as the best interests of the child. However, taken together with the first aspect of the primary 
status of the best interests of the child – that it ought to be considered first temporally – the 
inherent significance of the best interests of the child reinforces that the best interests of the 
child must be considered as a factual matter which is separate from the commonly-held family 
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life. In chapter 4, I argued that when Article 8 ECHR family life is engaged alone in a “simple 
balancing approach” to deportation decision-making, the best interests of the child are 
integrated into the assessment of the family life as a right commonly-held between all the family 
members. Therefore, treating the best interests of the child as having its own inherent, primary 
weight and to be temporally considered first requires the decision-maker to set apart the 
assessment of best interests from the commonly-held Article 8 ECHR right. To consider the 
best interests of the child as part of an assessment of the commonly-held right would fail to 
consider the best interests first. It would also treat the best interests as subsumed within the 
family life and thus as not having its own inherent significance. 
 Considering the best interests of the child as a primary consideration thus requires the 
structure of decision-making to make a separate consideration of the best interests of the child. 
If the best interests of the child are included as part of the right to family life, as in the “simple 
balancing approach” in chapter 4, then the best interests of the child do not receive the 
prescribed status of inherent primary significance. Whilst considering the best interests of the 
child as the temporally first consideration is not strictly required, to do so ensures that the best 
interests are given sufficient inherent significance and insulates the consideration of best 
interests from being infected by proscribed considerations such as the offending of the parent. 
The “modified balancing approach” of decision-making reflects these procedural aspects of 







2(c)(ii) ‘A child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as 
the offending of a parent’543 
In ZH (Tanzania) Lady Hale stated that the children of foreign nationals must not be ‘blamed’ 
for their parent’s immigration wrongdoing. The eponymous ZH was a Tanzanian national who 
had two British citizen children.544 The mother had an ‘appalling’ immigration history arising 
from multiple failed asylum applications, some of which were fraudulent.545 Although ZH 
(Tanzania) was a removal case, the principles established apply equally to deportation cases.  
In ZH (Tanzania) the best interests of the children were balanced against the public interest ‘to 
maintain firm and fair immigration control, coupled with the mother’s appalling immigration 
history and the precariousness of her position when family life was created.’546 However, Lady 
Hale qualified the nature of the balance between the best interests of the child and the public 
interest finding that, as for the mother’s ‘appalling’ immigration history, ‘as the Tribunal 
rightly pointed out, the children were not to be blamed for that.’547 This idea, that children are 
not to be ‘blamed’ for the immigration misdeeds of their parents, is not unique to ZH 
(Tanzania). In EM (Lebanon),548 Lady Hale stated that the ‘child is not to be held responsible 
for the moral failures of either of his parents.’549 Later, in Zoumbas, the Supreme Court restated 
                                                          
543 ibid 
 
544 ZH (Tanzania) (n21) [2] 
 
545 ibid [5]: 
 
‘She made a claim for asylum on arrival in her own name which was refused in 1997 and her appeal 
was dismissed in 1998, shortly after the birth of her daughter. She then made two further asylum 
applications, pretending to be a Somali, both of which were refused.’ 
 




548 EM (Lebanon) (n226) 
 




what it considered the established principles of the s55 duty, and stated that, ‘A child must not 
be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent’.550  
 I argue that the logical meaning of a requirement not to blame children for the actions 
of their parents in deportation cases is that only rights-based considerations may outweigh the 
best interests of the child. This would bring the meaning of s55 BCIA closer to what I argued 
in chapter 3 is the international obligation under Article 3 UNCRC. I argue this because it is 
the only interpretation of the idea that a child should not be blamed for the offending of their 
parent which navigates a line between two unlikely absolutes; that the best interests of the child 
must always prevail regardless of the public interest, or that there is no substantive content to 
the idea. 
 Let us start with what it means to ‘blame’ someone. To blame someone is to say that 
they are responsible for some wrong. Blame is therefore a necessary precondition of 
punishment because blame requires the moral competence to be able to act in a way which 
avoids the blameworthy behaviour. Where someone is unable to prevent or avoid the action, 
they cannot be reasonably blamed for that action and therefore cannot reasonably be punished 
for it.551 Thus the child of a criminal offender cannot be said to be blameworthy of the criminal 
act that the offending parent has committed because they cannot have prevented their parent’s 
offending and could not have avoided it taking place because it was not the child’s own actions. 
Rosalind English argues that the logical consequence of ZH (Tanzania) is that therefore there 
can be no public interest consideration against which the best interests of the child can be 
weighed against, and therefore no balancing exercise under Article 8 ECHR possible: 
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So in other words a determination that takes into account the usual principles of 
Article 8 jurisprudence amounts to a verdict on the children which “blames” them 
for their parents bad behaviour. The objection to this line of reasoning is that it 
evacuates the balancing act of any content by first taking away the usual factors by 
which we measure whether one case is deserving and the other not and then 
substituting for these measures a mechanical test – the question: “is this in the 
child’s best interests”? 
 
 However, this runs contrary to how Lady Hale in ZH (Tanzania) explicitly sets out the 
idea that the child should not be blamed. Lady Hale does not set out an absolute test, as English 
supposes, that the best interests of the child will always prevail. Instead, the best interests of the 
child are still explicitly made subject to a balance: 
 
…the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration. This means that 
they must be considered first. They can, of course, be outweighed by the cumulative 
effect of other considerations.552 
 
On the other hand, Laws LJ appears to go too far in the opposite direction to English’s 
argument. In reviewing the statement that the child should not be blamed for the moral failure 
of their parent he exclaimed, ‘Of course not; but that is not to say, as sometimes it is perhaps 
taken to say, that in a child case the importance of immigration control is in any way 
lessened.’553 However, if the public interest is entirely unaltered, then to say that the child is 
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not being blamed for the parent’s actions becomes a mere platitude with no legal substance or 
consequence. This cannot be correct either. It is a principle which has been endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in both ZH (Tanzania) and in Zoumbas, which assume that it has some 
substantive meaning. 
I argue that the principle established by the Committee on the Rights of the Child – that 
the best interests of the child can only be outweighed by rights-based considerations554 – is the 
most coherent understanding of what it means not to blame the child. Where deportation arises 
solely because of the offence that has been committed, it is because the FNO is blameworthy 
(i.e. they had the moral competence to affect their behaviour so that they did not offend). The 
child should not be blamed because they lack the moral competence to affect their parent’s 
offending behaviour and therefore they should not experience the negative consequences of that 
offending (i.e. the deportation of a parent). However, deportation in order to protect the human 
rights of others is of a different character to deportation as a consequence of past offending. To 
balance the rights of the child against the rights of others does not entail the blaming of the 
child. 
This is therefore a question as to whose rights are at stake in deportation decisions; the 
innocent, vulnerable child or the “bad” migrant FNO. Viewed as an assessment purely about 
the rights of the adult FNO, then their deportation clearly arises as a consequence of the blame 
that is attached to their offending. The deportation of FNOs is justified by UK courts on the 
basis that it should ‘deter foreign nationals from committing serious crimes by leading them to 
understand that, whatever the other circumstances, one consequence of them may well be 
deportation’.555 Deportation also communicates society’s ‘revulsion at serious crimes’556 and 
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the condemnation of ‘serious wrongdoers.’557 Both of these justifications for deportation attach 
because the FNO is blameworthy; they had the moral capacity to have avoided the 
blameworthy activity of criminal offending. It is therefore logically coherent558 to balance the 
rights of the FNO against public interest considerations – deterrence and communication – 
which are based solely upon the fact that they have offended. 
However, if the assessment is of the rights of the child, then it is morally incoherent to 
balance their rights against a public interest in deterring offending or communicating social 
revulsion. This is because blame for the offending does not attach to the child; the child did not 
have the moral competence to avoid the blameworthy behaviour because the offending was not 
theirs. Human rights-based considerations, however, can be balanced against the rights of the 
child because doing so implies no blame. If the best interests of the child conflicts with another 
individual’s human rights then this does not imply that either individual is blameworthy, only 
that they have valid rights which cannot be simultaneously pursued to their full realisation. 
Such is, for example, the rights conflict where a divorced parent seeks permission to take a 
child out of the UK in order for that parent to pursue career or other family interests, such as 
with a new partner or spouse (which are protected by the parent’s right to family and private 
life under Article 8 ECHR).559 The best interests of the child to maintain their own private life 
connections to the UK and their family life with the other parent are balanced against the rights 
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of their divorced parent to pursue their Article 8 ECHR protected family and private life. 
However, no blame attaches to either the parent for their desire to expand their individual 
private or family life, nor to the child for having their own rights which may point to the court 
refusing to authorise the child being taken out of the UK. In such cases the role of the courts is 
to determine whether the proposed interference is disproportionate to the rights held. 
In deportation cases, Article 3 UNCRC allows that the best interests of the child may be 
balanced against the rights of other individuals, because to do so does not require the child to 
be blamed. For example, where to not deport the FNO would interfere with the rights of others 
because they are likely to reoffend. Furthermore, the likely reoffending must be of a character 
which engages the rights of another individual. This would include the rights of individuals to 
bodily integrity, to property etc, but not the mere interests of general deterrence or 
communication. 
Lady Hale seems to reject any distinction between rights-based and non-rights-based 
considerations in ZH (Tanzania). Finding it ‘difficult to understand the distinction’, Lady Hale 
argues that ‘the prevention of disorder or crime is seen as protecting the rights of other 
individuals’ as well as a general public interest.560 However, if there is no distinction between 
rights-based and non-rights-based considerations then the requirement that the child should not 
be ‘blamed’ for the conduct of their parents become a substance free platitude in the way that 
Laws LJ implied.561 For it to mean something substantive for the child not to be blamed for 
their parent’s offending then the distinction between human rights and mere interests (as 
discussed in detail in chapter 3) becomes of vital importance. There is a distinction between 
limitations to human rights grounded in the public interest to prevent crime and disorder 
through deterrence and communication simply because the foreign national has offended, and 
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the public interest in protecting the rights of others. To balance the general public interest 
against the rights of the child would entail blaming the child for their parent’s offending, 
whereas where the child’s rights are limited in order to protect the rights of other individuals 
no blame entails. 
 As we can see, unpacking the logical consequences of what ZH (Tanzania) means when 
it states that the child should not be ‘blamed’ for the offending of their parent has expended a 
great deal of intellectual energy in the courts and academic comment. If there is no distinction 
between rights-based and non-rights based considerations which may be balanced against the 
rights of the child in deportation decisions, then to say that the child should not be ‘blamed’ 
for the offending of their parent either it means that the best interests of the child are paramount, 
despite the explicit rejection of this elsewhere in ZH (Tanzania), or it means nothing. As both 
these seem absurd conclusions, the only other logical conclusion is that there is in fact a 
relevant and important distinction between rights-based and non-rights-based considerations 
which Lady Hale should not have dismissed. Reliance on this distinction, on the other hand, 
aligns s55 BCIA with the unique characteristic of Article 3 UNCRC that only the rights of 
others may be balanced against the best interests of the child.  
 
3. A “Modified Balancing Approach” 
What ZH (Tanzania) provides us with is an alternative approach to deportation decision-
making, one that claims to put the best interests of the child first. The “modified balancing 
approach” begins from the position that the best interests of the child are an independent and 
separate consideration, one that must be considered separately and (ideally) first. The best 
interests of the child is a child-centred assessment in that the child should not be blamed for 
the offending of their parent. I argue that this means that the best interests of the child cannot 
196 
 
be outweighed by non-rights-based considerations but can be outweighed by the rights of other 
individuals. 
 At the same time as introducing into UK deportation law these principles which align 
with the unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC, the “modified balancing approach” 
remains attached to a balancing of family life and the public interest in deportation under 
Article 8 ECHR. Although the best interests of the child must be considered separately, it is 
also said to be an ‘integral part of the proportionality assessment under article 8 ECHR’.562 The 
legal propositions inherent to this “modified balancing approach” are: 
 
• That the best interests of the child should normally be identified at the beginning of the 
balancing exercise (i.e. separately);563 
• No consideration may be treated as being inherently more significant than the best 
interests of the child;564 
• That the best interests decision should not be devalued by the immigration record or 
criminal conduct of their parents and so should be taken in isolation from and without 
reference to those factors;565 
• That the best interests assessment is to be placed in the balance with other factors 
relevant to the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise.566 
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 This “modified balancing approach” is consistent with UK courts attempting to 
navigate a new legal obligation – s55 BCIA – alongside existing human rights obligations 
under Article 8 ECHR. However, this also incorporates the tensions between Article 8 ECHR 
and Article 3 UNCRC which in chapter 3 I analysed as creating the problems of the 
polycentricity of deportation decisions and the plurality of decision-making norms. 
 
4. Evaluating the “Modified Balancing Approach” 
If the “modified balancing approach” replicates in UK law the theoretical problems described 
in chapter 3 by the need to give effect to both Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC 
simultaneously, then we can use the issues identified as a means by which to explain why the 
“modified balancing approach” fails to resolve the problems. This part therefore uses the ideas 
of polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms as analytical devices. 
 
4(a) Polycentricity 
The “modified balancing approach” is clear that the best interests of the child are a facet of the 
Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise. As Jane Fortin asserts, Lady Hale means that ‘the need to 
fulfil the requirements of Article 3 of the CRC were made very much in the context of carrying 
out the balancing exercise required by Article 8 [ECHR]’567 The “simple balancing approach” 
required the best interest of the child to be folded into consideration of family life. The 
“modified balancing approach” appears to require the best interests of the child to be part of 
the Article 8 ECHR assessment, and seeks to treat the best interest of the child separately so as 
to ensure that it is not excluded from consideration either by accident or design. In the “simple 
balancing approach” the treatment of the right to family life as a commonly-held right resulted 
                                                          




in, I argued, only a partial consideration as to what the best interests of the child actually 
includes. The “modified balancing approach” seeks to ameliorate this by requiring the best 
interests of the child to be considered separately and first. The “modified balancing approach” 
is therefore more polycentric than the “simple balancing approach” because it requires more of 
the decision-maker in terms of considering the best interests of the child. By considering the 
best interests of the child separately and first it seeks to ensure that the best interests of the 
child are considered at all; something that the “simple balancing approach” struggled to 
evidence. This is reinforced by the Upper Tribunal authority finding that s55 BCIA is a discrete 
statutory duty which, if the SSHD or courts fails to discharge, would be an error of law.568 
  However, even as an independent statutory duty, s55 BCIA falls short of being 
established as a human right in UK law. Any subsuming of the best interests of the child into 
the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise robs the best interests of the child of their status as a 
right and instead treats it as a mere interest. The folding of the best interests of the child into 
the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise means that the presumption of priority holds only for 
the right to family life. The “modified balancing approach” does not anticipate a separate 
inquiry as to the tests of legitimate aim, suitability, and necessity with respect to the best 
interests of the child. The best interests of the child is still being treated as a mere interest rather 
than as a separate human right. 
 The “modified balancing approach” therefore is polycentric because it more effectively 
takes into account all the relevant interests in deportation decisions. However, it is not 
polycentric because it still places the rights of the adult foreign national offender at the centre 
of the enquiry. The “modified balancing approach” remains a question as to the disposal of a 
                                                          




foreign national offender – albeit a disposal which takes more notice of the child – rather than 
a question about the best interests of the child. 
 
4(b) Plurality of Decision-Making Norms 
4(b)(i) The relationship between family life and the best interests of the child 
The “modified balancing approach” is more polycentric than the “simple balancing approach” 
because of the fact that it requires the best interests of the child to be considered separately and 
to be given no less inherent weight than any other considerations. However, in making 
deportation decisions more polycentric, the “modified balancing approach” fails to address the 
plurality of decision-making norms which are a logical consequence of the principles that UK 
courts established in ZH (Tanzania). In particular, ZH (Tanzania) provides no guidance as to 
the proper relationship between the best interests of the child and the right to family life. ZH 
(Tanzania) demands that the best interests of the child be considered first, to have an inherent 
significance, and to be determined without reference to the offending of the parent. But having 
determined what the best interest of the child requires, ZH (Tanzania) provides no indication 
as to what to do with it or what relationship, if any, it has with the rest of the interests which 
make up family life. In chapter 3 I referenced this problem in the abstract by drawing a box 
around the best interests rights of the children involved in a deportation decision: 
 
Article 8 ECHR Article 8 ECHR  Article 8 ECHR UNCRC Article 3 
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)  Adam (Child)  
     Bryony (Child) Bryony (Child)






How does the separate factor of the best interests of the child fit into the balancing 
exercise of Article 8 ECHR? The metaphor of the balance works as a means of decision-making 
because it permits the weighing of two arguments; claimant versus defendant, deportation 
versus leave to remain. Determining the weight of what goes into each side of the balance may 
be more complex than weighing one thing on each side, and I argued that the “simple balancing 
approach” of Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence in deportation cases is one such example, whereby 
weight may be determined by a relationship between two factors (the value of family life 
magnified by the gravity of the interference). But this does not upset the general idea of a two-
sided balance. 
 The scales of justice are presented visually (for example on the Lady Justice statue on 
the Old Bailey) as a merchant’s scale with two balancing pans. Visually, we can imagine a 
form of scales with three pans dangling from a suspended tripod. This would allow the 
balancing of three separate weights; whichever pan hangs lowest is the weightiest of the three. 
But this extension of balancing does not accurately reflect what is meant by the “modified 
balancing approach” because although it is being treated as a separate consideration with its 
own inherent weight, the best interests of the child is not envisaged by this approach as being 
an entirely independent factor; it is not being balanced against the right to family life, it is 
supposed to be an integral component of it. 
 However, if the best interests of the child are an integral aspect of the family life then 
there is a conflict between the individual nature of the best interests of the child and the 
commonly-held right to family life. In the construction of the “simple balancing approach”, 
outlined in chapter 4, I described the right to family life as being commonly-held between all 
the family members. This made considerable logical sense as family life is necessarily 
relational; the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR protects relationships between 
individuals rather than things that can be experienced by an individual in isolation. The same 
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is not true of the best interests of the child. These are experienced individually and uniquely by 
each child within a family. Some aspects of the child’s best interests are connected to the 
relationships that they have with others, especially within the family. However, this is not the 
case with many other aspects, in particular those concerning their health, education etc, or those 
benefits which Lady Hale argues flows from the right to abode as a British citizen, ‘the 
advantages of growing up and being educated in their own country, their own culture and their 
own language.’569 These are not commonly-held by the family as a whole but instead are held 
and experienced by the children as individuals. 
 However, to simply add the weight of the best interests of each additional child 
individually to the balancing exercise on the side of the family life would result in it weighing 
more heavily the more children there are. Hypothetically, a family of ten children could result 
in the weight of family life always being greater than the public interest or rights of others, 
even if the best interests of each individual child is of limited weight. The outweighing of the 
public interest or rights of others occurs simply by virtue of the existence of multiple children 
to add to the scales. It appears odd that the rights of ten children, each with modest weight to 
their best interests, could outweigh the public interest whereas a single child with very weighty 
best interests may not, simply because they are only one individual. This kind of utilitarian 
assessment of the happiness of the most people is anathema to human rights discourse.  
The alternative is to treat the best interests of all the children in the family as coming 
under the one facet of family life and labelled ‘the best interests of the child’; a kind of average 
of the best interests of all the children involved. This seems to be the approach in ZH (Tanzania) 
in which the best interests of two children were at stake where it described the relevant facts 
(in so far as the best interests of the child were concerned) as being the same as between the 
                                                          




children, noting that they shared their status as British citizens, both attended school, and were 
of similar age. Thus to, adopt the ECtHR framework and assess their best interests along the 
basis of the value of the best interests in the specific case, magnified by the gravity with which 
an interference with the best interests are felt, would produce a materially similar outcome for 
both children. In ZH (Tanzania), Lord Hope could thus talk in terms of ‘their’ best interests, as 
though whether there were one, two or more children had no relevance to the outcome of the 
decision or the weight assigned to the best interests as a facet of the family life right.570 
But within each family, the best interests of multiple children will often differ. This is 
evident if for example, as in PD (Sri Lanka), the best interests of the child was measured with 
reference to factors which will be often influenced most by age; the length of residence of the 
child, the imminence of educational milestones, and the child’s extensive engagement with 
extra-curricular activities.571 The assessment of best interests of two children in a family may 
also differ because one lives with a disability whereas the other does not. Children within a 
family may even differ on lines of nationality, and ‘Although nationality is not a “trump card” 
it is of particular importance in assessing the best interests of any child.’572 For example, one 
child of non-British parents may have acquired ten years residence in the UK since birth and 
been registered as a British citizen under s(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 simply 
because they are ten years old, whereas a younger sibling may be non-British. The examples 
of potential difference are multifarious. 
Where the differences in factual circumstances are material to the assessment of best 
interests ZH (Tanzania) itself provides no guidance. One option would be that the decision-
maker determines the weight of the principle of the best interests of the child by reference the 
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child most negatively affected by the deportation, but this has the effect of completely ignoring 
the other children in the family as holding individual rights or interests; the very issue that the 
polycentricity of deportation decisions requires the court to grapple with. The other option is 
to take some kind of average of the best interest effects of deportation on all of the children, 
but doing so devalues the best interests of any child who would be particularly negatively 
affected by the deportation of an FNO parent by ignoring their specific circumstances which 
result in their best interests being particularly weighty. Both solutions offend the polycentricity 
of deportation decisions because they require the decision-maker to either ignore or devalue 
the relevant best interests of one or more children in the family. 
 The “modified balancing approach” therefore must offend either the polycentricity of 
deportation decisions or the plurality of decision-making norms. It does not adequately address 
the polycentricity of the rights and interests in deportation decisions because in introducing 
some of the plurality of decision-making norms there is no adequate account of the relationship 
between the best interests of the child and the right to family life to be found in the UK case 
law. Although it is stated that the best interests of the child are ‘integral’573 to the Article 8 
ECHR family life balancing exercise, this by itself does not resolve the relationship 
satisfactorily; ‘integral’ is nowhere defined. Regardless of whether the best interests of the 
child is considered as to be added onto the other interests which make up family life, or treated 
as an average of the best interests of multiple children, the essential polycentricity of 




                                                          




4(b)(ii) Not blaming the child for the offending of their parent 
The other aspect of the plurality of decision-making norms is the difference between what 
Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC permits to be balanced against the best interests of the 
child. I argued in chapter 3 that Article 3 UNCRC permits only rights-based considerations to 
be balanced against the best interests of the child, and that this requirement was the most logical 
way of understanding the principle in UK law that ‘A child must not be blamed for matters for 
which he or she is not responsible, such as the offending of a parent’.574 In ZH (Tanzania), 
Lady Hale found that: 
 
In this case, the countervailing considerations were the need to maintain firm and 
fair immigration control, coupled with the mother's appalling immigration history 
and the precariousness of her position when family life was created. But, as the 
Tribunal rightly pointed out, the children were not to be blamed for that.575 
 
 Lord Hope highlighted this too in his judgment, finding that ‘It would be wrong in 
principle to devalue what was in their best interests by something for which they could in no 
way be held to be responsible.’576 If in treating the best interests of the child as a separate 
consideration which is determined first, it is clear that the inherent weight that the best interests 
of the child has should not be ‘devalued’ by the immigration or criminal wrongdoing of their 
parents. The children ‘are innocent victims of their parents' choices.’577 Therefore what is in the 
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best interests of the child is not affected by their parent’s wrongdoing; what is best for the child 
is always best. 
 However, the problem caused by the plurality of decision-making norms is when the 
best interests of the child is made part of the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise. If the family 
life (including the best interests of the child) is then balanced against the parent’s offending or 
poor immigration background, the child’s best interests are still being made subject to an 
assessment of the weight assigned to the public interest in deporting their parent. The 
assessment is shifted later in the decision-making process, but the effect is the same; whether 
the best interests of the child are more likely to be upheld is entirely dependent on the weight 
assigned to the offending of the parent. Where two children have equally weighted best 
interests, where the parent’s offence is weighted more in the balancing exercise (because, for 
example, the prison sentence received was greater) the child’s best interests are less likely to 
prevail in the outcome of the deportation decision. The child is still effectively being blamed 
for the offending of their parent because whether they suffer the negative consequence of 
deportation is dependent on the severity of the actions of their FNO parent. 
 I argue that this lends weight to the idea that to not blame the children for the 
wrongdoings of their parents is best understood as to prevent the best interests of the child from 
being balanced against non-rights-based considerations, such as the simple fact that the foreign 
national offender parent has offended. If to not blame the child means less, then it effectively 
means nothing because it simply delays the point in the deportation decision-making process at 
which the child is blamed. 
 However, only balancing rights-based considerations against the family life (including 
the best interests of the child) in the “modified balancing approach” must offend the 
polycentricity of deportation decisions because it excludes from the decision those aspects of 
the public interest which Article 8 ECHR explicitly permits to outweigh the right to family life; 
206 
 
as in ZH (Tanzania), ‘the need to maintain firm and fair immigration control, coupled with the 
mother's appalling immigration history and the precariousness of her position when family life 
was created.’578 If polycentricity requires all the relevant interests to be taken into account in 
deportation decisions, to exclude aspects of the public interest from an Article 8 ECHR 
balancing exercise must be problematic. 
 This is the bind that the UK courts are clearly in following ZH (Tanzania). Not to blame 
the child for the offending of their parent is a natural consequence of the general public policy 
context, outlined in chapter 2, that the child is a person in their own right, and moreover, a 
vulnerable person who requires protection. However, there is clear tension between this public 
policy view of the child and the view of FNOs as individuals against whom deportation ought 
to be the automatic consequence of their offending. Both these have been translated into legal 
principles for decision-making in deportation cases – that the child should not be blamed for 
the offending of the parent and that the FNO may be deported because of their offending alone 
– but they remain principles in tension with each other. I have labelled the resulting tension as 
the polycentricity and plurality of decision-making norms inherent in deportation decisions. 
Regardless of the label, it is a tension that the “modified balancing approach” fails to adequately 
address in theory or practice. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has been propelled by the Supreme Court decision in ZH (Tanzania). It was the 
first decision to identify s55 BCIA as imposing on the deportation decision-maker legal 
principles beyond that already identified by previous courts in the Article 8 ECHR derived 
“simple balancing approach”. Previous to ZH (Tanzania) the best interests of the child were 
                                                          




recognised as being a part of the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR (domesticated 
through the Human Rights Act 1998) and s55 BCIA merely reinforced the necessity that the 
child’s best interests be identified as a factor within that “simple balancing approach”. ZH 
(Tanzania), however, reimagined the s55 duty to have incorporated the ‘spirit’ of Article 3 
UNCRC. According to the Supreme Court, the best interests of the child were to be considered 
separately, first and to be given an inherent weight of its own within the balancing exercise. 
Moreover, the child should not be ‘blamed’ for the actions of their parents which resulted in the 
deportation proceedings. 
 This chapter established that these aspects of the ZH (Tanzania) decision were a 
conscious choice made by the court in interpreting the s55 duty. The wording of s55 BCIA is 
sufficiently vague to be interpreted by the courts in either a narrow or expansive fashion; to 
support either a “simple balancing approach”, or one of paramountcy. Instead, ZH (Tanzania) 
sought a middle ground between interpretive extremes. However, in doing so, ZH (Tanzania) 
introduced into UK law those theoretical problems which in chapter 3 I identified as inherent 
in any deportation decision-making process which seeks to give effect to Article 3 UNCRC and 
Article 8 ECHR simultaneously. Neither ZH (Tanzania), nor the case law which followed it, 
have resolved these. There is no articulation of the proper relationship between the best interests 
of the child and family life, other than that the best interests of the child is simultaneously of 
separate, primary inherent weight, and also ‘integral’ to family life. The child is not to be 
‘blamed’ for the offending of their parent, but the family life which encompasses their best 
interests may be balanced against that offending. 
 This is problematic because the failure to articulate a decision-making process which 
satisfies the polycentricity of deportation decisions and the plurality of decision-making norms 
means that the “modified balancing approach” is essentially incoherent. Whilst its central claim 
is to put the best interests of the child first – temporally and substantively – the reality is that it 
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undermines that by continuing to treat the child as a collateral consequence of an adult-centric 
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This thesis is about the different approaches in UK deportation law to the obligation to give 
effect to the best interests of the child. This legal obligation to the best interests of the child has 
been introduced into UK law by s55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act (BCIA) 2009. 
I have argued that approaches based on a “simple balance” (after Huang)579 and a “modified 
balance” (after ZH (Tanzania))580 failed to give effect to the best interests of the child in a 
coherent or theoretically consistent manner. I have argued, that this is because deportation cases 
pull decision-makers in two competing directions; to deport the “bad” FNO, but also to protect 
the vulnerable, innocent child from the effects of that deportation. Furthermore, the legal 
obligation to the best interests of the child have appeared as ad hoc developments which 
decision-makers have approached, thus far, as requirements to be integrated into existing 
standards and frameworks (in particular that of the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR). 
In this chapter, I explore the “exception approach” to deportation cases that arose from the 
Immigration Act 2014. 
 The Immigration Act 2014 has had a complicated history. It was an attempt by the 
government to place on a statutory footing the Immigration Rules that it had introduced in July 
2012. Those rules were themselves ‘an attempt to respond to judicial decisions which the 
Government disapproved of by weighting the proportionality balance conducted by 
immigration judges firmly on the side of removal and deportation.’581 Of the competing public 
policy strands, the government clearly believed that deportation law had erred too far in 
protecting children (and by extension, their “bad” migrant parents) and not given enough 
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attention to the public interest in deporting FNOs. This was a central plank of Theresa May’s 
Conservative Party conference speech in 2011 when she was Home Secretary, promising that: 
 
…I will write it into our immigration rules that when foreign nationals are convicted 
of a criminal offence or breach our immigration laws: when they should be 
removed, they will be removed.582 
 
When Theresa May believed that the 2012 changes to the Immigration Rules were being 
‘ignored’583 by the courts she resorted to statute, the Immigration Act 2014, in order that 
primary legislation ‘will specify that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes shall, except 
in extraordinary circumstances, be deported.’584 Part 2 of this chapter explains the political and 
legislative development of the Immigration Rule changes in July 2012 and how the government 
came to adopt primary legislation as its preferred alternative to changing the landscape of UK 
deportation law. 
The Immigration Act 2014 has also had a complicated history because it has been at the 
centre of conflicting authority as to its interpretation. This conflicting Upper Tribunal and Court 
of Appeal authority was finally resolved in October 2018. In the Supreme Court judgment of 
KO (Nigeria),585 Lord Carnwath (with whom the rest of the Justices agreed) determined that 
the Immigration Act 2014 creates closely defined statutory exceptions to deportation. This 
chapter therefore deals with UK deportation law as it stands in January 2019. Before the 
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Supreme Court decision in KO (Nigeria), s19 of the Immigration Act 2014 existed in a liminal 
space. This is because the courts had interpreted the Act as merely introducing three new 
statutory directions as to the weight that foreign national offending had in the Article 8 ECHR 
balancing exercise,586 but otherwise ‘in substance the approach envisaged … is not materially 
different to that which a court will adopt in any other Article 8 exercise.’587 The deportation 
provisions of the Immigration Act 2014 were therefore not interpreted by the courts to be 
substantively different from that which preceded it (and which I labelled and discussed in the 
previous chapter as the “modified balancing approach”), only that Parliament had put its thumb 
on the balancing scales in favour of deportation. This thesis therefore does not address it as 
being an approach distinct from what went previously in its task of drawing out the recent 
chronology of UK deportation law. This chapter is therefore concerned with s19, Immigration 
Act 2014 as creating a different “exception approach” to deportation. Whether this different 
approach was actually UK deportation law from the Act coming into force, or only after the 
judgment in KO (Nigeria) in October 2018, is not an argument that is relevant to this thesis. 
Determining when the “exception approach” became effective in UK law and when the 
liminality of the Immigration Act 2014 began and ended does not take further the investigation 
as to the best interests of the child in UK deportation law. 
 This chapter therefore proceeds in part 3 with an explanation of the Immigration Act 
2014 as requiring an “exception approach” to deportation cases. At the same time, the 
Immigration Act 2014 did not displace the HRA nor s55 BCIA which I have identified 
throughout as the site of domestication of the right to family life (Article 8 ECHR) and the best 
interests of the child (Article 3 UNCRC). Nor did the Immigration Act 2014 displace the case 
law that preceded it, such as ZH (Tanzania). The “exception approach” therefore can be 
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assessed with reference to the problems of polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making 
norms. 
 In part 4, I undertake this analysis and conclude that the “exception approach” does not 
take into account the best interests of the child, and instead substitutes a heightened standard of 
‘unduly harsh’ (or higher) which a child must meet. The exceptions in the Immigration Act also 
excludes from consideration the best interests of many children by relying on a restrictive 
definition of a ‘qualifying child’ who may rely on the exception to deportation. The exception 
also excludes consideration of the family life rights of other family members affected by 
deportation, particularly the rights of women – ex-partners, grandparents, and other female 
relatives – upon whom the care of children frequently falls after the deportation of a parent. The 
“exception approach” is therefore, I argue, not polycentric. Furthermore, the exception 
approach also fails to resolve the plurality of decision-making norms by giving greater inherent 
weight to the public interest in deportation than the best interest of the child. This is 
notwithstanding that the primary status of the best interests of the child includes that the best 
interests of the child should have no less inherent weight than other factors. Finally, the weight 
given to the public interest is defined by the Immigration Act purely with reference only to the 
past behaviour of the FNO, rather than by reference to future risk of reoffending, the best 
interests of the child are balanced against non-rights-based considerations. The effect is to 
blame the child for the offending of their parent. 
Although this new “exception approach” steps outside the layering of the obligations to 
the best interests of the child onto Article 8 ECHR, which was observed in previous chapters, 
it still places the foreign national offender at the centre of the enquiry. The “exception 
approach” starts with a presumption in favour of deportation, against which only the strongest 
of claims by children can act as an effective exception. 
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If the Immigration Act 2014 did not displace the s55 BCIA duty, nor the interpretive 
case law, then if the Immigration Act 2014 does not resolve the problems of polycentricity or 
the plurality of decision-making norms which I have argued are created by the concurrent 
domestication of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC in the forms in which they have been 
domesticated, then the “exception approach” is deficient in giving effect to the best interests of 
the child in UK deportation law. Whether or not one believes that the Immigration Act 2014 
ought to be repealed and/or replaced as a consequence of its inability to resolve the problems 
of polycentricity or the plurality of decision-making norms is contingent upon one’s belief that 
it is both desirable and possible to devise a decision-making process which does resolve these 
problems. In chapter 7, I suggest an approach to deportation law which proves the possibility 
of doing so. The desirability of such an approach is a matter of personal political preference. 
 
2. Legislative changes to UK deportation law; the Immigration Rule changes in July 2012 
and the Immigration Act 2014 
In chapters 4 and 5, it is clear that the courts had driven a great deal of change to the substantive 
law on deportation. This was perhaps inevitable after Huang588 required decision-makers, 
appeal tribunals and courts to make individualised decisions about the proportionality of 
deportation under Article 8 ECHR.589 This was a state of affairs which the post-2010 
Conservative government suggested had occurred with the tacit approval of past 
administrations: 
 
…previous Secretaries of State have asserted that if the Courts think that the rules 
produce disproportionate results in a particular case, the Courts should themselves 
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decide the proportionate outcome on the facts before them rather than hold that the 
rule itself is incompatible with Article 8. The Courts have accepted this invitation 
to determine proportionality on a case-by-case basis and do not – indeed cannot – 
give due weight systematically to the Government’s and Parliament’s view of 
where the balance should be struck, because they do not know what that view is.590 
 
 This was perceived by the government as a ‘public policy vacuum’.591 The claim of a 
public policy vacuum did not exist in a political one. The government clearly believed that 
deportation law had not given enough attention to the public interest in deporting foreign 
national offenders. As SSHD, Theresa May stated that: 
 
We all know the stories about the Human Rights Act. The violent drug dealer who 
cannot be sent home because his daughter – for whom he pays no maintenance – 
lives here. The robber who cannot be removed because he has a girlfriend. […] 
we will change the immigration rules to ensure that the misinterpretation of 
Article Eight of the ECHR – the right to a family life – no longer prevents the 
deportation of people who shouldn’t be here. […] The meaning of Article Eight 
[ECHR] should no longer be perverted. So I will write it into our immigration 
rules that when foreign nationals are convicted of a criminal offence or breach our 
immigration laws: when they should be removed, they will be removed.592 
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Thus as a means of pursuing its political agenda, the government introduced new 
immigration rules in July 2012 to ‘embed within the rules the Secretary of State’s interpretation 
of Article 8 ECHR.’593  
 
The new Immigration Rules are intended to fill this public policy vacuum by setting 
out the Secretary of State’s position on proportionality and to meet the democratic 
deficit by seeking Parliament’s agreement to her policy. The rules will state how 
the balance should be struck between the public interest and individual rights, 
taking into account relevant case law, and thereby provide for a consistent and fair 
decision-making process. Therefore, if the rules are proportionate, a decision taken 
in accordance with the Rules will, other than in exceptional cases, be compatible 
with Article 8.594 
 
The Secretary of State’s interpretation of Article 8 ECHR weighted the proportionality 
balance ‘firmly on the side of removal and deportation.’595 As to the relationship between the 
courts and Article 8 ECHR, Thomas described the intended impact of the July 2012 
Immigration Rules as being: 
 
a clear attempt to give a policy steer to the courts and tribunals. They seek to 
confine Huang by defining proportionality though the rules and by re-introducing 
“exceptionality” as the criterion of success … The [SSHD]’s purpose is to attempt 
                                                          
593 Clayton (n28) 146 
 
594 Home Office, ‘Statement of Intent: Family Migration’ (n590) [38] 
 




to “shift” the judicial role from reviewing the proportionality of individual 
administrative decisions to reviewing the proportionality of the Rules596 
 
The post-July 2012 Immigration Rules require that once a foreign national offender is 
determined liable for deportation, that: 
 
the Secretary of State in assessing that claim will consider whether paragraph 399 
or 399A applies and, if it does not, the public interest in deportation will only be 
outweighed by other factors where there are very compelling circumstances over 
and above those described in paragraphs 399 and 399A.597 
 
 Paragraph 399(a) of the Immigration Rules exclusively concerns children (and thus is 
of exclusive concern to this thesis): 
 
(a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child under 
the age of 18 years who is in the UK, and 
(i) the child is a British Citizen; or 
(ii) the child has lived in the UK continuously for at least the 7 years immediately 
preceding the date of the immigration decision; and in either case 
(a) it would be unduly harsh for the child to live in the country to which the 
person is to be deported; and 
(b) it would be unduly harsh for the child to remain in the UK without the 
person who is to be deported 
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However, family life is complex and the complexity of the post-Huang case law is a 
result of the courts grappling with individual proportionality decisions; what does the right to 
family life require when the individual complexity of family life is coupled with the complexity 
of the circumstances of offending which led the foreign national offender to this particular 
juncture, in the individual complex circumstances that they arise? As Mr Justice Munby in the 
Court of Appeal observed: 
 
such is the diversity of forms that the family takes in contemporary society that it 
is impossible to define, or even to describe at anything less than almost 
encyclopaedic length, what is meant by “family life” for the purposes of Article 
8.598 
 
 It was apparent that ‘strong factual cases which would previously have been allowed 
under the application Article 8 ECHR would fall outside what was provided for by the 
Immigration Rules.’599 This was not least because there was no obvious immediate reference 
in the Immigration Rules to the best interests of the child and surely, it was argued, that there 
must be circumstances related to the interests of children which were not reflected adequately 
in the Immigration Rules.600 Addressing this in MF (Nigeria), the Court of Appeal benefited 
from the SSHD’s own submission that ‘the new rules do not herald a restoration of the 
exceptionality test.’601 Therefore the Court of Appeal, apparently with the SSHD’s support, 
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was able to find space within the Immigration Rules formulation that ‘the public interest in 
deportation will only be outweighed by other factors where there are very compelling 
circumstances’602 for authority to continue to conduct ‘a proportionality test as required by the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.’603 This Article 8 ECHR proportionality test would operate to 
capture those cases where the Immigration Rules did not adequately reflect the case law on 
Article 8 family life. Thus: 
 
The word "exceptional" is often used to denote a departure from a general rule. The 
general rule in the present context is that, in the case of a foreign prisoner to whom 
paras 399 and 399A do not apply, very compelling reasons will be required to 
outweigh the public interest in deportation. These compelling reasons are the 
"exceptional circumstances".  We would, therefore, hold that the new rules are a 
complete code and that the exceptional circumstances to be considered in the 
balancing exercise involve the application of a proportionality test as required by 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence.604 
 
However, despite the SSHD’s position in litigation in which ‘[counsel for the SSHD] 
has made it clear on behalf of the Secretary of State that the new rules do not herald a restoration 
of the exceptionality test’,605 in the political sphere the SSHD chose to interpret the decision in 
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MF (Nigeria) as the judges ignoring Parliament606 and instead pursued her agenda through 
primary legislation; in the form of s19 of the Immigration Act 2014. 
 
3. Section 19 of the Immigration Act 2014 
Section 19, Immigration Act 2014 is textually dense and, as a piece of amending legislation, is 
a plethora of sub-sections. Part 2(a) below sets out the relevant portions of the text before 
describing how it creates a child-centred exception to deportation. However, part 2(b) observes 
that the Immigration Act 2014 does not displace either the HRA nor the s55 duty, or the 
deportation case law that preceded it.  
 
3(a) Section 19 Immigration Act 2014 as an “exception approach” 
Section 19, Immigration Act 2014 itself introduces a new Part 5A to the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act (NIAA) 2002. This thesis will therefore use the section numbers 
within the context of the NIAA for consistency and clarity, although it will continue to identify 
the whole as the approach adopted by the Immigration Act 2014. Part 5A NIAA requires courts 
and tribunals to ‘(in particular) have regard’607 to a list of public interest considerations when 
determining any Article 8 ECHR based appeal against removal or deportation.608 S117B NIAA 
lists considerations which apply ‘in all cases’,609 and s117C NIAA lists those which apply ‘in 
cases concerning the deportation of foreign national criminals’.610 The public interest 
considerations which apply to FNOs states that: 
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117C(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. 
 
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the 
public interest in deportation of the criminal. 
 
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period 
of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation 
unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies. 
 
(4) Exception 1 applies where— 
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life, 
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and 
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the 
country to which C is proposed to be deported.  
 
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a 
qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a 
qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be 
unduly harsh. 
 
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of 
imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless 
222 
 
there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in 
Exceptions 1 and 2611 
 
 “Exception 1” clearly applies regardless of whether or not the foreign national offender 
has children and is concerned with what would be considered to be private life under Article 8 
ECHR. It is disjunctive to “Exception 2” and thereby applies separately to it as deportation 
must occur unless either (not both) Exceptions apply. Because this thesis is concerned with 
foreign national offenders who have children, this chapter is concerned only with “Exception 
2”. 
 These sub-sections introduce a new set of legal nomenclature which itself defines. A 
‘foreign criminal’ is a person who is not a British citizen, who has been convicted of an offence, 
and who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months, or ‘has been 
convicted of an offence that has caused serious harm’, or ‘is a persistent offender’.612 What 
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these latter two actually mean is irrelevant to this thesis because this thesis had defined FNOs 
as those who are liable for deportation, and coming under either definition will mean that they 
are liable for deportation under s3(5) Immigration Act 1971.613 A ‘qualifying child’ is ‘a person 
who is under the age of 18 and who is a British citizen, or has lived in the United Kingdom for 
a continuous period of seven years or more’.614 A non-British citizen child born in the UK can 
therefore only become a ‘qualifying child’ when they reach the age of seven, and any non-
British citizen child under the age of seven years cannot be a ‘qualified child’. The qualifying 
period of residence in the UK must be continuous and so any breaks in residence will reset the 
clock on the qualifying residence period, although what counts as a sufficient break has not yet 
been the subject of case law. 
  The statutory exceptions require an ‘evaluative exercise’615 rather than an exercise of 
balance. The most obvious difference between the two is that balancing requires a comparison 
between variables, whereas an evaluation is a comparison of a variable against a constant. 
Therefore I evaluate whether my dinner is healthy by reference to how I define ‘healthy’ 
(calorific content, vitamins present, levels of sugar, fat etc), but balance when I consider which 
dinner is healthier (the dinner with low fat, low sugar, but few vitamins, balanced against the 
high fat, high sugar dinner fortified with additional vitamins). Thus to evaluate whether a 
deportation is ‘unduly harsh’ requires the decision-maker to evaluate whether or not the effects 
of the deportation meets a definition of ‘unduly harsh’ which is unchanging and determined 
externally to the individual case. In contrast, a balancing exercise would require an assessment 
of the weight of the best interests of the child as against the offending of the FNO; the greater 
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the severity of offending the worse must be the consequences for the child before it can be 
considered ‘unduly harsh’.  
In KO (Nigeria), Lord Carnwath found nothing in the use of the terms ‘the effect of C’s 
deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh’616 that ‘import[s] a reference to the 
conduct of the parent’ which is to be balanced against the situation of the children or partner.617 
Because it is an evaluative exercise, the meaning of ‘unduly harsh’ or ‘very compelling 
circumstances’ applies uniformly across the category of foreign national offender, defined with 
reference to the length of their imprisonment that it covers. Therefore any FNO sentenced to 
imprisonment for less than four years must demonstrate that the effect of their deportation is 
unduly harsh on a qualifying child, regardless of whether their sentence is for one year or three-
and-a-half years, and whether certain types of offence are considered to be more severe than 
others. Likewise, the child of an FNO sentenced to twenty years imprisonment must meet only 
the same level of ‘very compelling circumstances’ as where the FNO parent was sentenced to 
only four years. The seriousness of the offence committed is irrelevant to the judicial task, 
because this is defined by the statutory categories of exception, so that decision-makers would 
not be ‘asked to decide whether consequences which are deemed unduly harsh for the son of 
an insurance fraudster may be acceptably harsh for the son of a drug-dealer.’618 
In comparison with the decision-making approaches described in the preceding two 
chapters, an exception to deportation marks two significant departures. The first, as already 
noted, is that under the exception approach to the Immigration Act 2014 the weight assigned to 
the public interest side of the Article 8 ECHR balancing scale is pre-determined by statute and 
of unalterable weight within the two categories of ‘unduly harsh’ and of exhibiting ‘very 
                                                          
616 Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002, s117C(5) 
 
617 KO (Nigeria) (n24) [17] & [22] 
 




compelling circumstances’. In contrast, the “simple balancing approach” and “modified 
balancing approach” both envisage the weight of the public interest in deportation to be of 
(potentially) infinite variability based upon the severity of the offending. The second is that on 
the other side of the balancing scales stands only the interests of the child.619 Previously, the 
best interests of the child would either be folded in its entirety into the family life right of other 
family members, including the FNO parent, (the “simple balancing approach”) or determined 
separately but then integral to the family life right (the “modified balancing approach”). 
 
3(b) The best interests of the child and the right to family life after the Immigration Act 2014 
It has been a central claim of this thesis that the best interests of the child (Article 3 UNCRC) 
and the right to family life (Article 8 ECHR) have been domesticated into UK law by s55 BCIA 
and the HRA respectively. Because the Immigration Act 2014 does not displace either of these 
statutory provisions, either by express or implied repeal, both must equally continue to apply. 
This means that the “exception approach” must be considered in the context of the requirement 
in UK law to apply both human rights regimes and to grapple with the issues of polycentricity 
and the plurality of decision-making norms which are inherent in this legal framework of 
multiple human rights regimes. If the “exception approach” cannot resolve these problems, then 
as a decision-making process it cannot give effect to the best interests of the child, as this thesis 
has argued they are defined in law. If the current statutory regime governing deportation of 
FNOs with children is deficient in this regard, it strongly suggests that it must be repealed and 
replaced. 
 The Immigration Act 2014 operates in the context of the s6 HRA duty that UK courts 
must act compatibly with Convention rights. This is stated explicitly in s19 Immigration Act 
2014 itself: 
                                                          




117A(1)This Part applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether 
a decision made under the Immigration Acts— 
(a) breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 
8, and 
(b) as a result would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
 
The Home Office ECHR memorandum confirms this intention, stating that, ‘New 
section 117A of the [NIAA] 2002 Act requires a court or tribunal considering Article 8 [ECHR] 
in an immigration case to have particular regard to the public interest as defined in this Part.’620 
The Exceptions themselves were justified by the government as comprising a 
codification of the existing principles of law, both from the ECtHR and domestic courts. These 
are the principles that, presumably, Theresa May believed had been ‘perverted’ by erroneous 
interpretation or application by UK judges.621 Therefore according to the Home Office ECHR 
memorandum: 
 
Exception 2 in new section 117C(5) is designed to capture the circumstances where 
the Article 8 [ECHR] case law would be likely to prevent deportation of a foreign 
criminal on family life grounds. […] In applying an “unduly harsh” […] test, 
particularly in respect of foreign criminals who are also illegal migrants it reflects 
the principles in the current [Immigration] Rules and the domestic jurisprudence in 
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this area such as ZH (Tanzania) that states the best interests of a child are a primary 
consideration, particularly where they are British.622 
 
The ECHR memorandum does not mention the s55 duty, nor the best interests of the 
child. However, the Immigration Act 2014 does, and at s71 states unequivocally that: 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, this Act does not limit any duty imposed on the 
Secretary of State or any other person by section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Act 2009 (duty regarding the welfare of children). 
 
Furthermore, the courts have found consistently that s55 BCIA and the case law 
(particularly ZH (Tanzania)623 and Zoumbas624) ‘survived’625 as applicable principles of law 
after the Immigration Act 2014. In MK it was said that: 
 
…in all cases where section 55 of the 2009 Act applies, the requirement to perform 
the twofold statutory duties is unaffected by the statutory reforms made by the 
Immigration Act 2014 and, in particular, the insertion of the new Part 5A into the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. There has been no amendment of 
section 55 of the 2009 Act. It continues to apply with full vigour. It has not been 
modified in any way by the most recent flurry of statutory activity. […] Both 
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regimes will have to be given full effect by the Secretary of State in appropriate 
cases.626 
 
This was also the finding of the Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria): 
 
…the presumption, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, that the 
provisions are intended to be consistent with the general principles relating to the 
“best interests” of children, including the principle that “a child must not be blamed 
for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent”627 
 
Therefore, those aspects of the best interests of the child which I have argued in this thesis 
arise from the domestication of Article 3 UNCRC into UK law also survive; that the best 
interests of the child is a primary consideration (to be considered separately, first, and of no less 
inherent weight than other considerations) and that the best interests of the child should not be 
balanced against non-rights-based considerations. This also means, inevitably, that the 
theoretical challenges inherent to giving effect to the best interests of the child in UK law also 
survive. The “exception approach” in the Immigration Act 2014 to deportation cases must 
demonstrate that it resolves the problems of polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making 
norms in order to give effective consideration to the best interests of the child in deportation 
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4. Evaluation of the “Exception Approach” 
4(a) Polycentricity 
Polycentricity in deportation decisions requires that all the rights and interests affected by 
deportation are taken into account. However, to describe the Immigration Act 2014 as a “child-
centred” exception flatters to deceive. The principal problem with the statutory exception as it 
stands is that although it is concerned exclusively with the interests of the child, it is not 
consistent with the best interests of the child. This is the case both in the criteria which act as a 
necessary gateway for the exception, and the standard of harm required before the exception 
takes effect. 
 A ‘qualifying child’, is one who is ‘a person who is under the age of 18 and who is a 
British citizen, or has lived in the United Kingdom for a continuous period of seven years or 
more’.628 The inclusion of an automatic qualification of a British citizen child, regardless of 
age, is not in itself objectionable because it helps move the ‘right to abode’ from a simple 
liberty to enter without let or hinderance629 to a more protective status for children, albeit one 
that remains short of granting an inviolable positive right to remain.. The Supreme Court in ZH 
(Tanzania) also recognised an intrinsic significance of British citizenship for a child’s best 
interests: 
 
Nor should the intrinsic importance of citizenship be played down. As citizens these 
children have rights which they will not be able to exercise if they move to another 
country. They will lose the advantages of growing up and being educated in their 
own country, their own culture and their own language.630 
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Identity is a core aspect of the best interests of the child under the UK family law ‘welfare 
checklist’631 (s1(2) Children Act 1989) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child General 
Comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary 
consideration.632 Living in one’s country of citizenship is important to a child’s identity, 
Bhabha argues, because the: 
 
Ability to enjoy the attributes of the apprenticeship [to adult citizenship rights, such 
as voting] is a prerequisite for the assumption of the obligations of citizenship on 
majority; citizenship, to be meaningful, then, is a civic practice that has to be lived 
and experienced, that requires participatory presence and engagement633 
 
For the British state to ignore the importance of British citizenship as establishing a moral 
right of presence in the UK is, Bhabha argues, to ignore the moral obligations of the state to its 
citizens. In deportation cases, ‘Attention to the claims of the citizen child is displaced by a focus 
on the noncitizen parent.’634 But this represents selective blindness to the ‘fact [that] all non-
naturalized citizens acquire their privileged insider status and their associated claims on the 
state through the accident of birth’.635 
However, this argument does not also commit one to also argue that the best interests of 
the child requires non-British children to be constructively deported to their country of 
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nationality. A British identity – whatever that is – may be developed by a child who is not a 
British citizen, and maintaining that identity should be an integral part of the assessment of 
their best interests. Secondly, the moral obligation on the British state extending to its citizens 
an unconditional right of abode does not extinguish its moral or legal obligations to the best 
interests of all children; citizen and non-citizen alike. Recognising a right to abode of one’s 
own citizens does not require a state to force all children to live in the state of their nationality, 
either by preventing the freely chosen emigration of British citizen children from the UK or 
deporting non-British citizen children. The automatic inclusion of British citizen children to 
‘qualifying’ status under the Immigration Act 2014 also does not preclude non-British citizen 
children from also qualifying. Indeed, the Immigration Act 2014 defines children who qualify 
for the exceptions as including non-British citizen children who have been resident in the UK 
for seven years or more.636 
However, the problem with this rule-based qualification is that where the outcome of 
deportation of a foreign national offender parent is unduly harsh on a non-British child, that 
child is not protected from the harm to their best interests unless they meet an arbitrary 
threshold of seven years residence; ‘Rule-based systems can also lead to unjust outcomes.’637 
This is clearly a probable consequence of hard and fast qualifying criteria, such as that the 
exceptions to deportation apply only to British citizens and children who have been resident in 
the UK for seven years or more. A ‘seven year policy’638 has particular resonance for UK 
immigration lawyers. Between 1996 and 2008, a Home Office policy (referred to as DP 5/96) 
applied to the effect that where a child had been resident in the UK for seven years, neither 
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deportation nor removal action would normally be taken against a child, and leave to remain 
would be granted to their family.639 Even after the official withdrawal of the policy the courts 
found seven years to be an appropriate rule of thumb as to how long a child’s residency in the 
UK would have to be in order to weigh heavily in the Article 8 ECHR balancing exercise.640 
The difference between a general principle and an inviolable rule is self-evident, but also of 
legal importance. The Secretary of State acts unlawfully if she treats a policy as having the 
character of a rule,641 so to have refused leave to remain solely on the basis that a child had not 
reached the milestone of seven years residence under DP 5/96 would have been unlawful. Were 
DP 5/96 still in operation as a policy, the best interests of the child would be of relevance as to 
whether seven years residence was a reliable rule of thumb to apply in the individual case. Lots 
of factors associated with the best interests of the child may suggest that a specific child ought 
to be granted leave to remain, along with their family, before they had accumulated seven years 
residence. In contrast, the ‘qualifying child’ criteria of s117D(1) NIAA is impervious to 
arguments to the effect that the best interests of the child require that they be granted access to 
the statutory exception, regardless of their length of residence. The qualifying child criteria 
ensure that the interests of some children of foreign national offenders are considered under the 
statutory exception to deportation, but not the best interests of all children of foreign national 
offenders. The “exception approach” therefore cannot be polycentric because it fails to take 
into account all of the relevant rights and interests in deportation decisions, particularly the best 
interests of children who do not qualify for the statutory exception. 
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 The second stage of the exception is whether the effect is ‘unduly harsh’ or exhibiting 
‘very compelling circumstances’, depending on whether the foreign national offender was 
sentenced to a period of more or less than four years imprisonment. Even the lower standard of 
‘unduly harsh’ presents considerable issues for the claim that the exception to deportation under 
the Immigration Act 2014 actually takes into account the best interests of the child. A standard 
of ‘unduly harsh’ effects on the child is defined in the case law by reference to synonyms rather 
than substantive content: 
 
…“unduly harsh” does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable 
or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. “Harsh” 
in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antitheses of pleasant 
or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb “unduly” raises an already 
elevated standard still higher.642  
 
 This is not to say that a court will never find that the consequences of deportation are 
very severe or very bleak. In MK (Sierra Leone), from which the above definition of ‘unduly 
harsh’ is taken, the Upper Tribunal found that: 
 
…we have no hesitation in concluding that it would be unduly harsh for either of 
the two seven year old British citizen children concerned to be abruptly uprooted 
from their United Kingdom life setting and lifestyle and exiled to this struggling, 
impoverished and plague stricken west African state. No reasonable or right 
thinking person would consider this anything less than cruel.643 
                                                          







 However, other judges have taken the view that the loss of contact with an FNO parent 
from a child’s life in the UK is not ‘unduly harsh’: 
 
There is undoubtedly a close relationship between this father and his children, as 
one would expect in any family living together as does this one. The preserved 
finding of fact is that, although it would not be unduly harsh for the four younger 
children to move to Nigeria, the reality of the situation is that they will remain here 
and, as the family relationships cannot be maintained by modern means of 
communication, there will be a complete fracture of these family relationships. The 
claimant is not authorised to work and so has been unable to provide financial 
support for his family but his role within the household has meant that his wife has 
been able to work, which she would find hard or impossible if she had to care on a 
daily basis for the children without her husband's assistance. Thus it is said that if 
the claimant is removed, the main household income will be lost and the children 
would be subject to economic disadvantage. But, again, that is not an experience 
that can, in my judgment, be categorised as severe or bleak or excessively harsh as, 
like any other person lawfully settled in the United Kingdom, the claimant's wife 
and family will have access to welfare benefits should they be needed.644 
 
 In neither case is the assessment made as to what is in the child’s best interests. An 
assessment of the best interests of the child, whatever list of factors are used to determine it, 
requires only that one situation be better than another, whereas ‘unduly harsh’ clearly requires 
                                                          




the post-deportation situation to be severely bleak. For example, if the ‘plague stricken’ state 
of the country (Sierra Leone was at the time experiencing an Ebola outbreak)645 tipped it into 
the status of unduly harsh, it would unlikely to be in the best interests of the British children in 
MK to suffer constructive deportation to Sierra Leone if it was only ‘struggling’ and 
‘impoverished’. However, the ‘unduly harsh’ exception will act to protect the child’s best 
interests in only the heightened set of negative circumstances. In the other example from case 
law, it will usually be in the best interests of the child to be in a household with a working parent 
rather than one reliant on benefits, not least because benefit income is capped at £20,000pa646 
whereas income from employment is not. In contrast, only abject destitution appears to be 
considered in the case law to be an ‘unduly harsh’ effect of deportation.  
This is not to say that the best interests of the child must be a paramount consideration 
– both Article 3 UNCRC and the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) permits the best interests of 
the child to be overridden by the rights of others – but that to take into account the best interests 
of the child in a polycentric deportation decision requires that what is in the best interests of the 
child must be determined. Because the statutory exception under the Immigration Act 2014 
does not address the best interests of the child, it cannot be polycentric in the way required by 
Article 3 UNCRC or s55 BCIA. 
 Despite this, it is worth observing that the Immigration Act 2014 exception does at least 
address one of the problems of polycentricity thrown up by the “modified balancing approach” 
explored in the preceding chapter. That approach was critiqued as having no way to cope 
effectively with situations whereby the best interests of one child in a family weighed more 
heavily against deportation than that of their siblings. The question posed was whether the 
“modified balancing approach” would average out the weight of best interests as between the 
                                                          
645 MK (section 55 – Tribunal options) Sierra Leone (n502) [45] 
 




multiple children; such an average would more adequately reflect the effect of the deportation 
on the children (as a plural group), but not give sufficient weight to the best interests of a child 
with weightier interests. The exception at least seems to answer this aspect of the problem of 
polycentricity by making the focus of the investigation about each individual child’s 
circumstances, and weighing each individually against a standard test of ‘unduly harsh’ or ‘very 
compelling circumstances’. This is a test that can be failed when applied to one child but passed 
when applied to a second, yet the “fail” by one child has no bearing on whether the second 
child will pass, nor on the legal consequences for the foreign national offender parent’s 
deportation as a result of that “pass”. 
 Although it presents an effective answer to the existence of the rights and interests of 
multiple children, the exceptions under the Immigration Act 2014 still leads to problematic 
theoretical and practical consequences with respect to how it treats the polycentric rights of 
other adults which are also at stake. S117C NIAA does permit deportation to be outweighed by 
the effect of deportation on the ‘the partner or child’.647 However, this is a disjunctive exception 
which only includes current partners who are British Citizens or those with indefinite leave to 
remain.648 The focus solely on the interests of the individual child results in the exclusion of 
interests of other family members, which in deportation appeals affecting children will 
frequently be the interests of women; ex-partners, mothers, grandmothers, and other female 
family members upon whom the care of children frequently falls. Any decision-making process 
which is apt to exclude the interests of women is vulnerable to a forceful feminist critique on 
this ground alone.649 As in the example from KMO,650 above, the loss of employment/career 
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and associated material disadvantage will be most immediately experienced as a negative effect 
on the private life of the carer who remains in the UK. But if this is an unduly harsh effect of 
the deportation of the foreign national offender, then only if they are currently partners will 
s117C NIAA intervene and an exception to prevent the deportation; ex-partners, grandparents 
or others must suffer the consequences of the deportation, regardless of its harshness. 
The final set of interests to account for in a polycentric deportation decision is that of 
the public interest. The exception approach in the Immigration Act 2014 does take into account 
the public interest by starting with a presumption of deportation; ‘The deportation of foreign 
criminals is in the public interest.’651 The public interest thereafter weighs more heavily 
depending on the length of sentence served because the interests of the child will only outweigh 
the assumption of deportation if it is ‘unduly harsh’ on the child, rising to ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ where the sentence is greater than four years imprisonment. The structural 
device of an exception rather than a balancing exercise does not diminish the fact that the public 
interest is taken into account in the exception approach to the Immigration Act 2014. The 
specific situation of children as vulnerable and dependent on adult care, as discussed in chapter 
2, means that, as Elias LJ observed in MA (Pakistan), there are ‘powerful reasons why, [a 
qualifying child should be permitted to remain in the UK] even though the effect is that their 
possibly undeserving families can remain with them.’652 
However, the presumption in favour of deportation means that even where the interests 
of individuals are taken into account by the exceptions to deportation in the Immigration Act 
2014, they are given the status of mere interests rather than as rights. As argued in chapter 3, 
the core distinction between rights and interests is that rights are subject to the presumption of 
priority; the requirement that interference is only lawful if it is for a legitimate aim, is rational, 
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necessary, and proportionate. The presumption in favour of deportation means that it may be 
conducted even if it is neither rational nor necessary; the only relevant test is that of its unduly 
harsh or exceptional effects on the child.  
 The exception approach to the Immigration Act 2014 is therefore only weakly 
polycentric. It takes into account the interests of some children (i.e. ‘qualifying’ children) and 
adults (i.e. ‘qualifying’ partners), and well as the public interest in deportation. However, it 
falls considerably short of taking into account the interests of all children or adults affected by 
deportation decisions because of the restrictive qualifying criteria. Furthermore the exceedingly 
high barriers of ‘unduly harsh’ or ‘exceptional circumstances’ means that the best interests of 
qualifying children are not taken into account, only a version of their interest where the 
consequences of deportation are the most abject. Finally, the presumption in favour of 
deportation means that the interests of children are taken into account as mere interests, rather 
than as a human right. 
 
4(b) Plurality of Decision-Making Norms 
The plurality of decision-making norms, identified in chapter 3, is encountered because 
deportation decisions are governed by two separate, substantive legal regimes – Article 3 
UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR (or their domestic equivalents) – which have within them specific 
rules governing their fulfilment. It is in trying to give effect to both sets of rules effectively in 
one decision-making process which is challenging. Chapters 4 and 5 have shown how UK 
courts have attempted to reconcile these two regimes in decision-making processes which I 
have described as the “simple balancing approach” and the “modified balancing approach”, but 
I have argued that neither has effectively given effect to the plurality of decision-making norms 
because both have required one or more of the decision-making norms contained within the 
best interests of the child to be ignored. In this part I argue that the “exception approach” in the 
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Immigration Act 2014 at least fulfils the requirement that the interests of the child653 ought to 
be a primary consideration. However, it does not also adequately require that the best interests 
of the child be balanced only against rights-based considerations. The ultimate conclusion is 
that the Immigration Act 2014’s “exception approach” also fails to resolve this problem. 
First, then, does an “exception approach” to the Immigration Act 2014 treat the interests 
of the child as a primary consideration? In one sense, the interests of the child are the primary 
consideration because the only evaluation that the decision-maker is required to make is with 
respect to the child; is the deportation of their FNO parent unduly harsh or exhibits very 
compelling circumstances above unduly harsh? The primary status of the interests of the child 
arises from the intrinsically child-centred frame of thought that the decision-maker is required 
to adopt. Because the weight of the public interest is pre-determined by statute based on the 
length of sentence served, the decision-maker should not be distracted from a focus solely on 
the child’s interests by considerations based on the specific context of the offending of the 
FNO. However, it may also be said that the interests of the child are not treated as a primary 
interest as the public interest is considered to be (contrary to the instructions in Zoumbas) 
‘inherently more significant than the best interests of the children’.654 This is because there is 
a presumption in favour of deportation which automatically makes is more significant, and 
because the exception to deportation are not framed in terms of the best interests of the child, 
rather they are framed as the greater hurdles of ‘unduly harsh’ or ‘exceptional circumstances’.  
A decision-making framework which focuses on the child’s interests goes some way to 
satisfy the requirement to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. 
However, Article 3 UNCRC does not impose simply a requirement to treat the best interests of 
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the child first in the temporal sense. As Lord Kerr argued, there must be a substantive effect on 
the decision-making in order for the treating the best interests of the child as being temporally 
first to actually comply with the primacy of the best interests.655 Therefore the presumption in 
favour of deportation results in a substantive undercutting of the procedural child-centric focus 
of the Immigration Act 2014 exception. Although it is a child-centric exception, it is one that 
is drawn so narrowly that the best interests of the child cannot be treated as being of the same 
inherent significance as the public interest in deportation. This is by design; ‘The Government 
aims to remove as many foreign national offenders as quickly as possible’.656 
The second aspect of the plurality of decision-making norms is that the best interests of 
the child should not be overridden by non-rights-based considerations. The “exception 
approach” to deportation in the Immigration Act 2014 fails to comply with this in a more direct 
way than the previous approaches explored. In the “simple balancing approach” and the 
“modified balancing approach” the weight assigned to the public interest in deportation is 
variable based on the severity of the offending of the FNO, whereas in the “exceptionapproach” 
the weight of the public interest is static. This means that it cannot be adjusted by the decision-
maker in order to reflect a greater public interest in deportation arising from a rights-based 
reason for deportation, or lowered where the public interest in deportation is only in 
consequence of a generalised public interest.  
For example, both FNO1 and FNO2 are sentenced to two years imprisonment. Where 
FNO1 presents a high risk of (re)offending against an individual this is clearly a rights-based 
consideration which General Comment 6657 permits to override the best interests of the child;658 
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the individual who is at high risk of being offended against has a right to physical integrity, 
property etc, which would be interfered with by the offending (which in Article 8(2) ECHR 
terms is ‘the rights or freedoms of others’). In contrast, where FNO2 presents no risk of 
reoffending, the rationale for their deportation can lie only in the communicative and deterrent 
functions of deportation;659 considerations which are not based in the rights of individuals but 
rest instead in a general public interest (in Article 8 EHCR terms, the public interest in the 
prevention of crime and disorder). In these contrasting examples between FNO1 and FNO2, 
the “simple balancing approach” and “modified balancing approach” both permit the decision-
maker to weigh the public interest in deportation more heavily against FNO1. The general 
public interest in deportation may still under both approaches be sufficient to make the 
deportation of FNO2 proportionate to the interference with the best interests and/or right to 
family life of the child, and therefore contrary to the requirements of Article 3 UNCRC, but 
these balance-based approaches at least allow for recognition that the public interest is less 
weighty in such cases. 
Under the “exception approach” of decision making arising from the Immigration Act 
2014, the weight assigned to the public interest in the cases of both FNO1 and FNO2 is defined 
by statute to be the same – that the effect of their deportation must be ‘unduly harsh’ on the 
qualifying child – and cannot be adjusted by the decision-maker. Therefore not only may the 
best interests of the child be overridden by non-rights based considerations, the best interests 
of the child are as likely to be overridden by non-rights based considerations as by rights-based 
considerations because the statutory regime makes no distinction between the two. 
 This conclusion as to the failure of the “exception approach” to adequately address the 
unique characteristic of Article 3 UNCRC that only rights-based considerations can override 
                                                          




the best interests of the child also therefore feeds into its failure of the “exception approach” to 
preclude the blaming of the child for the offending of their parent. Although the “exception 
approach” directly eschews any suggestion (as had been made by the Secretary of State) that 
the Immigration Act 2014 requires a consideration of whether ‘the consequences were or were 
not “due”’660 to the child, the relative weight of the public interest is altered by statute with 
reference only to the prison sentence served by elevating the test of ‘unduly harsh’ under 
s117C(5) to that of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s117C(6) NIAA. This is inherently looking 
back only at what past prison sentence was served, rather than being a forward-looking 
assessment as to the risk that the FNO presents in the future for the rights of others. The child 
is therefore required to suffer greater negative consequences the longer the prison sentence of 
the parent. The only determinative factor is how long the FNO spent in prison and it is irrelevant 
to the exceptions as to whether or not they are likely to reoffend in a way as to interfere with 
the rights of others. There can be no clearer example of deportation effectively blaming the 
child for the offending of their parent. 
For these reasons, the “exception approach” fails to give adequate attention to the 
unique characteristics of Article 3 UNCRC and thereby fails to adequately address plurality of 
decision-making norms. The exception does not treat the best interests of the child as a primary 
consideration in a substantive sense, despite the procedural frame of thought presents a 
superficial child-centeredness. Instead, the public interest in deportation is treated as having 
more inherent weight than the best interests of the child because the exception begins with a 
presumption in favour of deportation. Because the “exception approach” alters the weight of 
the public interest based solely on the length of prison sentence received, the best interests of 
                                                          




the child may be overridden by non-rights-based considerations. In the exception approach, 
this also results in the child being directly blamed for the offending of the parent. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Immigration Act 2014, confirmed by the Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria), introduced an 
“exception approach” deportation. The statutory exceptions are not based on a human right 
balancing framework, but on a child-centric evaluation of the impact of deportation of an FNO 
on children. However, under scrutiny the notion of a “child-centric” exception to deportation 
flatters to deceive. Whilst the “exception approach” does centre on the child, it does not 
adequately take into account the best interests of all children affected by deportation. Instead, 
any child who falls outside of the qualifying criteria will not have their best interests considered 
as an exception. Even if a child is a ‘qualifying child’ then the requirement that the effects on 
the child ought to be ‘unduly harsh’ or evidence ‘exceptional circumstances’ mean that the 
exception is not based on what is in the best interests of the child, but on a heightened standard 
which the Upper Tribunal have described as amounting to very severe or very bleak. The 
exception also does not take into account the rights of all adults affected by deportation, 
particularly the rights of ex-partners, grandparents, and other female relatives upon whom the 
care of children often falls after the deportation of a parent. The “exception approach” to the 
Immigration Act 2014 is therefore not polycentric. 
 The “exception approach” also fails to resolve the plurality of decision-making norms. 
Because the exception begins with an assumption in favour of deportation, the best interests of 
the child are not given a primary status through which they possess an inherent weight no less 
than the public interest in deportation. Finally, because the weight assigned to the public 
interest is pre-determined by statute and based entirely on the pass behaviour of the FNO 
(indexed by the length of the prison sentence received) the interests of the child are caused to 
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be outweighed by non-rights-based considerations. The effect is to blame the child for the 
offending of their parent because the length of sentence determines whether the child can be 
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This thesis has been concerned up to this point with identifying the reasons for the difficulties 
that UK deportation law has found in giving effect to the best interests of the child. In this final 
substantive chapter, I demonstrate the existence of an alternative decision-making approach 
which is capable of giving effect to the best interests of the child in deportation decisions, 
whilst avoiding the theoretical pitfalls that I identified each previous decision-making approach 
as having fallen into. In demonstrating this alternative decision-making approach – which I call 
the “human rights approach” – it supports the conclusion that the problems of polycentricity 
and the plurality of decision-making norms is a consequence of the ad hoc layering of legal 
obligations in deportation decisions. This chapter supports that conclusion by demonstrating 
that an approach to decision-making which is not based on the ad hoc layering conducted to 
date is more capable of giving effect to the best interests of the child in deportation decisions.  
In chapter 3 I argued that UK law has domesticated Article 8 ECHR (the right to family 
life) through the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 and Article 3 UNCRC (the best interests of 
the child) through s55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act (BCIA) 2009, and through 
subsequent case law. These two domestic legal requirements mean that deportation decisions 
ought to be polycentric in that they must give effect to all the relevant rights and interests 
engaged in deportation decisions, and also ought to respect the plurality of decision-making 
norms inherent in Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR. These issues arise because UK 
decision-makers are required to remain faithful to both legal regimes. However, the application 
of a deportation decision which gives simultaneous effect to both appears theoretically 
impossible because they require fundamentally different things of decision-makers. 
Because the suggested “human rights approach” is not based on the ad hoc layering of 
legal obligations, it will require new legislation. As well as the repeal of s19 Immigration Act 
2014, amendment to the UK Borders Act 2007 will be required. The UK Borders Act 2007 sets 
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out the requirements for ‘automatic deportation’ and when deportation orders may be revoked. 
The suggested amendment is in bold: 
 
Section 32(6) The Secretary of State may not revoke a deportation order […] unless 
(a) he thinks that an exception under section 33 applies 
 
Section 33(2) Exception 1 is where removal of the foreign criminal in pursuance of 
the deportation order would breach— 
(a) a person's [European] Convention rights, or 
(b) the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention, or 
(c) the best interests of the child under Article 3 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
  
The “human rights approach” would therefore not build on top of developments in UK 
deportation law in which different approaches to decision-making have been adopted in order 
to accommodate both Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC. I outlined these approaches in 
chapters 4-6. In the first, the “simple balancing approach”, the best interests of the child was 
woven directly into the fabric of Article 8 ECHR as one of the principles which the European 
Court of Human Rights adopted in its Üner judgment661 as relevant for determining the 
proportionality of an interference with the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR. In the 
“modified balancing approach” the status of the best interests of the child as a primary 
consideration was asserted, including through the statutory duty of s55 BCIA, and the attempt 
by the court in ZH (Tanzania) to bolt this duty onto the Article 8 ECHR proportionality 
                                                          




exercise. The final development has been the “exception approach” found in the Immigration 
Act 2014 which allowed for the best interests of the child to override the public interest in the 
deportation of FNOs, but only where the deportation was ‘unduly harsh’ on the child or 
exhibited ‘exceptional circumstances’. Each of these separate approaches have failed to be 
polycentric or to give effect to the plurality of decision-making norms. The layering of the 
legal obligations to the best interests of the child onto the right to family life has thereby failed 
to produce a coherent means of deportation decision-making which gives effect to the best 
interests of the child. 
The “human rights approach” takes the idea of the best interests of the child as a human 
right both literally and seriously. The starting point of the “human rights approach” is that the 
best interests of the child is an independent, free-standing human right. This means that it is to 
be applied separately to the right to family life rather than as an element of it. This arises from 
the UK’s international law obligation under Article 3 UNCRC. The Committee on the Rights 
of the Child have already given their view that the best interests of the child is ‘A substantive 
right […which] creates an intrinsic obligation for States, is directly applicable (self-executing) 
and can be invoked before a court.’662 The difficulties of the “simple balancing approach”, 
“modified balancing approach”, and “exception approach” have all apparently arisen as a result 
of UK deportation law not domesticating Article 3 UNCRC as an independent, free-standing 
human right, and instead attempting to give effect to the best interests of the child only as a 
part of a single deportation decision with the right to family life, either subsumed within it (as 
in the “simple balancing approach”), or bolted-on to it (the “modified balancing approach”), or 
as an Article 8 ECHR based exception to deportation (the “exception approach”). The central 
contention in this chapter then is that if treating the best interests of the child as a human right 
                                                          




can result in a deportation decision-making process which is polycentric and respects the 
plurality of decision-making norms of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC then approaches 
which are based on the ad hoc layering together of these obligations make it difficult for UK 
law to give effect to the best interests of the child in deportation decisions.  
This chapter progresses by examining what it would mean for the best interests of the 
child to be a human right in the UK’s deportation law. In part 2, I outline the “human rights 
approach” to the best interests of the child as a commitment to the application of the tests of 
proportionality which I argued in chapter 3 as inherent to the presumption of priority that 
human rights have over other interests;663 the tests of rationality, necessity, and balancing. In 
part 3 I take each of the questions inherent to the presumption of priority in turn and explain 
their proposed meaning and content. Because this approach focuses on the importance of the 
tests preceding that of balancing, I label this approach as being the “human rights approach”, 
in contrast to the approaches previously discussed which have either placed emphasis on the 
balancing exercise (the “simple balancing approach” and the “modified balancing approach”) 
or on a framework of exceptions (the “exception approach”). I argue (in part 4 of this chapter) 
that this “human rights approach” does successfully achieve a decision-making process which 
is both polycentric and reflects the plurality of decision-making norms. It does this by 
recognising that Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR are different human rights which must 
be determined separately of each other. Both are relevant to situations of deportation, but this 




                                                          




2. Outline of the “Human Rights Approach” 
In this first part I outline what I mean by a “human rights approach” to the best interests of the 
child. Part 2(a) establishes what is required of deportation decision-makers under the best 
interests of the child as a human right. I outline proportionality and its sub-tests of rationality, 
necessity, and balancing as essential elements of human rights decisions recognised widely in 
the academic literature. I identify these as prevailing in UK human rights law, particularly in 
the House of Lords case of Razgar664 and therefore use this as the starting point for developing 
a decision-making framework relevant to the best interests of the child as a human right.  
Once part 2 of this chapter identifies the outline of the “human rights approach”, part 3 
of this chapter describes in detail the operation of each of the separate elements inherent to it. 
Part 4 analyses this “human rights approach” as a means by which UK deportation law is able 
to rationally construct a decision-making process which gives effect to the best interests of the 
child and reconcile Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR.  
 
2(a) A “human rights approach” to the best interests of the child 
The Committee of the Rights of the Child have stated that Article 3 UNCRC – the best interests 
of the child – is itself a freestanding human right than can be directly engaged.665 This is 
supported by academic acceptance of this assertion666 and of academic and practitioner 
acceptance of the authoritative nature of General Comments of the Committee.667 
 Because it starts from the position that the best interests of the child is a human right, 
the “human rights approach” requires the application of human rights methodology in a 
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disciplined manner. In chapter 3 I argued the importance of a distinction between human rights 
and mere interests. Human rights are interests that are considered to be particularly important 
by political choice and societal agreement.668 When an interest is considered to be of sufficient 
importance to be considered a human right, the importance of human rights is established and 
maintained by the presumption of priority that human rights have.669 The presumption of 
priority is that to lawfully interfere with a human right, the state must satisfy all of a sequence 
of tests. These tests together are frequently labelled the tests of ‘proportionality’,670 but each 
plays a distinct role, and only the last requires a balancing between two things (the right of the 
individual against the state interference with the right) which resembles the metaphor 
merchant’s balancing scales. The tests in sequence are: 
 
(1) Where specified by the human rights measure in question, the interference must 
be in pursuit of a permitted restriction. Some human rights are written with 
specific legitimate aims which may be pursued by the state as a permitted 
restriction on a right, such as with the Article 8 ECHR right to family life and the 
legitimate aims of ‘the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.’ Other human rights may only be interfered with in order to further another 
human right, and in chapter 3 I argued that Article 3 UNCRC is of this type so 
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that only rights-based considerations may be balanced against the best interests of 
the child.671 
 
(2) The second test, that of suitability or rationality, ‘requires that the limitation 
contribute to the achievement of a legitimate end.’672  
 
(3) The test of necessity requires that the action be the ‘least restrictive means to 
further that end’.673  
 
(4) The final test of proportionality is that of ‘balancing’,674 also referred to in the 
literature as ‘proportionality sricto sensu’675 or ‘proportionality in the narrow 
sense’,676 enquires as to whether the benefits of the permitted government action 
under the legitimate aim are proportionate to the interference with the human 
right.677 Thus the balancing test ‘requires that the limitation achieve the pursued 
end to a degree that justifies the extent of the constraint on the […] right’.678  
 
The discrete application of each test of the presumption of priority – rationality, 
necessity, and balancing – is a widely used theoretical description of what is required in making 
                                                          
671 General Comment No. 6 (2005) (n252) [86] 
 
672 Pulido (n184) 484. See also: Cohen-Eliya and Porat (n184) 464 
 
673 Cohen-Eliya and Porat (n184) 464; Pulido (n184) 484 
 
674 Pulido (n184) 483 
 
675 Barak (n187) 6 
 
676 Pulido (n184) 484 
 
677 Cohen-Eliya and Porat (n184) 464 
 




proportionality decisions.679 In the House of Lords decision in Razgar, Lord Bingham set out 
the ‘likely’680 questions for identifying the proportionality of an interference with Article 8 
ECHR: 
 
(1)  Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of the applicant's right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) 
family life? 
(2)  If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially 
to engage the operation of article 8? 
(3)  If so, is such interference in accordance with the law? 
(4)  If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others? 
(5)  If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to 
be achieved? 681 
 
This structured five question approach continues to be used by UK courts to structure 
Article 8 ECHR decision-making.682 We can see here that the test of necessity (Razgar question 
4) is distinct from balancing (Razgar question 5). This distinction between the two tests exists 
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notwithstanding Hickman’s citation of Huang683 as evidence that the test of necessity is 
‘subservient to the more general, less structured, question of whether the overall measure has 
struck a ‘fair balance’ between competing interests.’684 
The “human rights approach” to the best interests of the child is a logical development of 
the Razgar questions, albeit applied to a different human right; that of the best interests of the 
child. The framework of the “human rights approach” presents the decision-maker in 
deportation decisions with a series of questions, with the tests of rationality, necessity, and 
balancing at their heart: 
 
1. Are the best interests of the child engaged? 
2. What are the best interests of the child? 
3. Would the deportation of the FNO secure the rights and freedoms of an identifiable 
individual or secure the rights and freedoms of the general public? 
4. Would the deportation of the FNO rationally contribute to securing the rights and 
freedoms of others? 
5. Is the deportation of the FNO necessary to secure the rights and freedoms of others? 
6. Is the interference with the best interests of the child strictly proportionate to the 
interference with the rights and freedoms of others? 
 
Questions 1-3 are important to determining the outline of the best interests of the child 
and the rights of others as the permitted restriction against which it may be balanced. For the 
practical purposes of a decision-maker applying proportionality to the best interests of the child 
as a substantive human right, it is essential that the decision-maker is satisfied that the best 
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interests of the child are engaged and what those best interests are, and what the outlines of the 
permitted restriction on that right are that the state pleads in aid of deportation. This is the same 
work that Razgar questions 1-3 do with respect to outlining the existence and scope of an 
engaged family life and its permitted limitations. 
I have argued consistently that the permitted restrictions on the best interests of the child 
as a human right under Article 3 UNCRC are the rights of others. In contrast, Article 8 ECHR 
permits a wider series of legitimate aims based in the public interest to be balanced against the 
right to family life. It should be uncontroversial that different human rights may have different 
permitted restrictions. For example, Article 9 ECHR permits proportionate interference with 
the right to thought, conscience and religion for ‘the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
These are a different list of legitimate aims to those under Article 8 ECHR and the decision-
maker could not seek to lawfully interfere with Article 9 ECHR on the basis of a legitimate 
aim that appears under Article 8 ECHR but excluded from Article 9 ECHR (such as the 
‘economic well-being of the country’). 
An addition to Razgar is the test of rationality685 which is inexplicably absent from 
Razgar but is otherwise a generally accepted aspect of proportionality.686 The “human rights 
approach” to the best interests of the child requires its application, although its importance in 
individual cases vis-à-vis the other questions will be fact specific; some cases may turn more 
on the tests of rationality, some on necessity, and some on balancing. What does not alter is 
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that a failure to pass only one of these tests is necessary and sufficient to render deportation an 
unlawful interference with the human right of the best interests of the child.  
Part 3 of this chapter engage each of the questions inherent to the best interests of the 
child as a human right. Part 4 engages in analysis of this new “human rights approach” as 
resolving the polycentricity and plurality of decision-making norms thrown up by deportation 
decisions. 
 
3. The Questions Inherent to the “Human Rights Approach” 
In the previous part, I established that there are six questions which are inherent to the “human 
rights approach” to the best interests of the child. Each are individually important, although 
their importance in specific cases will be fact dependent. Not all cases will require a detailed 
evaluation of each test, but the decision-maker must turn their mind to each test. This part 
addresses each of these tests in turn as to their proposed content and meaning, in the order to 
which they arise: 
 
1. Are the best interests of the child engaged? 
2. What are the best interests of the child? 
3. Would the deportation of the FNO secure the rights and freedoms of an identifiable 
individual or secure the rights and freedoms of the general public? 
4. Would the deportation of the FNO rationally contribute to securing the rights and 
freedoms others? 
5. Is the deportation of the FNO necessary to secure the rights and freedoms of others? 
6. Is the interference with the best interests of the child strictly proportionate to the 




3(a) Are the best interests of the child engaged?  
The first relevant question to the “human rights approach” is to establish that the best interests 
of the child are engaged in a deportation decision, and that they are engaged as a human right. 
The “human rights approach” puts the best interest of the child temporally first; one of the 
conditions of Article 3 UNCRC inherent in the best interests of the child being a primary 
consideration. However, by itself, putting the question as to whether the best interests of the 
child are engaged first does not make the best interests of the child a human right; to do so 
requires a commitment to the other questions – of necessity, rationality, and proportionality – 
inherent to the presumption of priority for human rights. It is a commitment to the presumption 
of priority which distinguishes the creation of a human right as opposed to a mere interest.  
That a deportation decision impacts upon a child (‘a person who is under the age of 
18’)687 is determined in individual cases. However, because all children have the right to have 
their best interests considered as a primary consideration, then unlike with the “exception 
approach” of decision-making arising from the Immigration Act 2014, the consideration of best 
interests under a “human rights approach” is not restricted to what the Act refers to as 
‘qualifying children’; a British citizen child or a child who has been resident for a period of 
seven years or more.688 Therefore under a “human rights approach” the best interests of all 
children will be considered regardless of citizenship, age, or length of residency, so long as 
their interests are affected by the deportation of a FNO. 
Under the “human rights approach”, whether a person affected by a deportation is 
actually a child is ‘an issue of objective fact’689 and the means by which age assessments are 
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conducted690 is beyond the scope of this thesis. Additionally, whether a child will actually be 
affected by a deportation decision is open to a range of analysis, but there appears little reason 
to depart from the ECtHR norm in family cases which assumes that family life exists on the 
basis of blood and conducts a short enquiry as to whether there are sufficient de facto ties to 
amount to family life in other relationships.691 Such de facto ties between a foreign national 
offender and a child could be emotional or financial. However, the necessity of ties between 
the child to the FNO parent in order to engage the child’s human right to their best interests 
suggests that children would not have a relevant best interests right which is engaged in all 
circumstances. Absence of ties would likely occur where contact between the child and FNO 
is prohibited with no prospect of being permitted in the future, as may be ordered by a family 
court.692 
More relevant for the purposes of this thesis are issues arising where there are more 
than one child affected by a deportation decision, because taking into account the rights of 
multiple rights holders is central to the polycentricity of deportation decisions. I explain how 
the “human rights approach” would deal with there being more than one child whose individual 
human rights are engaged by a deportation decision; either where there is more than one child 
whose best interests appear to conflict (part 3(a)(i)), and where there are more than one child 
where their best interests coincide (part 3(a)(ii)). 
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3(a)(i) Whose best interests in situations of conflict? 
The “human rights approach” gives greater recognition than previously explored approaches 
to the possibility of conflict between the rights of a child and the rights of others, including that 
of other children. Where a deportation decision is not in the best interests of one child, but is 
in the best interests of another child, or would imperil the human rights of an adult (such as the 
other parent in situations involving domestic violence), those human rights would be identified 
in the third question of the “human rights approach”; would the deportation of the foreign 
national offender secure the rights and freedoms of an identifiable individual or secure the 
rights and freedoms of the general public? The question then becomes whether the deportation 
of the foreign national offender is rational or necessary in order to secure the right of another 
child to their best interests, or an adult to their human rights. If these questions are answered in 
the affirmative, the “human rights approach” permits a balancing between the best interests of 
the child and the rights of others, including the best interests of other children. The best interests 
of the child are therefore not an absolute human right, a trump card or overriding exception. 
Instead, it may give way to the rights of others.  
 If it is in the best interests of the child to not have contact with a foreign national 
offender parent, then this is a family law matter and cannot be reasonably resolved by 
deportation proceedings. There is an existing legal obligation on social services to protect 
children from harm arising from parental contact and measures available for them to safeguard 
children. These obligations apply at the point at which the child is at risk and so social services 
cannot, lawfully, delay action behind deportation proceedings in the hope or expectation that 
deportation will discharge their safeguarding duties for them.693 If the child is already 
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prevented from contact with the foreign national offender parent in order to safeguard the 
child’s best interests, then it is unlikely that the best interests of the child as a human right is 
engaged in the first place.694 This is because if there is no contact permitted between parent and 
child then the child’s best interests are unlikely to be affected by the parent’s deportation.695  
If on the other hand there is a conflict whereby the deportation of the foreign national 
offender’s deportation would negatively affect the best interests of one child but at the same 
time be beneficial to the best interests of another child, then the deportation decision-maker 
would approach this conflict in the same way as they would a conflict between any other human 
rights. The “human rights approach” resolves, through a structured approach, any conflict 
between human rights. Is the deportation of the parent rationally capable of protecting the 
second child, is it strictly necessary to protect the second child, and finally, is it proportionate 
in the narrow sense? 
However, what the state cannot reasonably claim is that the deportation of the FNO is 
in the best interests of a child where contact is permitted by the family courts. There exists in 
family law a presumption that children should be brought up by their parent(s) and that 
‘maintaining current arrangements (the status quo) and contact with the non-residential parent 
are each in children’s best interests.’696 There is no reason to depart from these assumptions. 
Where contact between the FNO parent and a child is restricted by the family courts and/or 
social services then it must be assumed that the contact restrictions in place are sufficient to 
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protect the best interests of the child. Social Services and the family courts, as emanations of 
the state, can be assumed to provide for the most intensive limitation on parental contact 
necessary for the protection of the child. The only exception to this are extreme circumstances 
whereby the FNO parent has shown intent to harm a child, notwithstanding the measures put 
in place to prevent the child from having any contact.  
The answer in these sort of situations is to focus on the question as to whose rights are 
at stake. In most human rights conflicts we are concerned with how the rights of an individual 
protect themselves from a certain negative outcome. Such example is when a FNO argues that 
their own rights to be free from torture (Article 3 ECHR) or to carry on family life (Article 8 
ECHR) are at stake. The FNO uses their own human rights as a shield against an undesirable 
action. In contrast, deportation decisions are of another kind when a child argues that a human 
rights interference is caused by an action on a third person (the FNO parent). The child is not 
seeking to protect the human rights of the FNO, nor seeking to prevent deportation for the sake 
of the FNO; the child is at all times seeking only the protection of their own human rights from 
disproportionate interference. Confusion only arises when one forgets that the child seeks to 
engage their human rights to protect themselves from a human rights interference (loss of 
effective contact with their parent or their own constructive deportation), rather the best 
interests of the child being used by the foreign national offender to protect them against 
deportation. As Lady Hale recently noted:  
 
…it is quite correct to say that children must be recognised as rights-holders in their 
own right and not just as adjuncts to other people’s rights. But that does not mean 
that their rights are inevitably a passport to another person’s rights.697 
                                                          






  The best interests of the child are a human right that belongs to the child. Under the 
“human rights approach”, as now, the deportation of a foreign national offender will have been 
already determined to be a priori conducive to the public good because of the offence that they 
have committed.698 The deportation order will be made unless it is a violation of someone’s 
human rights to carry it out.699 If a child is in a situation where their best interests are improved 
by the deportation of a foreign national offender (e.g. because the foreign national offender is 
intent on harming them notwithstanding a no contact order) then a deportation order will be 
made unless someone else’s human rights are more weighty in the proportionality assessment. 
Under the “human rights approach” this may be the human rights of another child of the FNO 
(e.g. their Article 3 UNCRC right to their best interests).  
Conflicts of this type therefore do not present an existential problem for the “human 
rights approach” to the best interests of the child. Instead the “human rights approach” is 
specifically designed as a means of resolving such questions through the proportionality 
exercise. In contrast, an approach based on the paramountcy of the best interests of the child 
would end up in an unresolvable conflict whereby the best interests of two children point to 
two different outcomes, but both claim to be the paramount consideration upon which a 
decision ought to be taken. The principle of paramountcy would result in an unstoppable force 
meeting an immovable object. In contrast, proportionality under the “human rights approach” 
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3(a)(ii) Whose best interests when there is more than one child? 
This preliminary question as to whose rights are at stake also raises an issue first canvassed 
with respect to the “modified balancing approach” in chapter 5; how should the decision-maker 
weigh the best interests of multiple children? Immediately above,700 I addressed how the 
decision-maker ought to address where different children have divergent best interests; where 
one child’s best interests are negatively affected by the deportation of a FNO, but another 
child’s best interests are enhanced by deportation. In those cases, the “human rights approach” 
permits of a proportionality assessment between these conflicting rights. However, more 
challenging is when there are multiple children whose best interests are negatively affected by 
the deportation of a foreign national offender, but to differing degrees. In chapter 5 I suggested 
that the best interests of children affected by the deportation of a parent may vary along the 
lines of the length of their residency in the UK, the imminence of educational milestones, and 
the child’s engagement with extra-curricular activities.701 The assessment of best interests of 
two children in a family may also differ because one lives with a disability whereas the other 
does not. Children within a family may even differ on lines of nationality, and ‘Although 
nationality is not a “trump card” it is of particular importance in assessing the best interests of 
any child.’702 The examples of potential difference are multifarious. 
Where there are multiple children, I suggested that in the “modified balancing 
approach” the weight of the best interests of the child might be treated as being either 
cumulative or averaged out. The first option would seem to artificially advantage families with 
more children by adding extra weight to the family life side of the balance for each extra child 
in the family, whereas the second would fail to give sufficient weight to the best interests of a 
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child whose interests where substantially weightier than that of their siblings. In contrast, the 
“exception approach” treated each child separately, presenting a pass/fail model whereby the 
effect on each child was assessed against the standard of ‘unduly harsh’ or ‘exceptional’ effects 
on the individual child. The FNO need not show that their deportation is ‘unduly harsh’ on all 
the children affected by their deportation because where the effect of deportation on any one 
child meets the exception, then the foreign national offender cannot be deported. 
 Furthermore, unlike the right to family life in the “simple balancing approach” which I 
argued was conceived as being a commonly-held right, the “human rights approach” also 
requires each child to be treated separately as the best interests of the child are a right that is 
held individually and uniquely by each child in a family. Like the “exception approach”, the 
“human rights approach” is a pass/fail whereby the deportation of the foreign national offender 
is unlawful if it is contrary to the right to the best interests of only one child.  
 Unlike under the “exception approach”, however, this does not mean that the rights or 
interests of others are irrelevant. I above stated that in situation of conflict between the human 
rights of different individuals this would be addressed by the tests of rationality, necessity, and 
balancing as between the two competing rights. Where rights do not conflict, for example 
where a partner or spouse has a family life with the foreign national offender, that right can 
also be pressed as a separate right under Article 8 ECHR. Demanding a separation of the family 
life right of an adult partner and the best interests rights of the child may be critiqued as a way 
of sidestepping the problem of polycentricity. However, I argue that it is instead ensuring that 
each right is protected and respected to their fullest extent. In contrast, the “simple balancing 
approach” in particular results in the best interests of the child being subsumed under the family 
life rights of others (and therefore not realising the best interests of the child fully), and the 
“exception approach” results in the family life rights of others being subsumed under the best 
interests of the child. Whereas in Beoku-Betts it was rightly said that ‘there is only one family 
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life’,703 the “human rights approach” recognises that the best interests of the child are a human 
right which is not exhausted by consideration only of the family life of the child and therefore 
should be considered separately as a distinct human right. 
 That is not to say that the family life enjoyed by the child, nor the situation of other 
carers, are not relevant to the best interests of the child. However, their relevance is either with 
respect to how deportation of the FNO may result in the remaining carer being unable to meet 
the interests of the child, or because there is a conflict between the rights and interests of the 
carer and the best interests of the child. In the first instance, these issues make up part of 
question two, what are the best interests of the child, and in the second instance they go to the 
third question with respect to securing the rights and freedoms of others. Where the interests 
of the carer are not relevant to the best interests of the child they remain relevant, and can be 
pursued as the carers’ right to family and/or private life under Article 8 ECHR and should be 
treated as such. 
 Only because the ECHR was not designed with an independent, free-standing child’s 
rights component has the ECtHR been required to read in a best interests standard into its 
Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence, and only because the UK had a reservation to the UNCRC and 
no domestic incorporation in the immigration sphere has the best interests of the child had to 
be considered as part of Article 8 ECHR. This ad hoc layering of obligations mean that the 
“simple balancing approach” and “modified balancing approach” arose from need rather than 
because they present the most sensible means by which to achieve the desired outcome to 
secure the best interests of the child. The UK’s withdrawal of its UNCRC reservation presents 
an opportunity to recognise a proper free-standing human right to the best interests of the child. 
 
                                                          




3(b) What are the best interests of the child? 
In chapter 2, I outlined the lack of agreement as to what is included, substantively, within the 
best interests of the child. I briefly examined three checklists as to the content of the best 
interests of the child; the UK family law ‘welfare checklist’704 (s1(2) Children Act 1989), the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment 14,705 and in the BIC-Model, created 
by academic Margrite Kalverboer and colleagues.706 I argued that although each checklist 
includes and excludes different individual factors, they each contain an identifiable, shared 
nucleus of concern for the child’s physical, emotional, and material needs, and support for the 
child’s development. 
 Taking the best interests of the child seriously and literally as a human right in the 
deportation context will require UK courts to engage with detailed consideration of what is in 
the child’s best interests. The Committee on the Rights of the Child argue that the best interests 
of the child is context specific and a ‘dynamic’707 principle and the “human rights approach” 
may require UK courts to determine a new checklist specific to deportation law. In chapter 2, 
I made the point that this thesis is not concerned with defining and defending a particular 
checklist for determining the best interests of the child because, although it is an important 
enquiry, it is one which is logically separate from how the best interests of the child ought to 
be treated within the wider decision-making process in deportation cases. 
 What is significant for this thesis is that the question as to the best interests of the child 
is being asked as the central motivating determination of the “human rights approach”. In 
contrast, under the “simple balancing approach” the ECtHR determines the weight of the 
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family life as being split between the value of family life and the gravity if the interference 
which means that the best interests of the child is never determined as an independent, separate 
consideration. The “modified balancing approach” does require the best interests of the child 
to be determined separately but does not address how then the decision-maker should use that 
determination.  
 The “human rights approach” requires the decision-maker to make the best interests of 
the child the primary consideration, both in terms of it being a separate enquiry and being put 
temporally first. This ensures that the “human rights approach” engages the requirements of 
Article 3 UNCRC to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. 
 
3(c) Would the deportation of the FNO secure the rights and freedoms of another? 
Just as the decision-maker must establish that the best interests of a child are engaged by a 
deportation, they must also establish that there is a permitted restriction. Only if the interference 
with a human right is to pursue a permitted restriction can the interference be lawful. I argued 
in chapter 3 that Article 3 UNCRC only permits human rights-based considerations to be 
balanced against the best interests of the child, an argument I re-establish in part 3(c)(i). In part 
3(c)(ii) I further establish that this means that the reasons supporting deportation of a foreign 
national offender must be a forward looking assessment as to whether or not the FNO is likely 
to commit an offence in the future, rather than deportation being invoked solely as a 
consequence of past offending. In part 3(c)(iii) I argue that there is therefore an important 
distinction between a risk of future offending which affects the rights of an individual and a 
general public interest in preventing crime and disorder. The first is a permitted rights-based 





3(c)(i) The rights and freedoms of others 
I argued in chapter 3 that Article 3 UNCRC only permits human rights-based considerations to 
be balanced against the best interests of the child.708 In contrast, the legitimate aim of 
preventing crime and disorder under Article 8 ECHR – which may justify an interference with 
family life – contains non-rights-based aspects. These non-rights-based aspects are a 
generalised public interest of general deterrence of criminal behaviour and the communication 
of social revulsion at foreign national offending.709 I argued that because only a human-rights 
based consideration may be balanced against the best interest of the child, this requires that the 
risk of reoffending be linked directly to an interference with the rights or freedoms of another 
person.  
This need not necessarily be an identifiable individual. The “human rights approach” 
would still permit the best interests of the child to be interfered with where the deportation 
would secure the rights and freedoms of others, but the government is unable to point to a 
specific individual who is at risk. This goes some way towards the generalised public interest 
under Article 8 ECHR to prevent crime and disorder. However, it stops short of reintroducing 
a balance against the generalised public interest by maintaining a necessary link with a forward-
looking assessment of the risk of the FNO interfering with the human rights of others. That 
there may be uncertainty as to where the line lies between the rights and freedoms of others 
and the general public interest in preventing crime and disorder is one of the issues which can 
only be determined with reference to individual cases rather than to an abstract principle. Greer 
makes a similar point: 
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There is a fine line separating legitimate interference with [European] 
Convention rights in pursuit of specific collective goals, which is consistent with 
the Convention's raison d'etre, from trampling minority rights in order to secure 
the common good, which is not.710 
  
The fine line that separates the rights and freedoms of others and the general public 
interest in preventing crime and disorder is easier to identify the further one gets from it. 
However, one of the primary reasons for the difference between the rights and freedoms of an 
identifiable individual and of an unknown, theoretical member of the public is that it is a 
relevant distinction for question 5 (necessity) and question 6 (balancing) of the “human rights 
approach”. Where the FNO poses a risk to a specific individual, there may be no necessity to 
the deportation because other specific orders may be balancing, the weight that would be given 
to a risk of offending against an unknown, hypothetical victim would be less than in the case 
of an interference with the rights and freedoms of a known individual. I explain these assertions 
fully below in part 6 and part 7. For the questions of necessity and balancing it is an important 
precursor step to identify whether the best interests of the child is being balanced against the 
human rights of an identifiable individual, against certain groups or types of people in the 
abstract, or any possible random individual. 
Connected to the question as to whose human rights are balanced against the best 
interests of the child is identifying that the imputed future activity of the FNO actually engages 
with the human rights of those individuals. The human rights of others would include where 
the FNO represented a risk to human rights to bodily integrity and thus (e.g.) offences against 
the person, sexual offences, etc. It would also include property rights and thus to offences like 
                                                          




theft, robbery, fraud etc, and to human rights related to the security of minorities (covered by 
offences such as inciting religious or racial hatred). Other offences may also engage other 
human rights of the individual, but this must be assessed on a case by case basis rather than it 
be presumed that all crimes engage the human rights of some individual. The need to engage 
substantively with the question as to whether the reoffending risk engages the human rights of 
others distinguishes the “human rights approach” from the approach adopted in ZH (Tanzania) 
in which Lady Hale appeared to presuppose that any justification based on the prevention of 
crime and disorder will engage the human rights of others.711 
 Contra the implication of ZH (Tanzania), there is not a general human right to live in a 
society free from crime, and not all crimes directly interfere with the human rights of 
individuals. This is not an exercise is identifying victimless crimes, only a recognition that not 
all acts which are criminal interfere with the human rights of others, and not all interferences 
with human rights are crimes. Therefore the “human rights approach” to deportation decision-
making would not permit the best interests of the child to be balanced against a risk of 
reoffending by a foreign national offending where the likely offending cannot be shown to 
directly affect the human rights of others. For example, in the case of the simple possession of 
drugs,712 there is no human right that a victim could point to as being interfered with by 
someone else’s drugs possession. Therefore the best interests of the child could not lawfully be 
interfered with in order to deport a foreign national offender because of their risk of committing 
such an offence. 
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3(c)(ii) Forward looking focus 
The other aspect of the protection of the rights and interests of others as the only permissible 
limitation on Article 3 UNCRC is that it requires a forward-looking focus of investigation. This 
means that the deportation of an individual foreign national offender could not be justified on 
the basis solely of their having committed an offence in the past, only in order to prevent further 
offences in the future. After all, deportation is not supposed to be part of the process of 
sentencing for past offending.713 Deportation cannot protect against a human rights interference 
by the foreign national offender which occurred in the past because it has already happened. 
Deportation can, however, contribute to the prevention of a human rights breach in the future. 
There must therefore be a risk of such an occurrence for there to be a legitimate rights-based 
justification for interfering with the best interests of the child. 
This is a departure from the current assessment of the public interest with respect to non-
EAA national FNO, as their deportation is currently justified on the basis of ‘avoiding the risk 
of reoffending, deterrence and public revulsion.’714 Deterrence and public are not forward 
looking factors as they are based solely on the fact that offending has occurred in the past, and 
apply regardless of whether or not the foreign national offender presents a risk of interfering 
with the human rights of another person in the future. 
A purely forward-looking focus on the foreign national offender’s conduct would, 
however, be similar to UK deportation law as it applies to EEA-nationals. The Immigration 
(European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 explicitly prevents deportation being justified 
solely on the basis that a crime has been committed in the past. Instead, only if the foreign 
national offender presents an ongoing threat of reoffending can their deportation be justified.715 
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The difference of treatment between EEA and non-EAA national offenders has been 
recognised by UK courts: 
 
…a decision to remove an EEA national has to be based exclusively on the personal 
conduct of the person concerned and requires an individualised assessment of his 
case. […] The approach required in an EEA case is fundamentally inconsistent with 
the application of a statutory duty to deport on the basis of a generalised assumption 
that deportation is conducive to the public good.716 
 
Furthermore, general deterrence and public revulsion cannot justify the deportation of an 
EAA-national FNO. Instead, the decision to deport an EAA-national FNO: 
 
                                                          
(5) Where a relevant decision is taken on grounds of public policy or public security it shall, in 
addition to complying with the preceding paragraphs of this regulation, be taken in accordance with 
the following principles— 
 
(a) the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality; 
 
(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the 
person concerned; 
 
(c) the personal conduct of the person must represent a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society, taking into account past conduct of the person and that the threat 
does not need to be imminent; 
 
(d) matters isolated from the particulars of the case or which relate to 
considerations of general prevention do not justify the decision; 
 
(e) a person’s previous criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the 
decision; 
 
(f) the decision may be taken on preventative grounds, even in the absence of 
a previous criminal conviction, provided the grounds are specific to the 
person. 
 




…must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned and 
that matters that do not directly relate to the particular case or which relate to 
considerations of general prevention do not justify a decision to remove him. On 
the face of it, therefore, deterrence, in the sense of measures designed to deter others 
from committing similar offences, has of itself no part to play in a decision to 
remove the individual offender. Similarly, it is difficult to see how a desire to reflect 
public revulsion at the particular offence can properly have any part to play717 
 
 Applying an identical requirement within a “human rights approach” to the best 
interests of the child is therefore not a radical development to deportation law, but rather an 
extension of part of the law that already applies to EEA-national FNOs. 
 
3(d) Would the deportation of the FNO rationally contribute to the rights and freedoms of 
others? 
Deportation results in the incapacitation of the FNO from offending further in the UK (because 
they are no longer present here) and so in the majority of cases, their incapacitation through 
deportation will rationally contribute to securing the human rights of others. However, there is 
a minority of cases where a deportation order may not rationally contribute, for example where 
a deportation order cannot be executed because the FNO is de jure or de facto stateless.  
 As well as the practical aspect of rationality discussed above there is also a normative 
one. One aspect of non-rights-based considerations against which the best interests of the child 
are balanced in the “simple balancing approach”, “modified balancing approach”, and 
“exception approach” is that deportation orders serve a communicative function. Applying a 
                                                          




deportation order even if it cannot be practically carried out can still be rationally applied if 
the deportation order itself is considered to serve its communicative function by labelling the 
foreign national offenders as ‘serious wrongdoers’718 or ‘public revulsion’719 at their crimes. 
However, a communicative function of deportation orders cannot be used to justify a 
deportation which interferes with the human right to the best interests of the child under the 
“human rights approach” because communication about the offence or offender does not 
protect the human rights of others. Labelling an offender or their offence by imposing an 
inexecutable deportation order therefore does not prevent the FNO from reoffending and 
thereby interfering with the rights of others. Indeed, the focus on the control of FNOs through 
deportation, and deportation alone, may serve to direct attention away from other means of 
post-sentence control of offenders which are explored under the heading of necessity in part 6, 
below.  
However, if a core purpose of deportation orders is given effect to, such as 
communicating revulsion, then the order is automatically both rational and necessary, and no 
other alternatives to deportation need be considered in order to protect the rights of others. If, 
on the other hand, a deportation order is not rational because it cannot effectively incapacitate 
the foreign national offender from interfering with the rights of others by reoffending, the onus 
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3(e) Is the deportation of the FNO necessary to secure the rights and freedoms of others? 
The question of necessity seeks the ‘least restrictive means’720 of securing the legitimate aim 
and thus requires the state to show that there was not a less invasive action that would have 
achieved the same goals, but without interfering with individual human rights to the same 
extent. Where a less restrictive means exists, the proposed interference will be inconsistent 
with human rights protections as being unnecessary.721 Taking seriously the best interests of 
the child as a human right requires that the deportation of FNOs be necessary, and therefore 
that there is no less restrictive means of achieving that aim. The test of necessity would 
therefore require the decision-maker to give careful consideration to the range of devices that 
are present in UK law and which are currently used with British Citizen offenders after the end 
of their sentences. Examples include post-sentence supervision, Sexual Harm Prevention 
Orders, Criminal Behaviour Orders, and Terrorism Prevention and Investigative Measures, a 
list which I expand on further below.  If any of these other measures are likely to be effective 
in protecting the rights of others, then deportation is not necessary and therefore a violation of 
the child’s best interests as a human right. 
There is nothing about foreign national offenders that marks them out as being different 
from UK national offenders so that deportation can be the only necessary means of post-
sentence prevention of reoffending. Indeed, the threat to society posed by foreign national 
offending has been greatly exaggerated. During the 2006 ‘crisis’ surrounding the release of 
1023 FNOs from prison without being considered for deportation,722 only three had been in 
fact imprisoned for murder and nine for rape, yet ‘the ceaseless discussion of rape and murder 
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had the effect of inflating the significance of these offenders within the population.’723 Albeit 
from dated figures,724 FNOs may be less likely to be imprisoned for violent or sexual offences: 
 
…the December 2006 figures suggest that rates of violent and sexual offences for 
sentenced foreign and British nationals are either comparable or less prevalent 
amongst foreign nationals. For example, 10 per cent of sentenced foreign nationals 
were imprisoned for sexual offences against 11 per cent of British nationals, and 18 
per cent of foreign nationals were imprisoned for ‘violence against the person’ 
compared to 28 per cent of British nationals.725 
 
 There is clearly a disconnect between the public imagination of FNO and the reality of 
the general risk they pose. Deportation clearly cannot be necessary to incapacitate all FNOs 
sentenced to more than a year in prison, and yet the binary nature of deportation – a FNO is 
either deported or they are not – coupled with the statutory direction that ‘The deportation of 
foreign criminals is in the public interest’726 tends towards this outcome. However, and in 
contrast to the treatment of FNOs, UK law does not require the permanent incapacitation of 
UK national offenders beyond the length of their prison sentence. Indeed, the indeterminate 
prison sentence was abolished in 2012.727 Instead some level of risk of reoffending is accepted 
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as a consequence of an offender being released back into the community. That risk is managed 
by the use of other measures which are at the disposal of the criminal and civil justice systems 
to help mitigate the risk of reoffending, and also to protect the rights of individuals at specific 
risk of interference with their rights arising from that reoffending. It is these measures which 
should be assessed by the courts in deportation cases as possible less restrictive measures which 
may render deportation unnecessary in individual cases. The range of possible post-sentence 
measures available for the control of offenders is staggeringly large and the following list may 
present only a snapshot. 
For those sentenced to less than two years imprisonment a mandatory period of post-
sentence supervision now applies728 so that all offenders must spend twelve months under the 
care of the probation service, either on licence or under supervision.729 The stated rationale for 
post-sentence supervision is the effective rehabilitation of offenders.730 Other post-conviction 
measures are attached after conviction of specific offences or type of offending. Conviction of 
a football-related offence may be followed by a Football Banning Order of two to five years 
duration.731 Sexual Risk Orders (imposed post-conviction)732 and Sexual Harm Prevention 
Orders (which do not require conviction of an offence to be applied)733 apply to sex offenders 
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and those deemed to be future potential sex offenders.734 Criminal Behaviour Orders735 may be 
imposed after conviction of an offence if ‘the offender has engaged in behaviour that caused 
or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person’.736 Mere suspicion of 
terrorism can result in the imposition of a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures.737 
In the case of domestic violence, Non-Molestation Orders have been around in one form or 
another since 1976.738 
The critique of many of these measures is based on their hybrid criminal-civil nature 
and thereby the rule of law implications of their application.739 The purpose of this thesis is not 
to define what post-sentence measures should be used in order that the deportation of a FNO 
is rendered unnecessary, nor to provide empirical or theoretical justification of any particular 
measure(s). Instead, it is sufficient to observe that there are a range of post-sentence measures 
which are currently in use in the UK in order to prevent reoffending, and thereby protect the 
rights of others. After all, the government can hardly claim that these measures are entirely 
futile in preventing further offending or in protecting the public and thus are ineffective as a 
less restrictive measure than deportation for FNOs. There is also no reason to believe that these 
measures are uniquely effective for British Citizen offenders and uniquely ineffective for 
FNOs, just as there is no evidence that FNOs are any more ‘dangerous’ upon release from 
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prison than British citizen offenders.740 It would be up to the decision-maker in individual 
deportation cases to assess whether any particular post-sentence measure is an effective means 
for protecting the rights of others and thereby renders deportation unnecessary. 
The effectiveness of any post-conviction measure of this kind, and therefore the 
necessity or otherwise of deportation, may rely on whether or not the risk of future offending 
by the FNO interferes with the human rights of an identifiable individual or the rights and 
freedom of the public in general. This is one of the reasons for the importance of the third 
question for determining whether the best interests of the child are violated by the deportation 
of a foreign national offender parent; would the deportation of the FNO secure the rights and 
freedoms of an identifiable individual or secure the rights and freedoms of the general public? 
For example, a Football Banning Order may be effective in protecting the public at large from 
football-related violence, but ineffective in the case of a concerted attempt to harm a specific 
player or official. On the other hand, a Non-Molestation Order may be effective in preventing 
a foreign national offender convicted of assaulting an ex-partner from repeating the offence 
against that individual, but ineffective if the offender presents a risk of violence against women 
as a group. 
Assessment of the necessity of deportation and the exploration of less restrictive 
measures for achieving the protection of the rights of others is an important aspect of taking 
the best interests of the child seriously and literally as a human right. The best interests of the 
child are not an absolute right and there will remain some cases in which deportation is 
necessary in order to protect the rights of others. However, the plethora of post-sentence 
measures aimed at preventing reoffending in the UK national suggest that in many cases there 
will be a less restrictive means by which to achieve the aim of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
                                                          




3(f) Is the interference with the best interests of the child proportionate to the interference 
with the rights and freedoms of others? 
The final question is that of balancing between the best interests of the child as a human right, 
as against the human rights of others that may be interfered with if the foreign national offender 
is not deported. When a human right is interfered with, that human right is not being satisfied 
to its maximum extent. The test of balancing (or proportionality strictu sensu) requires the 
decision-maker to determine whether the importance of what is being sought to be achieved 
through the interference is sufficient to justify that level of interference. ‘The greater the degree 
of non-satisfaction of […] one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the 
other.’741 In the “human rights approach” the importance of the rights and freedoms of others 
must be sufficient to justify the interference with the best interests of the child by the 
deportation of a FNO parent. The greater the importance of the best interests of the child, the 
greater must be the importance of the rights and freedoms of others in order to justify 
deportation. 
The means by which decision-makers might come to a decision as to the balance 
between a human right and an interference is by no means settled in the academic literature or 
judicial decisions.742 After all, the idea of the merchant’s balance is only a metaphor,743 one 
which is capable to accommodating multiple formal decision-making processes. In this part, I 
use Alexy’s delineation of three primary elements which must be considered when balancing 
human rights against a legitimate aim; (1) the abstract weight of the right being interfered with, 
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(2) the intensity of interference with the right, and (3) the empirical certainty with which we 
know the right will be interfered with.744 I adopt these because they help rationally tease out 
the different elements which might be reasonable to include in a balancing exercise. I address 
each of these in turn. 
 
3(f)(i) Abstract Weight 
The first ingredient of the balancing exercise in the “human rights approach” is what Alexy 
refers to as the abstract weight; the weight a human right has independent of the individual 
case.745 For Alexy, human rights have a pre-existing conceptual weight. This means that one 
type of human right may have a greater abstract weight than others.746 For example, society 
may choose to consider freedom of expression of the political press to be a priori more weighty 
than other forms of expression.747 In any conflict between them the more important human 
right – the one with the most abstract weight – goes into the balancing exercise already with an 
advantage over the other. The best interests of the child is one human right among many and 
therefore the best interests of the child may be balanced against the rights of others. However, 
the best interests of the child are to be treated as being ‘primary’ so that the decision-maker 
must not ‘treat any other consideration as inherently more significant than the best interests of 
the children’.748 Therefore where the FNO presents a risk to the human rights of an identifiable 
individual the abstract weight of this competing human right can be no weightier than the 
weight given to the best interests of the child; of equal abstract weight but not inherently more 
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significant. The abstract weight of the human right being balanced against the best interests of 
the child then becomes progressively lighter the further it is from being an identifiable human 
right held by an identifiable individual and the closer it is to the rights and freedoms of the 
general public. The abstract weight of the competing human right must therefore be determined 
in the light of the facts of the individual case, rather than independently of it in an a priori 
manner as Alexy suggests. 
As the competing rights and freedoms of others become progressively lighter, 
eventually, the rights and freedoms of the general public becomes too far removed from an 
identifiable human right held by an identifiable individual. At this point instead of having any 
abstract weight in the balancing exercise it becomes simply a general public interest which is 
not based in a human rights consideration, and therefore cannot be balanced against the best 
interests of the child at all.  
In the case of deportation under the “human rights approach”, there is a fine line 
between a permitted balance between the best interests of the child and the human of abstract 
individuals, and the trampling of the rights of a vulnerable group (the children of foreign 
national offenders) in order to secure a general public policy goal of preventing crime and 
disorder. The importance of the third question in the “human rights approach” – would the 
deportation of the FNO secure the rights and freedoms of an identifiable individual or secure 
the rights and freedoms of the general public? – is thereby re-emphasised. The relevant question 
is whether the justification for deportation rests on the protection of the human rights of another 
person, even if that person is as yet unknown, or to protect the public as a whole from crime in 
the abstract. It is important at that earlier stage to identify whether there is a valid, rights-based 
consideration to be balanced against the best interests of the child at all. Where there is not, the 
interference must be found to be contrary to the best interests of the child as a human right at 
that earlier stage, rather than at the stage of balancing. 
284 
 
An example of where the rationale for deportation becomes under the “human rights 
approach” an impermissible resort to a general public interest is that of general deterrence. A 
general deterrent effect could be said to protect the rights and freedoms of other individuals if 
the effect of deportation means that other foreign national offenders do not go onto commit 
similar crimes in similar situations. This is the justification used for including deterrence as an 
essential part of the public interest under the UK’s current deportation regime.749 However, the 
causal link between the deterrent effects of deportation and the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others is insufficient to be a rights-based justification for deportation. That is not 
to say that deportation will not have a general deterrent effect under the “human rights 
approach”, only that it is not itself a rights-based consideration which can be balanced against 
the best interests of the child. General deterrence is an incidental effect of deportation under 
the “human rights approach”, rather than a valid underlying justification for the deportation. 
 
3(f)(ii) Intensity of Interference 
In chapter 2, I argued that there are a range of different checklists available for determining 
what is in the best interests of the child. I do not intend to defend a particular checklist, but to 
indicate what it means to determine the intensity of interference in the context of the best 
interests of the child as a substantive human right. 
The intensity of interference can be distinguished from the gravity of interference which 
I argued in chapter 4 was an essential element of the ECtHR’s assessment of family life under 
Article 8 ECHR through the Üner criteria. I argued that the ECtHR’s assessment of the gravity 
of interference reflects aspects of the family members’ membership, belonging, or integration 
in the receiving and deporting country. The ECtHR’s overriding concern is whether the 
                                                          




circumstance of the family’s integration in the deporting state and continuing relationship, if 
any, with the receiving state means that the interference is believed by the ECtHR to be felt 
more or less keenly. This is to be contrasted with the intensity of interference in the Alexian 
balancing exercise which is a more holistic assessment. A good description of this kind of 
assessment can be found in the UK case of EV (Philippines): 
 
In a sense the tribunal is concerned with how emphatic an answer falls to be given 
to the question: is it in the best interests of the child to remain? The longer the child 
has been here, the more advanced (or critical) the stage of his education, the looser 
his ties with the country in question, and the more deleterious the consequences of 
his return, the greater the weight that falls into one side of the scales. If it is 
overwhelmingly in the child's best interests that he should not return, the need to 
maintain immigration control may well not tip the balance. By contrast if it is in the 
child's best interests to remain, but only on balance (with some factors pointing the 
other way), the result may be the opposite.750  
 
The BIC-model developed by Kalverboer et al envisages a similar exercise, but 
formalises it by using a binary numeric system. Kalverboer et al work through an example of 
a child, ‘L’, and her best interests between Afghanistan and the Netherlands.751 In that example, 
return to Afghanistan fulfilled 5 of 14 components752 to the best interests of the child, whereas 
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the Netherlands fulfilled 7 of 14.753 We can say that the return of ‘L’ to Afghanistan would 
interfere with her best interests, although not with overwhelming intensity. In contrast, the 
interference with ‘Ls’ best interests would clearly be very intensive if the Netherlands fulfilled 
all the components of ‘Ls’ best interests and Afghanistan none.  
Again, I do not claim that Kalverboer’s BIC-model is the correct checklist for assessing 
the best interests of the child, nor that a numeric system of the kind envisaged by Kalverboer 
et al is the most appropriate means of determining the intensity of interference. Instead, my 
argument is limited to suggesting that determining the intensity of interference is a necessary 
element to a rational balancing exercise, and that as a process it is not alien to decision-making 
with respect to the best interests of the child, either through formal strategies such as that 
developed by Kalverboer et al, or less structured strategies such as that adopted by the Court 
of Appeal in EV (Philippines).  
 
3(f)(iii) Empirical Certainty 
The final factor to determine the balance between competing human rights according to Alexy 
is the level of empirical certainty involved in the decision about human rights; how sound is 
the evidence base that justifies the interference?754 This applies to both the best interests of the 
child as a human right and the protection of the human rights of others. 
 With respect to the protection of the human rights of others through deportation, how 
likely is it that the FNO will reoffend, and thereby interfere with the human rights of others? 
How strong is the empirical basis for that assessment? Is it based on an actuarial assessment of 
the kind of offender they are, or on the basis of an individualised assessment by a competent 
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professional? Have they reoffended in the past, so as to give more empirical support the 
conclusion that they are more likely to do so again in the same circumstances? How convincing 
is the evidence that they have engaged effectively with rehabilitative exercises which may 
make criminal offending less likely? 
 With respect to the best interests of the child, how likely is it that their best interests 
will be interfered with to the level of intensity suggested? Is the assessment of the best interests 
supported by evidence or assertion? Is the assessment of the best interests of the child supported 
unanimously by the relevant professionals involved in the child’s life and/or instructed for the 
purpose of deportation proceedings, or is there reasonable professional disagreement? 
 In assessing the empirical certainty of the best interests of the child and the risk of 
reoffending, the decision-maker must be alive to the inequality of arms between the state and 
the child of a FNO who seeks protection of their best interests. If the state seeks the deportation 
of the FNO on the basis of their risk of reoffending, they will be supported at minimum by an 
OASys report; a tool designed to assess the likelihood of reoffending and drawn up by the 
probation services as a matter of course for those convicted of offences.755 In contrast, the child 
of a FNO may not be entitled to legal aid as deportation proceedings are generally excluded 
from legal aid.756 This may present significant obstacles to presenting empirically reliable 
evidence of the interference that the child complains of. Not only may the child be unable to 
obtain or understand the importance of readily available evidence (such as school reports) for 
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themselves, they or their parents may not be able to afford additional specialist reports such as 
those provided by independent social workers.757 
 Whilst Ahmed established that there is no general obligation on the Secretary of State 
or immigration tribunals under s55 BCIA to proactively secure evidence as to the best interests 
of the child,758 that does not mean that such an obligation may never arise. The Court of Appeal 
has recognised that: 
 
…the Tribunal will expect the relevant interests of the child to be drawn to the 
attention of the decision maker by the individual concerned. The decision maker 
would then make such additional enquiries as might appear to him or her to be 
appropriate.759 
 
 However, in SS (Nigeria) the appropriate circumstances for the decision-maker to use 
this power was said to be ‘limited’.760 Furthermore, the House of Lords has recognised that in 
some situations, separate legal representation for the children involved in immigration cases 
may be required.761 In Ahmed, the Upper Tribunal found that the existence of a duty on the 
decision-maker to proactively obtain evidence about the best interests of the child is 
contextual.762 Ahmed can then be distinguished on the basis of context. In particular, in Ahmed 
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the primary decision-maker (the Secretary of State) had been unaware until a relatively late 
stage that s55 BCIA was engaged and that the best interests of the child had therefore not 
‘arisen forcefully’763 before that point in the legal proceedings. In Ahmed, the proceedings 
centred around deprivation of citizenship.764 However, firstly, where the legal question at issue 
is whether the best interests of the child are violated under the “human rights approach” to 
deportation, the best interests of the child can only arise forcefully from the earliest stages as 
they are the basis for the case in the first place. Secondly, the deprivation of citizenship was 
found in Ahmed did not itself affect the best interests of the child directly.765 In this respect, the 
Upper Tribunal specifically drew comparison with cases of deportation766 in which the best 
interests of the child will presumably arise more forcefully as being a decision affecting the 
child and thus engage more readily the decision-makers obligations to seek empirical evidence 
of the child’s best interests. 
 The positive duty on the decision-maker to obtain empirically reliable evidence about 
the best interests of the child will therefore arise much more frequently in cases where 
deportation appeals are determined under the “human rights approach”. In order to secure the 
best interests of the child as a human right, provision for independent assessment of those best 
interests for the benefit of the deportation decision-maker will have to be improved from the 
current situation. In RS, the Upper Tribunal observed that it was ill-equipped to make such 
assessments and that there is currently no means of accessing specialist input to guide its 
decisions: 
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…there is no local authority or children's guardian, no access to the service provided 
by CAFCAS [sic], and no independent means of ascertaining the wishes, concerns 
and interests of the child.767 
 
This may be achieved in practice by expanding the role of the Children and Family Court 
Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) which currently only works in the family law 
context.768 However, even if Cafcass or other body were to provide an empirically reliable 
report in all deportation cases, this would not mean that the best interests of the child would 
automatically obtain a high level of empirical certainty for the purposes of the balancing 
exercise. Cafcass’ investigations may be inconclusive or inconsistent with evidence from other 
sources, for example, or evidence about the situation the child would face in the receiving 
country may be limited.  
 
4. Operationalising the “Human Rights Approach” in UK Statute law 
Operationalising the “human rights approach” in UK law may be possible by taking the 
principles established in ZH (Tanzania) to their logical conclusion. However, an amendment to 
primary legislation may prove the more durable solution which does not require the Supreme 
Court to grapple with whether it is permissible for it to interpret s55 BCIA 2009 as creating a 
new substantive human right in UK law.  
The suggested amendment is in bold as an amendment to the automatic deportation 
provisions of the UK Borders Act 2007: 
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Section 32(6) The Secretary of State may not revoke a deportation order […] unless 
(a) he thinks that an exception under section 33 applies 
 
Section 33(2) Exception 1 is where removal of the foreign criminal in pursuance of 
the deportation order would breach— 
(a) a person's [European] Convention rights, or 
(b) the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention, or 
(c) the best interests of the child under Article 3 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
 
 In one sense, this is all that should be required by any amendment to legislation. Section 
33 of the UK Borders Act already refers out to two external sources of law; the European 
Convention rights in schedule 1 of the HRA 1998, and the Refugee Convention. The “human 
rights approach” expanded on above is, I have argued, a logical application of the text of Article 
3 UNCRC and of established descriptions of proportionality contained in both human rights 
and common law in authority such as Bank Mellat (No 2)769 and Quila.770 On the other hand, 
the introduction of a new statutory intervention into the existing political milieu of immigration 
                                                          
769 Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [20]: 
 
‘the question depends on an exacting analysis of the factual case advanced in defence of the measure, 
in order to determine (i) whether its objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a 
fundamental right; (ii) whether it is rationally connected to the objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive 
measure could have been used; and (iv) whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity 
of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the 
interests of the community. These four requirements are logically separate’ 
 
770 Quila & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45, [45]: 
 
‘a) is the legislative objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right? 
b) are the measures which have been designed to meet it rationally connected to it? 
c) are they no more than are necessary to accomplish it? 





law is fraught with difficulties, as evidenced by the introduction of the attempts to define Article 
8 ECHR in the immigration rules in July 2012,771 and the Immigration Act 2014.772 
 An addition to the ‘interpretation’ section of the UK Borders Act 2007 (s38) would be 
appropriate, and be the fifth interpretation clause, and therefore a new s38(5), UK Borders Act 
2007. This would state: 
 
Section 38(5) In section 33(2)(c), the best interests of the child under Article 3 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child comprises five questions which shall 
be consecutively determined by the Secretary of State and the courts— 
(a) does the decision to make a deportation order against an individual 
interfere with the best interests of the child? If so, 
(b) does the decision to make a deportation order against an individual 
promote the Convention Rights (schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998) 
of others? If so, 
(c) does the decision to make a deportation order against an individual 
rationally contribute to promoting the Convention Rights (schedule 1 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998) of others? If so, 
(d) is the decision to make a deportation order against an individual the least 
restrictive means by which to promote the Convention Rights (schedule 1 of 
the Human Rights Act 1998) of others? If so, 
                                                          
771 Gemma Manning, ‘The Immigration Rules and Article 8 - A Complete Code for Deportation Cases?’ (2014) 
71 Student Law Review 34; Sadat Sayeed and David Neale, ‘Immigration and Asylum Case Law since 2016 – A 
Complex Picture: Part 1’ (2017) 22 Judicial Review 277; Sheona York, ‘Deportation of Foreign Offenders - A 
Critical Look at the Consequences of Maaouia and Whether Recourse to Common-Law Principles Might Offer a 
Solution’ (2017) 31 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 8. 
 
772 Collinson (2017) (n106); Jonathan Collinson, ‘Disciplining the Troublesome Offspring of Section 19 of the 
Immigration Act 2014: The Supreme Court Decision in KO (Nigeria)’ (2019) 33 Journal of Immigration, Asylum 
and Nationality Law 8 
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(e) is the interference with the best interests of the child proportionate to the 
interference with the Convention Rights (schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 
1998) of others? 
Exception 1 to deportation in section 33(2)(c), is met where— 
question (a) is answered in the positive, and question (b) in the negative; or, 
question (a) is answered in the positive, and question (c) in the negative; or, 
question (a) is answered in the positive, and question (d) in the negative; or, 
question (a) is answered in the positive, and question (e) in the negative; and 
regardless of the answer to any other question. 
 Exception 1 to deportation in section 33(2)(c), is not met where— 
  question (a) is answered in the negative; or, 
question (a), question (b), question (c), question (d), and question (c) are all 
answered in the positive. 
 
 Although this appears convoluted, it provides the clearest roadmap for operationalising 
the “human rights approach” by leaving as little as possible to structural vandalism, as had 
arguably been the fate of the “exceptions approach” in the Immigration Act 2014.773 
 
5. Analysis 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that the best interests of the child (under the domestication 
of Article 3 UNCRC through s55 BCIA) and the right to family life (under the domestication 
of Article 8 ECHR through the HRA) present significant theoretical problems when the 
obligations inherent to each appear simultaneously. Thus when decision-makers are asked to 
make a single decision about deportation which gives effect to the best interests of the child 
                                                          
773 Collinson (2017) (n106) 
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and the right to family life they may make a decision which is polycentric but which does not 
give effect to the plurality of decision-making norms, or visa versa. In contrast, the “human 
rights approach” began from the premise that the best interests of the child is a free-standing, 
independent human right which must be determined separately. I argue that analysis of the 
“human rights approach” supports the assertion that the problems of polycentricity and 
plurality of decision-making norms are resolvable when the decision-maker takes the best 
interests of the child as a human right seriously and literally, rather than engage in the ad hoc 
layering of obligations which gave rise to the “simple balancing approach”, “modified 
balancing approach”, and “exception approach”. 
 
5(a) Polycentricity 
The “human rights approach” starts from the premise that the best interests of the child ought 
to be treated as an independent, separate human right in its own respect. The “simple balance 
approach”, “modified balance approach”, and “exception approach” all attempt to construct a 
single deportation decision which gives effect to both Article 3 UNCRC (the best interests of 
the child) and Article 8 ECHR (the right to family life). I have suggested that this is in part 
because of the history of domestication of both provisions. 
 The ECHR does not include a discrete human right that protects the best interests of the 
child. Instead, the best interests of the child were adopted by the ECtHR in 2006 in Üner774 as 
a facet of the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR. UK law also did not recognise the best 
interests of the child as a relevant principle to apply to immigration law until the withdrawal 
of a reservation in 2009 to the UNCRC to the effect that it would not apply to immigration 
matters.775 However, the ECHR had been domesticated by the Human Rights Act 1998 and so 
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the best interests of the child was recognised as being relevant to deportation decisions in UK 
law as a facet of Article 8 ECHR, before the best interests of the child under Article 3 UNCRC 
was domesticated as a separate provision through s55 BCIA. It could be argued that UK courts 
have been locked into a desire to produce a single deportation decision-making process that 
gives effect to both Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR by accident, rather than rational 
design; an ad hoc layering of obligations into one deportation decision-making process. 
 Absent thus far has been discussion of the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR. 
Throughout this thesis I have made the point that deportation decisions must be polycentric, 
that is, that deportation decisions engage multiple rights and interests that must be taken into 
account. In chapter 3, I used a fictional but representative example family to illustrate the range 
of human rights and interests engaged by a decision to deport a foreign national offender. The 
fictional family comprised a foreign national offender (Marcus), their current partner (Samira), 
a child (Adam) and step-child (Bryony) with their current partner, an ex-partner (Sharon), and 
a child with that ex-partner (Claude). All of these are then balanced against the public interest 
in deportation. The multiple human rights and interests engaged in this situation could be set 
out as follows: 
 
Article 8 ECHR Article 8 ECHR  Article 8 ECHR UNCRC Article 3 
Marcus (FNO) Samira (Partner)  Adam (Child)  Adam (Child)  
     Bryony (Child) Bryony (Child)






The “human rights approach”, which starts from the premise that the relevant right 
engaged in deportation decisions is that of the best interests of the child, clearly only takes into 
account the rights of the children under Article 3 UNCRC (in the example above), and part of 
the public interest, but only insofar as it engages the rights and freedoms of others. How can 
the “human rights approach” then claim to be polycentric? I argue that taking seriously and 
literally the claim that the best interests of the child is a human right does not extinguish the 
Article 8 ECHR family life claims of any other person; human rights is not a zero-sum game. 
Instead, the right to family life must also be determined, but as a separate and independent 
human right. After determining whether or not deportation is a disproportionate interference 
with the best interests of the child, the decision-maker would then turn to whether or not 
deportation is a disproportionate interference with the right to family life. Considering Article 
3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR as independent human rights sequentially may result in one of 
the following outcomes: 
 
1. Violation of Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR 
2. Violation of Article 3 UNCRC, but not Article 8 ECHR 
3. No violation of Article 3 UNCRC, but a violation of Article 8 ECHR776 
4. No violation of either Article 3 UNCRC or Article 8 ECHR 
 
Outcomes 1, 2, and 3 would result in the deportation of the foreign national offender 
being prohibited on human rights grounds; deportation would result in a human rights breach 
                                                          
776 Such an outcome could occur, for example, in situations where the foreign national offender has minimal 
contact with a non-resident child, but has a strong family life relationship with a spouse. In such circumstances, 
the Article 8 ECHR family life with the spouse may prevail over the public interest in deportation even when the 




of an individual and therefore should not take place. It irrelevant which substantive human right 
is engaged, or who the rights-holder is, for the purpose of this end result. 
The application of multiple human rights to the same factual situation, and their 
sequential consideration as equally important but separate human rights, is an everyday aspect 
of human rights adjudication. Deportation is an example of a case where a single act (that of 
deportation) can engage more than one human right. Two cases emphasise this point.  
In Paposhvili, the applicant was a Georgian national resident in Belgium and who had 
been convicted of a number of criminal offences. He argued before the ECtHR that his 
deportation to Georgia would be a violation of Article 3 ECHR because of the lack of 
appropriate treatment there for his leukaemia and, consequently, his life expectancy would be 
considerably reduced by his deportation.777 Furthermore, he argued that his deportation would 
be a breach of his Article 8 ECHR family life rights as it would entail his separation form his 
family who had Belgian residency papers.778 In the second case, of Mubilanzila Mayeka & 
Kaniki Mitunga, a child (Kaniki) arrived in Belgium where she was sent to stay with an uncle 
and grandmother after her mother (Mubilanzila) had obtained refugee status in Canada.779 Not 
realising that Kaniki had not automatically also been given refugee status by the Canadian 
authorities,780 Kaniki arrived in Belgium without the necessary immigration documentation.781 
The Belgian authorities removed Kaniki to the DRC, her country of nationality, 
unaccompanied and where there was no reception arrangements in place to ensure Kaniki’s 
safe arrival and future care.782 The removal itself was considered to be a violation of the Article 
                                                          
777 Paposhvili v Belgium App no 41738/10 (Grand Chamber, 13 December 2016), [195] 
 
778 ibid [208] 
 
779 Mubilanzila Mayeka & Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR, 12 January 2007), [10] 
 
780 ibid [14] 
 
781 ibid [11] 
 
782 ibid [31] 
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3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR rights of Kaniki because of the lack of care in the manner of her 
unaccompanied deportation (Article 3 ECHR) and because the deportation interfered with 
Kaniki’s family life (Article 8 ECHR).783 
In both cases, a violation of Article 3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR was found by the 
ECtHR. The findings were not of a violation of Article 3 in conjunction with Article 8, but of 
two separate human rights arising from the single action by the state. Successfully showing a 
violation of either right would have been sufficient to prevent the deportation or removal.784 In 
neither case was there any question that a finding of non-violation of either right could possibly 
result in the deportation being found to be permitted. Once an action of the state is shown to be 
a violation of a human right then the action is unlawful, no matter how many human rights are 
engaged and how many are actually found to be violated. 
A case where a violation of Article 3 UNCRC is shown and Article 8 ECHR is not (or 
visa versa) is not a conflict of rights situation. Not showing a violation of one right is not the 
same as saying that that human right requires the deportation of the FNO. The human rights 
are engaged as a shield to prevent deportation, not a sword to demand it. Where an individual’s 
human rights are determined to be at stake in deportation proceedings, these are addressed 
through the process of proportionality and therefore balanced against the Article 8 ECHR or 
Article 3 UNCRC rights of those negatively affected by the deportation. It is at this stage where 
there is a conflict of rights and the question is whether the protection of one person’s rights are 
a disproportionate interference with the rights of others. If it is determined that the FNOs 
deportation is a disproportionate interference with the rights of the other then the conflict of 
                                                          
 
783 Violations were also found of Article 3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR rights of the mother, Mubilanzila, because 
of the distress and separation caused by Kaniki’s removal. Kaniki’s Article 5(1) and 5(4) ECHR rights and Article 
8 ECHR right to family life were also found to have been violated by her detention prior to her removal (ibid) 
 
784 In Mubilanzila Mayeka & Kaniki Mitunga the ECtHR application was brought after deportation had taken 
place. In Paposhvili the applicant died before his deportation could be carried out and the case was pursued by his 
relatives (ibid [31]; Paposhvili v Belgium (n708) [126]) 
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rights is resolved in favour of preventing the deportation. If it is determined that the deportation 
is not a disproportionate interference with an individual’s Article 3 UNCRC or Article 8 ECHR 
rights then the conflict of rights is resolved in favour of deportation. 
Under the “human rights approach”, once an assessment of the best interests of the child 
as a human right has been conducted, the decision-maker must make an independent 
assessment of Article 8 ECHR. At this stage, the decision-maker may balance the general 
public interest in deportation against the family life of the FNO and of their children, and the 
general public interests may even prevail. However, by considering the best interests of the 
child as an independent human right means that it is not cross-contaminated, unlike under the 
“simple balancing approach”, “modified balancing approach”, and “exception approach” 
where the general public interest is balanced against the best interests of the child because there 
is no distinction made between what is permitted under Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR. 
However, a finding of violation of only one of Article 3 UNCRC and Article 8 ECHR is 
required in order to prevent the deportation of a FNO. 
Considering the best interests of the child as a human right and the right to family life 
sequentially ensures that the deportation decision is polycentric because all the relevant rights 
and interests are taken into account. The best interests of the child are considered (under Article 
3 UNCRC), the family life of the FNO, their partner, and their children are considered (under 
Article 8 ECHR), the general public interest in deportation is considered (under Article 8 
ECHR), and the rights and freedoms of others are also considered (under Article 3 UNCRC 
and Article 8 ECHR). The best interests of the child are considered as a human right, as is 
family life, and the public interest in deportation is kept at the status of an interest because it is 
relevant only to the determination of Article 8 ECHR, rather than being allowed to claim the 
status of a human right that is permissibly balanced against the best interests of the child. 
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The “human rights approach” therefore presents a considerable improvement on the 
“simple balance approach”, the “modified balance approach”, and the “exception approach” 
by being truly polycentric by taking into account all the relevant rights and interests in 
deportation decisions. 
 
5(b) The Plurality of Decision-Making Norms 
The plurality of decision-making norms was identified in chapter 3 as arising from the different 
things which Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC demand of decision-makers, even in their 
domestic law guises. By this I mean that those aspects of decision-making process which are 
set out on the international level have been adopted by UK courts as aspects of the right to 
family life under the Human Rights Act 1998, and the best interests of the child under s55 
BCIA. These aspects are: 
 
1. That the right to family life may be balanced against the public interest in preventing 
crime and disorder; 
2. That the best interests of the child may be balanced against the human rights of others, 
but not non-rights-based considerations; 
3. That the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration. This means that it 
must be considered separately and be of no less inherent weight than other 
considerations. Considering the best interests of the child temporally first is optional 
but doing so assists the decision-maker in ensuring that they give adequate application 
of the other aspects of the primacy of the best interests of the child. 
 
In chapter 3, I demonstrated that it was theoretically impossible to give effect to all three 
aspects of the decision-making norms of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC in the same 
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deportation decision, or at least impossible to do so whilst also making a decision which is 
effectively polycentric as well. Exploring the ways in which UK law has attempted to structure 
deportation decision-making in chapters 4-6 has borne this out. Each of the “simple balancing 
approach”, “modified balancing approach”, and “exception approach” have struggled to 
accommodate the decision-making norms of both Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 UNCRC in 
the same decision whilst giving effect to all the relevant rights and interests at stake in 
deportation decisions. 
However, the “human rights approach” to deportation decisions begins with the insight 
that each of the right to family life and the best interests of the child are two separate human 
rights. Examining deportation decisions as separately engaging two separate human rights – 
just as deportation decisions are already assessed as engaging separate human rights when 
deportation interferes with the freedom from torture, right to a fair trial, and right to family life 
– ensures that deportation decisions are able to be consistent with the plurality of decision-
making norms. 
The best interests of the child are considered separately because it is recognised as being, 
under the “human rights approach” a separate human right. This contrasts most with the 
“simple balancing approach” and “modified balancing approach” which seek to subsume the 
best interests of the child as an interest relevant to the right to family life. In so doing, these 
approaches also fail to give the best interests of the child no less inherent weight than other 
interests. The “human rights approach” is given no less inherent weight than other 
considerations if in the balancing stage of enquiry it has no less abstract weight than other 
considerations. 
When presented by a deportation appeal which engages the best interests of the child and 
the right to family life, the decision-maker may decide the two claims in any order under the 
“human rights approach” and yet maintain the separateness between the two which is the 
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practical reason for considering the best interests of the child temporally first. Therefore, under 
the “human rights approach” not putting the best interests of the child first temporally does not 
endanger the primacy of the best interests of the child, which is the case under the “simple 
balancing approach” and “modified balancing approach”. 
Finally, the “human rights approach” ensures the application of different considerations 
as being legitimate limitations on the right to family life and the best interests of the child. The 
decision-maker will undertake a balancing exercise between the best interests of the child 
against the human rights of others, and then of the right to family life against the general public 
interest. The existence of limitation clauses applicable to one human right engaged by a case 
does not mean that those limitation clauses are to be employed by the decision-maker in relation 
to the other human rights engaged by the case. For example, in Paposhvilli and Mubilanzila 
Mayeka & Kaniki Mitunga,785 the decision as to whether Article 3 ECHR was violated was 
determined on the basis of the permitted restrictions on that right (i.e. none, as Article 3 ECHR 
is an absolute right) and the decision as to whether Article 8 ECHR was violated was 
determined on the basis of the permitted restrictions on that right (i.e. the limitation clauses in 
Article 8(2) ECHR). However, there can be no case in which the limitation clause in Article 
8(2) ECHR can be applied to a decision about a violation of Article 3 ECHR. Likewise, the 
more expansive public interest limitation clauses under Article 8 ECHR do not transpose, under 
the “human rights approach”, to the application of Article 3 UNCRC. 
This has been one of the primary errors in each of the “simple balancing approach”, 
“modified balancing approach”, and “exception approach”. By attempting to give effect to both 
the right to family life and the best interests of the child in one integrated deportation decision, 
the best interests of the child have been made subject to the public interest limitation clauses 
                                                          




inherent to Article 8 ECHR. This has resulted in the balancing of the public interest (a non-
rights-based consideration) against the best interests of the child. 
The “human rights approach” is therefore able to give effect to the plurality of decision-
making norms by recognising and giving effect to the plurality of human rights regimes present 
in deportation decisions. To date, UK law has approached deportation law from the point of 
view of a decision as to the disposal of an FNO. This means that the best interests of the child 
has been considered to be an aspect of the rights claim of the FNO, rather than a human right 
in and of itself. The s55 duty has been considered as an additional duty to be incorporated into 
the assessment of the rights claim of the FNO, rather than a unique human rights claim that is 
held by the individual child. The “human rights approach” instead understands deportation 
decisions to affect a range of different individuals, each with different rights claims that must 
be determined separately and individually. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this final chapter, I argued that the key to giving effect to the best interests of the child in 
UK deportation law is to recognise that the right to family life and the best interests of the child 
are separate, different human rights. That the best interests of the child is a freestanding, 
independent human rights is the view of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,786 and 
gives deportation decision-makers the only way to actually give effect to both the right to 
family life and the best interests of the child in a coherent manner. The best interests of the 
child as a human right puts the child at the centre of the deportation enquiry. It is worth noting 
what Bhabha says about child-centred approaches to immigration law: 
 
                                                          




…a child-centered perspective is equivalent to neither a call for open borders nor 
the deregulation of immigration control. Instead, the child-centered perspective 
postulates that the failure to acknowledge the fundamental differences between 
children and adults in the immigration context perversely skews decision-
making.787 
 
 Taking the best interests of the child literally and seriously as a human right identifies 
the best interests of the child to be different, and that previous approaches have skewed 
deportation decision-making by attempting to get the best interests of the child to fit within 
existing adult-centred paradigms of deportation decision-making. The best interests of the child 
as a human rights does not require the deregulation of immigration control, but instead a refocus 
on the questions that matter: 
 
1. Are the best interests of the child engaged? 
2. What are the best interests of the child? 
3. Would the deportation of the FNO secure the rights and freedoms others? 
4. Would the deportation of the FNO rationally contribute to securing the rights and 
freedoms of others? 
5. Is the deportation of the FNO necessary to secure the rights and freedoms of others? 
6. Is the interference with the best interests of the child strictly proportionate to the 
interference with the rights and freedoms of others? 
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I have labelled this the “human rights approach” to deportation. Under this approach, 
deportation decisions would be polycentric because considering the best interests of the child 
as a human right does not preclude the consideration of other human rights (such as the right to 
family life) which are also engaged by deportation decisions. What it precluded is a trade-off 
or balancing of the multiple human rights engaged by deportation decisions. This approach also 
gives effect to the plurality of decision-making norms because the best interests of the child are 
considered separately and have no less inherent weight than other considerations. The best 
interests of the child cannot be weighed against non-rights-based considerations but may give 
way to the rights of others where it is necessary and proportionate for them to do so.  
Taking seriously and literally the best interests of the child as a human right means that 
they may be given effect to in UK deportation law without encountering the theoretical and 
practical difficulties that UK law has thus far encountered in its “simple balancing approach”, 
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1. The decision to deport foreign national offenders 
In chapter 3, I introduced a fictional, but representative family to help investigate the best 
interests of the child in deportation decisions in UK law. In this fictional family, ‘Marcus’ is a 
national of Freedonia. In the UK he committed a criminal offence and the Home Office seeks 
his deportation. Marcus is in a relationship with ‘Samira’, also a Freedonian national and 
lawfully resident in the UK. Together they have a child (Adam) who is a Freedonian national. 
Marcus is therefore the biological, social, and resident parent of Adam. Samira has a second 
child (Bryony) from a previous relationship with a British national. Because of the British 
nationality of Bryony’s father (but with whom Bryony has no contact), Bryony is British. 
Marcus is the social and resident parent of Bryony, although he is not the biological parent. 
Finally, Marcus also had a previous relationship with a British national, ‘Sharon’. Marcus and 
Sharon had a child (Claude) who is a British national by virtue of Sharon’s nationality. Marcus 
is the social, biological, but not resident father of Claude. 
 This family is fictional, but representative of the complex ties that encompass what 
‘family life’ means. Not only are the ties of relationship between different individuals complex, 
there is an inherent complexity to other aspects of the factual circumstances behind each 
individual. This is particularly so with respect to the children, and it is the best interests of 
children that this thesis has been concerned. The children – Adam, Bryony, and Claude – have 
different nationalities, different mothers, and different relationships (social and biological, 
resident and non-resident) with Marcus. They are presumably of different ages, which might 
correspond to different educational milestones, and different capacities and needs for 
maintaining a social world beyond the immediate family. The children might have disabilities 
or learning difficulties which impact on their daily lives. The children have different maternal 
grandparents, and might have different relationships with Freedonia; they may have visited 
there and speak Freedonian, they may not. 
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In this thesis, I have highlighted how the deportation of foreign national offenders 
(FNOs) – like Marcus – is determined by statute to be ‘conducive to the public good’788 and 
the public identify their continued presence in the UK to be undesirable.789 Marcus is 
considered to be individually responsible for his offending and his deportation is individually 
deserved and required as a direct consequence. However, Marcus is not just an individual; he 
is part of a family. He has a partner and three children. Each of them is individual and unique, 
each having their own constellation of connections with each other, with other individuals, and 
with society as a whole. The desire to protect family life and best interests of children caught 
up in the deportation of Marcus is also reflected in both public policy and deportation law, but 
this is in clear tension with the impetus to deport. 
 In this thesis, I have identified that this central tension – deportation versus protection 
of human rights – has been reflected in the provisions of the UK’s deportation law. The 
Immigration Act 1971 begins with the assumption that Marcus’s deportation is ‘conducive to 
the public good’.790 The legal protection of human rights has been added to this legal 
foundation as and when they arose in the wider legal environment. First, the protection of the 
human right to respect to family life (Article 8 ECHR), was domesticated in the Human Rights 
Act (HRA) 1998. Second, that the best interests of the child ought to be a primary consideration 
(Article 3 UNCRC), domesticated in s55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act (BCIA) 
2009. This ad hoc development of legal principles has resulted in, I have argued, UK 
deportation law binding itself to a series of increasingly irreconcilable legal principles; a 
plurality of decision-making norms: 
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 That the best interests of the child are an ‘integral’ part of the right to family life under 
Article 8 ECHR; 
 That the best interests of the child ought to be a primary consideration; that it ought to 
be considered separately and of no less inherent weight than other considerations (and 
preferably temporally first in the decision-making process); 
 That the child should not be ‘blamed’ for the moral failings of their parent, including 
that they have offended; therefore only rights-based considerations ought to be balanced 
against the best interests of the child; 
 That the legitimate aims for interfering with the right to family life include the 
maintenance of immigration control and preventing crime and disorder, including by 
the deportation of foreign national offenders in order to incapacitate, deter, and to 
communicate society’s opprobrium for criminal offending. 
 
Furthermore, deportation decisions are polycentric. Deportation decisions may be about 
an isolated individual, with no existing social or family ties to the UK who is arrested on arrival 
at the airport. However, many deportation decisions, like that of Marcus, affect multiple 
individuals connected by family ties. Marcus has a family life with his partner, Samira, but that 
family life is inherently not just Marcus’; it is Samira’s family life as well. Marcus has children 
and therefore has a family life with them, but that family life is not just Marcus’; it is the family 
life of his children as well. Marcus’ children also have best interests which stretch beyond the 
simple maintenance of family but also encompasses their safety, education, health, 
environment, and identity, amongst other things.791 
 
                                                          




2. The Simple Balancing Approach 
The “simple balancing approach”792 is based on this paradigm which views the deportation of 
Marcus through the metaphor of a balance between two competing values; the weight of family 
life on one side, and the weight of the public interest in deportation on the other. In the “simple 
balancing approach”, ‘there is only one family life’.793 This one family life is a commonly-held 
human right to family whereby the weight of family life held by Marcus’ family can be assessed 
as a whole and placed onto one side of the balancing scales. 
 The decision-maker, following the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
jurisprudence, is able to assess the overall weight of family life by considering the value the 
family life, magnified by the gravity with which any interference with family life will be felt. 
The decision-maker will consider the value of Marcus’ family life by looking at whether 
Marcus is married794 and whether he lives with his children.795 The gravity of interference is 
dependent on the level of belonging that Marcus, Samira and their children have to the UK or 
whether they are considered to really ‘belong’ in Freedonia. Although two of Marcus’ children 
are legally British citizens, the decision-maker will have to assess whether they are old enough 
for that citizenship to mean something more to them than a liberty to enter the UK without let 
or hinderance.796 To what extent will they actually miss living in the UK, to what extent do 
they actually belong? On the other side of the balance, the public interest in preventing crime 
and disorder weighs heavily. Criminal offending by an FNO engages all ‘three “parts” of the 
public interest – avoiding the risk of reoffending, deterrence and public revulsion.’797  
                                                          
792 Chapter 4 
 
793 Beoku-Betts (n203) [43] 
 
794 Üner v Netherlands (n20) [57-58] 
 
795 Joseph Grant v The United Kingdom (n321) [40] 
 
796 Caroline Sawyer (n565) 160 
 
797 Beaumont (n329) 
311 
 
 The “simple balancing approach” requires deportation decision-makers to weigh these 
two sides of the balance and undertake a fact-sensitive proportionality exercise between 
them.798 When the weight of the two competing values – family life and public interest – are 
placed in the balance, which value weighs most heavily? Which value must be given effect to; 
the deportation of the foreign national offender, or the protection of family life? 
 To the extent that the best interests of the child impinges on this fact-sensitive 
proportionality exercise, it is as one of the relevant factors relevant to deportation decision-
making. It must find a place alongside all the other factors relevant to the family life of Marcus, 
his partner, and his children, and the fact that Marcus has committed a serious criminal offence.  
In chapter 4 I argued that, in reality, the best interests of the child is split between 
consideration of the value of family life and the gravity of the interference. Some aspects of 
the child’s best interests (such as their relationship with resident and non-resident parents) are 
considered as part of the value of family life, and some aspects of their best interests (such as 
their de jure and de facto ties to the UK) are considered as part of the gravity of interference. 
However, this means that the best interests of the child are effectively side-lined because they 
are subsumed into the wider question of what weight ought to be given to the family life of the 
foreign national offender. The best interests of the child, as the best interests of the child, goes 
missing. 
This is problematic for two reasons. The first is that it means that the “simple balancing 
approach” to deportation decisions is not polycentric. The polycentricity of deportation 
decisions arises because they involve multiple individuals – Marcus, Samira, Adam, Bryony, 
Claude, and Sharon – but also because each of those individuals have different human rights 
which are engaged by deportation decisions. Marcus has a right to family life, Samira has a 
                                                          
 




right to family life, Sharon has a family life with Claude, and Adam, Bryony and Claude have 
both a right to family life and to have their best interests taken as a primary consideration. 
Whenever a decision-making process means that the best interests of the child goes missing – 
as it does under the “simple balancing approach” to deportation decisions – the decision-
making process is no longer polycentric. 
The second problem is that there is a plurality of decision-making norms. The 
polycentricity of deportation decisions arises from the fact that deportation decisions engage 
both the right to family life and the best interests of the child. The plurality of decision-making 
norms arises because each of these rights engage require something different of the decision-
maker. The right to family life under Article 8 ECHR (and domesticated into UK law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998) requires a balance between family life and the public interest in 
deportation as a means to prevent crime and disorder. The best interests of the child under 
Article 3 UNCRC (and domesticated into UK law by s55 BCIA) requires that the best interests 
of the child be a primary consideration; it must be considered separately and have no less 
inherent weight than other considerations. The best interests of the child may also not be 
balanced against considerations which are not grounded in the human rights of others. 
The “simple balancing approach” is unable to accommodate this plurality of decision-
making norms. Rather than treat the best interests of the child as a separate consideration, the 
best interests of the child is subsumed into the consideration of family life. Therefore, rather 
than being assessed separately as one thing – the best interests of the child – it is broken into 
those aspects which speak to the value of family life and the gravity of interference. Because 
it is subsumed in this way, it cannot have no less inherent weight than other considerations. 
Finally, the “simple balancing approach” has only two sides so that the best interests of the 
child must be balanced against non-rights-based considerations because non-rights-based 
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considerations are integral parts of the public interest in the Article 8 ECHR legitimate aim of 
preventing crime and disorder. 
The “simple balancing approach” reflects two of the themes of UK deportation law. 
The first is the dichotomous conflict between the desire to deport FNOs (notionally for the 
‘prevention of crime and disorder’) and the protection of the rights of individuals, particularly 
children who have a family life with the FNO. The “simple balancing approach” reflects this 
by having two sides to a metaphorical balancing scale and into which any relevant aspect of 
the case must be fit in order to be visible to the decision-maker. The second is that the best 
interests of the child are an ad hoc development to existing patterns of deportation decision-
making. The “simple balancing approach” was initially formulated without reference to the 
best interests of the child. Only in the 2006 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case of 
Üner799 was the best interests of the child first articulated as an aspect of the right to family life 
to be incorporated into the “simple balancing approach” of Article 8 ECHR. 
 
3. The Modified Balancing Approach 
The modification of the “simple balancing approach” – articulated by the Supreme Court in 
ZH (Tanzania)800 – was the second major development of UK deportation law examined by 
this thesis.801 This development seeks to give greater concentration to the best interests of the 
child through s55 BCIA by requiring some specific, child-centric principles must be given 
effect to alongside the right to family life; a “modified balancing approach”. These are that the 
best interests of the child be a primary consideration; it must be considered separately and have 
no less inherent weight than other considerations. The best interests of the child may also not 
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be balanced against considerations which are not grounded in the human rights of others, or in 
the preferred language of ZH (Tanzania), children should not be ‘blamed’ for the conduct of 
their parents.802 
 The articulation of these principles mean that the “modified balancing approach” is 
more polycentric because it requires decision-makers to take into account the best interests of 
the child as a consideration in and of itself, rather than one subsumed into consideration of 
family life (although it stops short of being fully polycentric because the best interests of the 
child do not obtain the status of a human right). However, the “modified balancing approach” 
presents a confused response to the plurality of decision-making norms by stating principles as 
to the best interests of the child but not explaining how they are to operate in practice. It does 
not define the relationship between family life and the newly separate consideration of the best 
interests of the child. How can the best interests be both separate to family life but at the same 
time ‘integral’ to it? The “modified balancing approach” includes the instruction that children 
should not be blamed for the conduct of their parents yet continues to allow that the vindication 
of their rights claim is contingent upon how severe the FNOs past offending was. How can a 
child be shielded from the blame for their parent’s deportation if their best interests are more 
likely to be impaired the more blameworthy the parent is considered to be? 
 Ultimately, the “modified balancing approach” remains committed to a vision of 
deportation which balances the FNOs family life against the impetus to deport as a consequence 
of offending. The “modified balancing approach” recognises that the best interests of the child 
may ‘sabotage’803 the Secretary of State’s intention to deportation but does not set out a 
coherent way in which it should do so. It develops statements of principle without developing 
a coherent structure in which those principles can be given effect to. 
                                                          
802 ZH (Tanzania) (n21) [33] 
 




4. The Exception Approach 
The development of a statutory “exception approach”804 to deportation cases may have been a 
response to the lack of consistent decision-making arising from the “modified balancing 
approach” with Theresa May as SSHD decrying the way in which the right to family life had 
been ‘perverted’.805 The Immigration Act 2014 dictates exceptions to the deportation of foreign 
national offenders when the effect of deportation on ‘qualifying children’ is ‘unduly harsh’ or 
exhibits ‘exceptional circumstances’.806 
 As an evaluative exercise concerned with whether the effect of deportation on the child 
amounts to ‘unduly harsh’ treatment or ‘exceptional circumstances’ appears, at first blush, a 
child-centred focus on the vulnerable child. However, although this may be the decision-
maker’s centre of attention it masks that it is the public imperative to deport that is reinforced 
by statute, not the protection of the child. The Immigration Act 2014 begins with the focus on 
the position of the FNO whose deportation is in the public interest. This acts as an underlying 
presumption which a qualifying child must overcome. Moreover, the child must demonstrate 
more than that their best interests are impaired by the deportation of the foreign national 
offender parent; the negative effects that they suffer must be greater than that so as to be 
‘unduly harsh’ or of ‘exceptional circumstances’. The child’s best interests are not the primary 
statutory consideration, rather it is the imperative to deport the FNO which is primary and that 
only reluctantly will the Immigration Act 2014 permit the interests of children to be an effective 
exception to deportation. 
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5. Why has UK law found it difficult to give effect to the best interests of the child in the 
decision to deport foreign national offenders? 
UK deportation law is the site of a tension between two different public policy impulses. The 
first is that FNOs are “bad” migrants, whose continued presence is the UK is considered to be 
manifestly not in the public interest. On the other hand, foreign national offenders may have 
children who are considered to be inherently vulnerable, innocent, and in need of the law’s 
protection. To deport an FNO may result in the vulnerable, innocent child having their best 
interests impaired for reasons beyond their control; after all it is not their fault that their FNO 
is an offender and they should not be blamed for what they are not responsible for. On the other 
hand, to protect the child means that the FNO escapes deportation. UK deportation law has 
found it difficult to give effect to the best interests of the child in deportation decisions precisely 
because to do so cuts against the imperative to deport the FNO. In claiming that their best 
interests should be given effect to, the child gets in the way of the state’s attempt to deport 
FNOs. 
 UK deportation law has sought to manage this public policy tension by conceptualising 
deportation decisions within the framework of a human rights balance. The family life of FNOs 
and their children are balanced against the public interest in deportation and this allowed 
decision-makers to make case specific proportionality decisions so that the public policy 
tension is resolved in individual cases. 
However, prevailing understandings of human rights has not stood still, and neither 
have the substantive human rights provisions relevant to deportation. The best interests of the 
child has impinged slowly on deportation decision-makers; first as an aspect of the right to 
family life,807 then as unincorporated treaty obligation,808 and finally as a statutory duty to take 
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into account the welfare of children.809 The courts have expanded the understandings of these 
obligations so that the s55 duty has been interpreted so as to include some of the important 
features of Article 3 UNCRC; that the best interests of the child ought to be a separate, primary 
consideration which is given no less inherent weight than other considerations, and which 
cannot be balanced against non-rights based considerations. This thesis has described the 
outlines of both jigsaw pieces (the best interests of the child and the right to family life) and 
explained why they do not appear to be able to fit together. Their not fitting together is because, 
I have argued, of the polycentricity of deportation decisions, and the plurality of decision-
making norms. Giving effect to either is possible, but this must come at the cost of the other; 
yet they are problems which must be resolved simultaneously because they arise 
simultaneously from the legal obligation to apply both the best interests of the child and the 
right to family life. 
The development of the obligation to the best interests of the child has been ad hoc, 
first within the “simple balancing approach” first devised with reference solely to determine 
the right to family life, second as a modification to that approach – a “modified balancing 
approach” – and lastly through a statutory intervention which created an “exception approach”. 
None of these approaches have been able to resolve the problem inherent to the legal obligation 
to give effect to the right to family life and the best interests of the child, as both have been 
come to be understood. This inherent problem is that the ad hoc development of the best 
interests of the child has resulted in the creation of two different parts of the law – the right to 
family life and the best interests of the child – which do not operate together seamlessly or 
effectively. They are like two jigsaw pieces which do not fit together but which the instruction 
is that they must be made to. The result is likely to be messy, incomprehensible, unusable, and 
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to require the exclusion of some of the aspects of the pieces; appropriate adjectives to apply to 
the “simple balancing approach”, “modified balancing approach”, and “exception approach”. 
In each approach, it is the best interests of the child which is the aspect frequently excluded (or 
at least side-lined). 
UK deportation law has therefore found it difficult to give effect to the best interests of 
the child in deportation decisions because it has remained committed to giving effect to the 
best interests of the child in a single deportation decision alongside the right to family life. 
However, because both require different things of the decision-maker, UK deportation law 
requires decision-makers to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
 
6. … And what to do about it 
In the final chapter, I argued for a change to s33 UK Borders Act 2007, which sets when and 
‘automatic’ deportation order may be revoked. This effect of this amendment would be to make 
the best interests of the child a freestanding, independent human right in deportation cases. 
Whereas the “simple balancing approach”, “modified balancing approach”, and “exception 
approach” all view the best interests of the child as an aspect of, or addition to, the UK’s 
domestic and/or international obligations under Article 8 ECHR, this final approach – which I 
have called the “human rights approach” – starts from the perspective that the best interests of 
the child is itself a human right which is directly engaged by the deportation of an FNO parent. 
 The rationale for its inclusion in this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it helps illustrate why 
UK law as found it difficult to take into account the best interests of the child in deportation 
decisions. The central argument has been that the ad hoc layering of legal obligations to the 
right to family life and the best interests of the child in deportation law has resulted in two 
theoretical problems; polycentricity and the plurality of decision-making norms. These arise 
because the content of these legal norms appear to require different, and irreconcilable, things 
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of deportation decision-makers when the right to family life and the best interests of the child 
are applied simultaneously. However, when the domestication of Article 3 UNCRC is 
separated from the domestication of Article 8 ECHR so as to recognise the best interests of the 
child as being a separate, independent human right, rather than as an aspect of the right to 
family life that must be subsumed within or bolted-onto it, the problems of polycentricity and 
the plurality of decision-making norms fall away. By demonstrating that it is possible to 
envisage a decision-making approach that does not have these contradictions at its heart, further 
supports the argument that it is because of the way in which Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 
UNCRC have been domesticated in the HRA and s55 BCIA that UK law has found it difficult 
to give effect to the best interests of the child in deportation law. 
 The second rationale for chapter 7 is to present a solution to the problem presented in 
this thesis. In chapter 5 I highlighted the choices that the UK Supreme Court had for the 
interpretation of s55 BCIA in the context of Article 3 UNCRC, and in chapter 7, the choices 
that Parliament made in creating an “exception approach” in the Immigration Act 2014. Each 
of these choices has resulted in an entrenchment of the problems of polycentricity and the 
plurality of decision-making norms by the ad hoc layering of developing legal obligations to 
the best interests of the child onto the right to family life in UK law. This provides a second 
answer to the thesis question; that UK law has found it difficult to give effect to the best 
interests of the child in deportation law, not because these are fundamentally irreconcilable 
legal obligations, because of the legislative choices made in UK deportation law. By making a 
different set of legislative choices, such as the one proposed here, UK law is capable of giving 







7. Implications for Future Research 
The “human rights approach” to deportation decision-making presented in chapter 7 has two 
clear implication for future research. Firstly, to what extent is it possible or desirable to modify 
the existing approaches to Article 8 ECHR (presented in this thesis as the “simple balancing 
approach” at chapter 4) so that the proposed “human rights approach” is given effect through 
interpretation of Article 8 ECHR, rather than through legislative change? Secondly, what are 
the implications of the “human rights approach” to the legal regulation of removal? 
 
7(a) Modifying Article 8 ECHR 
A central weakness of the proposed “human rights approach” to the best interests of the child 
in UK deportation law is that it requires the creation (or recognition) of a new, separate human 
rights obligation in UK law. In chapter 7 I suggested a wording as to how this might be achieved 
as an amendment to UK statute law. Article 8 ECHR, on the other hand, already has a concrete 
place in UK deportation law through the Human Rights Act 1998. UK authorities (including 
the Home Office, immigration tribunals and higher courts) must act in a manner which is 
compatible with Article 8 ECHR.810 Furthermore, a modification to the ECtHR’s conception 
of Article 8 ECHR would apply more broadly to affect the deportation practices of other states. 
There is clearly a practical advantage to working within an existing legal framework in order 
to create positive, child-centred law reform. Considering how this might be achieved would be 
potentially fruitful area for future research. 
                                                          




 Furthermore, the existing framework of Article 8 ECHR appears – on its face – to 
accommodate the best interests of the child. Both UK case law811 and ECtHR jurisprudence812 
have recognised the best interests of the child as being an integral element to what private and 
family life mean in the context of the Article 8 ECHR right. To what extent is the critique of 
the “simple balancing approach” in chapter 4 based on failings in the practical use of Article 8 
ECHR, rather than on specific doctrinal barriers? Can the same results as the “human rights 
approach” be obtained by using Article 8 ECHR? Future research would consider these 
questions. Below I sketch a departure point for this research, by highlighting differences 
between the “human rights approach” to the best interests of the child and Article 8 ECHR. 
These would have to be surmounted to achieve a doctrinally coherent and/or politically 
desirable modification of Article 8 ECHR. 
 Article 8 ECHR protects the right to family life and private life. Family relationships 
are core to what in chapter 2 were identified as aspects of the best interests of the child in the 
law and literature; relationships of mutual affection with parents or care-givers; supportive, 
flexible parenting structure; to have an example (behavioural, cultural etc) set by the child’s 
parent(s); interest in the child shown by parent(s); continuity in upbringing and care; capability 
of the child’s parent(s) to meet the child’s needs. 
 Private life under Article 8 ECHR is an expanding concept, including, for instance; the 
right to choose one’s name;813 the right to private sexual expression;814 the right to information 
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about toxic fumes;815 freedom from compulsory medical intervention;816 freedom from sexual 
assault;817 and, freedom from having a photograph of oneself being taken and disseminated.818 
The private life aspect of Article 8 ECHR may therefore reasonably include aspects of the best 
interests of the child such as the child’s identity, their health and physical wellbeing, and a 
social network with friends and peers, again, all aspects of the best interests of the child 
identified in chapter 2. 
However, there are also aspects of the best interests of the child which do not fit neatly 
within conceptions of family life, private life, or other ECHR rights. The wishes, feelings, or 
views of children, consideration of individual characteristics, and safe physical environment, 
sit uncomfortably within (although not entirely outside the possible ambit) the central 
proposition of the Article 8 EHCR right to private life ‘to ensure the development, without 
outside interference, of the personality of each individual with other human beings’.819  
This limitation of the ECHR protections of human rights in the context of children has 
been noted, not least by Kilkelly: 
 
the European Convention does not reiterate its standards of social and economic 
rights. Thus the Convention does not recognize the right to social security, the right 
to an adequate standard of living, or cultural rights of any kind. Specific reference 
to the important needs of childhood is absent too.820 
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 More problematic for the prospect of protecting all of what is implied by the best 
interests of the child under the umbrella of Article 8 ECHR are those aspects of the child’s best 
interests which are protected by other human rights, such as the right to education (Article 2 of 
Protocol 1). Could the right to privacy be stretched to include rights protected by other 
substantive Articles? The case law of the ECtHR suggests not. The exclusion of immigration 
removal and deportation from the protections of Article 6 ECHR were in part justified by the 
ECtHR on the basis that:  
 
by adopting Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 containing guarantees specifically 
concerning proceedings for the expulsion of aliens the States clearly intimated their 
intention not to include such proceedings within the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention.821 
  
 Protecting the child’s best interests in education through Article 8 ECHR rather than 
separately through Article 2 of Protocol 1 would be doctrinally impermissible for the same 
reasons. Notwithstanding this, in chapter 4 I gave as example the case of Keles in which the 
ECtHR successfully included the education opportunities of the children of foreign national 
offenders within the context of Article 8 ECHR in a deportation case. Clearly the doctrinal 
evidence here as to the ECtHR’s practice is mixed and future research would have to grapple 
with the doctrinal coherency of an approach which seeks to protect some rights through the 
application of another right. 
                                                          




 A second consideration for future research is that the best interests of the child does not 
directly correspond to the right to family life or the right to private life under Article 8 ECHR. 
Setting aside the separate problem of issues to do with the right to education, to effectively 
achieve an outcome similar to the “human rights approach” solely through Article 8 ECHR its 
interpretation must be developed to undo the conceptual separation of private and family life 
which I described in chapter 4 as occurring in the ECtHR case law. The ECtHR currently 
chooses to focus its analysis of protection exclusively on either the family or private life of the 
applicants822 and restricts: 
 
its formerly wide understanding [of family life] with a new focus on the ‘nuclear 
family’ of spouses and minor children, while at the same time broadening the 
protective reach of Article 8 ECHR to the network of personal, social and economic 
relations that make up the private life of every human being823 
 
 However, this does not point to Article 8 EHCR being doctrinally unsuitable for use so 
as to achieve the same result as the “human rights approach” to the best interests of the child, 
only that current trends in the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 8 ECHR preclude it. 
 Further research would have to consider that, even if it is possible to modify the 
definition of Article 8 ECHR family and private life so as to capture the individual components 
of the best interests of the child, whether this would be desirable. Would it adequately reflect 
what the best interests of the child is? “More than the sum of its parts” is cliché, but apt. 
Restricting consideration to private and family life reduces the scope of enquiry about the child, 
when the aim of a specific human right to the best interests of the child in the UNCRC is 
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designed to increase the range of the enquiry. For the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
‘In giving full effect to the child’s best interests, the following … should be borne in mind: … 
The universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated nature of children’s rights’.824 For 
McGoldrick, commenting on the UNCRC, it is a ‘range of personal, social, economic and other 
factors that determine the perception of what is in the 'best interests' of the child.’825 Restricting 
consideration of the child’s best interests to their family and private life (as centrally important 
to the lives of children as these might be) appears undesirable if it is incapable of fully 
expressing what the best interests of the child means.  
  
7(b) Removal 
This thesis has consciously limited its analysis to the subject of deportation and has drawn a 
hard distinction between deportation on the one hand and removal on the other. A deportation 
order is attached to those whose presence in the UK is ‘not conducive to the public good’826 
and removal applies to those in the UK who require leave to remain or enter and do not have 
it.827 However, this distinction obscures overlap between the two legal categories.  
Deportation is legally and morally distinct from removal because only deportation, 
deception, and the loss of refugee status through the actions of the individual refugee, may 
result in extant indefinite leave to remain (ILR) being curtailed.828 However, not all foreign 
national offenders are in the morally significant position of having ILR and many will also be 
removable because they require leave to enter or remain and do not have it. Furthermore, illegal 
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entry or visa overstaying (i.e. not possessing leave to enter or remain when one requires it) are 
in fact themselves criminal offences;829 albeit ones where the maximum sentence falls short of 
the automatic deportation threshold of 12-months imprisonment.830 Finally, the distinction 
drawn in this thesis obscures the fact that much of the case law relevant to removal also applies 
to deportation cases, and indeed this thesis makes much use of these cases to establish the law 
as applied to deportation. This shared case law includes the seminal cases of ZH (Tanzania), 
Zoumbas, Beoku-Betts, and Huang, all referred to in depth in this thesis. 
 The “human rights approach” clearly has implications for removal decisions. If, as I 
assert, the human right encapsulated by the best interests of the child must be treated as a 
separate, primary consideration and that only rights-based considerations may outweigh the 
best interests of the child, then this human right must apply equally to removal. The right to 
the best interests of the child cannot logically apply exclusively to deportation. This presents a 
significant challenge to the concept of immigration removal which warrants further research. 
 This challenge arises because, on its face, the “human rights approach” could prohibit 
immigration removals entirely where children are involved. This is because the reasons for 
removal are said to be because an individual does not possess leave to enter or remain, and so 
removal pursues the legitimate aim of controlling immigration.831 These do not appear to be 
human rights-based considerations as I have drawn them in this thesis because a failure to have 
an administrative immigration status does not obviously interfere with a human right possessed 
by an individual or group. Immigration control appears to affect only a general public 
                                                          
829 Immigration Act 1971, s24(1)(a)-(b) 
 
830 Entering the UK without leave, remaining beyond the time limited by the leave, or failing to observe a 
condition of the leave are punishable by imprisonment for up to six months, or a fine, or both (Immigration Act 
1971, s24(1)) 
 




interest,832 rather than the rights and freedoms of other individuals. If so, then removal as a 
function of immigration control alone cannot outweigh the best interests of the child. If 
immigration removal does not provide a legitimate aim for the state’s interference with the best 
interests of the child, then the removal of a foreign national with a child will rarely be permitted. 
Further research into the application of the Immigration Act 2014 ‘exceptions’833 regime to 
removal cases involving children, and how the “human rights approach” differs from the 
current legal regime, is clearly required.  
A departure point for this research would be to note that Home Office guidance on 
removal states that ‘The starting point is that we would not normally expect a qualifying child 
to leave the UK.’834 To what extent would the “human rights approach” be different from the 
above guidance, taken at face value?  
 Firstly, the “human rights approach” clearly extends to apply beyond the rigidity of the 
Immigration Act 2014’s ‘qualifying child’; British citizen children or children resident in the 
UK for more than seven years. But application of the “human rights approach” beyond 
‘qualifying children’ does not mean that the removal of all parents of children would 
automatically be prohibited.  
Many removals occur in the context where a non-British child had leave to enter and/or 
remain as a dependent of their parent, and so both parent and child are removable 
simultaneously. In such cases, the best interests of the child may not be interfered with at all 
because the child’s interests are as adequately met in their country of nationality as they are in 
the UK. This would most obviously (but by no means exclusively) be the case in of a child 
                                                          
832 Such as the ‘maintenance of effective immigration control’ or ‘the interests of the economic well-being of the 
United Kingdom’; Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s117B(1)&(2) 
 
833 Chapter 6 of this thesis. See also, Collinson (2017) (n106) 251; Collinson (2019) (n772) 14 
 
834 Home Office ‘Family Migration: Appendix FM Section 1.0bFamily Life (as a Partner or Parent) and Private 
Life: 10-Year Routes’ (11 April 2019, Version 4.0) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/795223/10-
year-routes-guidance-v4.0ext.pdf> accessed 8 May 2019, 68 
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removed as part of a family unit, after a period of temporary migration, to an economically 
developed, English speaking country such as Canada, the US, New Zealand, or Australia. The 
primary difference in the “human rights approach” is that the assessment must be of the child’s 
best interests, rather than of an arbitrary period of residence for the purpose of qualification 
and a consideration of the ‘reasonableness’835 of removal.  
As suggested previously,836 the period of seven years residence arose as a rule-of-thumb 
adopted by UK courts to help determine when the best interests of a child remaining in the UK 
begin to outweigh the public interest in removal.837 The removal provisions of the Immigration 
Act 2014 raise seven years residence to the status of inviolable rule. There are strong arguments 
that the ‘qualifying child’ provisions are therefore a breach of s55 BCIA, Article 3 UNCRC, 
and Article 8 ECHR because they do not take into account the best interests or family life rights 
of children who have been resident for less than seven years. The “human rights approach” 
would require the seven year period of residence to be guidance, rather than a qualifying rule. 
  Furthermore, the “human rights approach” would not automatically prohibit all 
removals of parents of children where the best interests of the child are engaged by the removal 
of a parent. Some of the grounds of refusal of leave to remain (and would thus make that person 
removable for lack of immigration leave) clearly have the potential to engage human rights-
based considerations in the way that the “human rights approach” envisages. Paragraph 322(5) 
of the Immigration Rules (contained within the general grounds for refusal of immigration 
leave) permit the refusal of immigration leave on the basis of:  
 
                                                          
 
835 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s117B(6). For a discussion on the difference between 
‘reasonableness’ and the best interests of the child, see Collinson (2019) (n772) 25 
 
836 Chapter 6, part 4(a) 
 




the undesirability of permitting the person concerned to remain in the United 
Kingdom in the light of his conduct […], character or associations or the fact that 
he represents a threat to national security 
 
 The improper use of this provision by the Home Office aside,838 refusals of further leave 
under this provision include circumstances which may engage human rights considerations 
which may legitimately be balanced against the best interests of the child under the “human 
rights approach”. These include criminal offending or conduct (including terrorism related 
behaviours) which has not been prosecuted.839  
The expectation that the SSHD would ‘not normally expect a qualifying child to leave 
the UK’ would not necessarily be upset by the “human rights approach” to the best interests of 
the child. Instead, the circumstances which sit outside the expectation that removal of a 
qualifying child is not reasonable would be given more certain legal content; firstly, where the 
best interests of the child are not interfered with by their removal or the removal of a parent; 
and, secondly where the reason for removal engages criminality, terrorism, or other activities 
which impact on the human rights of others. The “human rights approach” would also require 
the seven year period of residence for children to be ‘qualifying’ to be a rule of thumb rather 
than a hard and fast statutory rule. However, the practical effects of the “human rights 
approach” on the scope of removal decisions should not be underestimated depending on how 
the Home Office applies its policies in practice. Further research into the doctrinal and 
numerical impacts on removal of the “human rights approach” should be investigated further 
                                                          
838 The rule had been applied in a blanket manner to individuals who had to make post-hoc alterations to their 
self-assessment tax returns but who had made genuine errors (or others had made the errors on their behalf) rather 
than have been engaged in dishonesty. See, Balajigari and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2019] EWCA Civ 673 
 
839 For a clear example of this see the removal case of, Farquharson (removal – proof of conduct) [2013] UKUT 
00146 (IAC), [21] where the desirability of removal was premised on the basis that ‘the appellant represents a 
source of future danger to vulnerable women.’ The removal of Farquharson was clearly for reasons of protecting 
the human rights of others. 
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